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COURT PROCEDURE-EvIDENCE OF HYPOTHETICAL
TAX LIABILITY & CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION ON
NON-TAXABILITY OF AWARD PERMISSIBLE-Evidence of De-
cedent's Hypothetical Federal Tax Liability Is Admissible To
Aid Computation of the Survivor's Pecuniary Loss and a
Jury Instruction that the Award Is Non-Taxable Is Permissi-
ble in a Wrongful Death Action Tried under Illinois Law by
a Federal Court Sitting in Diversity. In re Air Crash DisasterNear Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 204 (1983).
On May 25, 1979, American Airlines Flight 191 lost an en-
gine and crashed shortly after takeoff from Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport, killing all two hundred seventy-one
passengers.1 Among those killed was Victoria Chen Haider, a
resident of Illinois.2 A wrongful death action brought by her
husband 3 against American Airlines and McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC) was consolidated in federal district court
for pretrial purposes with over one hundred other pending
actions4 by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation. 5 The DC-10 jet involved in the crash was designed
and built by MDC, and American Airlines was the owner of
the jet.6 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citi-
I In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 604 (7th
Cir. 1981).




In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445
(J.P.M.D.L. 1979). When several civil actions are pending in different districts involv-
ing common questions of fact, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation may trans-
fer the pending actions to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings upon the panel's determination that such a transfer would further ends of
convenience of witnesses and parties and would promote justice and efficiency. 7
WEST's FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL. § 8616 (M. Volz 2d ed. 1970) Such transfers are
often made in the case of air disasters.
r 644 F.2d at 604. MDC is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of busi-
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zenship.7 The Illinois wrongful death statute was found
applicable.8
Plaintiff Haider sought to block MDC and American Air-
lines from submitting evidence regarding decedent's hypo-
thetical federal tax liability and to preclude a cautionary jury
instruction on the non-taxability of the award. 9 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
it was bound to apply Illinois law' ° under the principles of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." The district court determined that
Illinois law would bar both the evidence and the jury instruc-
tion. 2 The district court, however, confessed its own uncer-
tainty in its characterization of both the evidence and
ness in Missouri. Id. American Airlines is a Delaware corporation with New York as its
principal place of business at the time of the crash. Id.
526 F. Supp. at 227; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
526 F. Supp. at 228. The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 2
(Smith-Hurd 1982), provides in part:
Every action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal repre-
sentative of such deceased person, and except as otherwise hereinafter
provided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased
person and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they
shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary
injures resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin
of such deceased person.
Id
526 F. Supp. at 226-28. Both plaintiff Haider and defendant MDC filed motions zn
h'mne seeking pre-trial determinations of both issues. Id
A motion in limine is usually made before or shortly after the beginning of a jury trial
for a protective order against the introduction of questions and statements which are
irrelevant or prejudicial. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 914 (5th ed. 1979). Defendants
MDC and American Airlines sought to have the following instructions given:
If you decide to award any damages to the plaintiff, your award will be
exempt from any income taxes; therefore, in fixing the amount of your
award, you should not be concerned about or consider the effect of taxes
on the award.
526 F. Supp. at 227.
526 F. Supp. at 232.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court in Erie held that federal
courts in diversity cases must apply state substantive law (whether statutory or com-
mon) to issues not governed by federal law. Id at 78. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which held that in matters of general jurisprudence federal
courts were not bound by state common law as declared by its highest courts. 304 U.S.
at 79. The twin aims of Erie, as enunciated in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
were the "discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administra-
tion of the laws [as between citizens and non-citizens]." Id
'2 526 F. Supp. at 231.
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instruction issues as substantive rather than procedural. 13
The characterization of the two issues as substantive would
mean that Illinois law would control instead of the law of the
federal forum.14 Because of its uncertainty in the correctness
of its characterization, the district court granted both plain-
tiff's and defendent's motions for certification of the question
to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for
resolution. 15
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with two
issues.16 First, whether, in a diversity action applying the Illi-
nois wrongful death statute, 7 evidence could be introduced
regarding decedent's hypothetical tax liability on projected
earnings.'" Second, whether a proposed cautionary jury in-
struction that any award would be non-taxable to the recipi-
ent was properly excluded.' 9 Held, reversed. Evidence of
decedent's hypothetical federal tax liability is admissible to
aid computation of the survivor's pecuniary loss and a cau-
tionary jury instruction that the award is non-taxable is per-
missible in a wrongful death action tried under Illinois law by
a federal court sitting in diversity. In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, llinois on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.),cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 204 (1983).
I. THE INCOME TAX PROBLEM-STOKES To LIEPELT
One of the recognized elements of recovery in both per-
sonal injury 20 and wrongful death actions is compensation for
loss of future earnings.2' In the case of airline disasters, there
are typically citizens of many states and countries involved.22
,2 Id. at 233-34.
' See supra note 11.
1 , 526 F. Supp. at 233-34. The district court certified the questions to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 526 F. Supp. at
234.
11 See in/ra notes 194-196.
17 See supra note 8.
' See thf/a note 195.
'9 See infra note 196.
- J. STEIN & R. CHASE, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY §§ 58, 59 (Supp. 1982).
21 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971).
22 E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Il. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594
1984]
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Because Congress has declined to enact a "federal aviation
disaster law" which would provide for uniformity of liability
and damages,23 the measure of damages in the case of each
plaintiff is determined by the wording of the applicable state
statute creating the right of action and its case law interpreta-
tion.24 Thus, there is often great disparity between awards. 5
In most states, the measure of damages in wrongful death
actions is based upon the pecuniary losses26 to the survivor
(7th Cir. 1981). Victims were residents often of the United States, Puerto Rico, Japan,
the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia. Id at 604.
2, H.R. 10917, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 CONG. REC. 3382 (1978) (bill died in com-
mittee).
In a connected case dealing with the issue of punitive damages, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit stated:
In conclusion, we agree with the district court's comments on the
problems involved in determining choice-of-law issues in airplane crash
cases. Airline corporations and airplane manufacturers are subject to
uniform federal regulation in almost every aspect of their operations,
except their liability in tort. As recently as 1978, a bill was introduced in
Congress to establish a federal cause of action for injuries suffered
through aviation activity. See H.R. 10917, 124 Cong. Rec. No. 17 (Feb-
ruary 14, 1978). If this bill, or any of its predecessors, had passed, those
actions would all be governed by federal law, uniform as to liability and
damages, rather than by the varying laws of a number of states. See
Note, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 621, 625 (1975). Along with the district court,
we conclude that it is clearly in the interests of passengers, airline corpo-
rations, airplane manufacturers, and state and federal governments, that
airline tort liability be regulated by federal law. Of course, we are well
aware of the fact that it is up to Congress, and not the courts, to create
the needed uniform law.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d at 632-33, quoted
in Brief for Appellee at 7, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979,
526 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. II1. 1981).
2, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 (1977). Comment, Income Taxes and the
Computation of Lost Future Earnings In Wrongful Death and Personal Inju Cases, 29 MD. L.
REV. 177 (1969).
25 See supra note 23
2 "Pecuniary Loss" is defined as
Loss of money or something by which money or something of money
value may be acquired. As applied to a dependent's loss from death
pecuniary loss means the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit
from the continued life of the deceased; such includes loss of services,
training, future education, guidance, and society.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (5th ed. 1979).
"Pecuniary damages" are those which "can be estimated in and compensated by
money." Id. at 353. "Compensatory damages" are "those that will compensate the
injured party for the injury sustained. . . such as will make good or replace the loss
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due to the premature death of his decedent.2 7 Historically,
the rule has been that the measure of damages is in terms of
projected gross earnings, minus the amount decedent would
have spent on himself, discounted to present value 28 with no
consideration of tax liability nor jury instruction to that ef-
fect. 29 This rule has been particularly appealing in the per-
sonal injury context where, unlike in the wrongful death
action, the injured person himself is the recipient of the
award 30 and personal expenses are not netted out.3 ' In a
wrongful death action, however, decedent's personal ex-
penses, such as food and shelter, are deducted in arriving at
the award. 2 Controversy has arisen because, to the extent
caused by the wrong or injury." Id at 352. The term "pecuniary"is often used inter-
changeably with the term "compensatory".
27 Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injuy or Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt.
Should We tell theujwy?, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 320, 320-21 (1965).
28 Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages - Fair Compensationfor Fu-
ture Pecunia Loss Requires Consideration ofEconomic Trends and Income Tax Consequences, 47
Miss. L.J. 173, 174-75 (1976).
See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1394 (1959) & A.L.R.2d Later Case Series.
Damages in personal injury cases could be considered as compensation for a loss
of capital when they "make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal
rights," Comment, supra note 24 at 178 (quoting Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d
574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)). See also Erickson v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.
1980) (tax evidence admissible in wrongful death case to compute loss of support suf-
fered by wage earner's dependents is not necessarily admissible in personal injury ac-
tion seeking recovery for loss of wages suffered by wage earner himself; Louissaint v.
Hudson Waterways Corp., 11I Misc. 2d 122, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1981) (while recovery
for wrongful death action might logically be limited to net after taxes, personal injury
recovery should be based upon gross income); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1394 (1959) &
A.L.R.2d Later Case Series.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1977). In a personal injury action, the
injured plantiff is the recipient of the award. Personal expenses, like food and clothing,
are not deducted in arriving at an award for a personal injury action because the
injured plaintiff is still alive to consume those items. If personal expenses were de-
ducted, the award would not compensate the plaintiff for what was taken away from
him by the tortfeasor. See generally 3 L. FRUMER, R. BENOIT & M. FRIEDMAN, PER-
SONAL INJURY § 3.05 (1965).
In the case of a wrongful death action, however, the recipient of the award is the
decedent's survivor who would not have had use of the amount decedent spent on food
and clothing had decedent continued living. Therefore, decedent's personal expenses
are deducted in arriving at an award in a wrongful death action. See generally 3 M.
MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 22.11. But see 22 Am. Jur. 2d Death § 153 (1965) (in some jurisdictions
there is no requirement that personal expenses be deducted in arriving at an award in
a wrongful death action).
.2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 (1977).
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that the survivor is awarded an amount based upon dece-
dent's gross income instead of net after taxes,33 the survivor
receives a windfall.3 ' The windfall consists of the amount of
federal income tax the decedent would have paid had he
lived. 5 In a purely monetary sense, as one commentary has
noted,36 the decedent is worth more dead than alive.3 ' This
anomaly exists because the survivor would never have had
the benefit of the amount of federal tax liability had the
wrongful death not occurred; 38 the decedent, had he lived,
would have continued to pay federal income tax.3 9 Conse-
quently, the federal tax paid would not have been available
to the survivor as an element of the decedent's pecuniary con-
tributions to him.4 °
Because compensation is the basic theory of tort dam-
ages, 41 defendants have sought to introduce evidence of dece-
dent's hypothetical tax liability and/or to have the jury
instructed that any award will not be taxable to the recipi-
ent.42 Such awards are non-taxable because of section 104 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, [I.R.C.] which states:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in ex-
cess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to
medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross in-
come does not include-...
13 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). For a discussion of Liepelt,
see infra notes 112-143 and accompanying text.
.1 444 U.S. at 497-98.
3r, Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injuqy Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 219
(1958).
.6 Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, supra note 28, at 197.
37 Id See infra note 39.
" Nordstrom, supra note 35, at 219.
39 Take, for example, the case of a decedent who is in the 50% tax bracket. If an
award is based upon gross earnings, instead of net, the windfall to the survivor is par-
ticularly obvious. Eg., Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957) (tax
evidence held admissible where decedent averaged gross income above $50,000 per
year and paid in excess of $38,000 in state and federal income tax).
" Id
4, W. PROSSER, TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971). The theory of compensation seeks to
return to the injured party, in the form of dollars, that which was taken away from him
by the tortfeasor. It is often spoken of as making the injured party "whole again." Id
42 Nordstrom, supra note 35, at 212-13. When defendants seek to introduce tax evi-
dence, the purpose is to reduce the amount of damages the defendant will have to pay
by the amount of tax decedent would have paid had he lived. Id
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(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
43
agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness ....
This section is held to apply to damages received in wrongful
death actions as well."
Section 104 of the I.R.C. has sometimes been interpreted as
expressing Congress' intent to confer a positive benefit upon
the plaintiff.45 In basing awards on a decedent's gross earn-
ings, courts have reasoned that plaintiffs were entitled to the
excess over net earnings as a sort of "bonus ' 46 although Con-
gress has never articulated such an intent.47 It has also be ar-
gued that Congress itself considered the issue too
speculative48 and that it was "simply not worthwhile to enact
- 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1980). Many states have the same sort of exclusionary tax
law regarding personal injury and wrongful death awards. See e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 84-2008(2)(g) (1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280(a) (1980)); N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 359(2)(e) (McKinney 1975).
See Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,
492, 496 n. 12 (1980).
45 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. V. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (wrongful death action under FELA); Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S.
81, 84-85 n.3 (1957) (disability payments under employee disability plan); Epmeier v.
United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952) (sickness benefits paid by employer);
Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d 726
(3d Cir. 1976); Raines v. N.Y.C. R.R., 51 111. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230 (personal injury
action under FELA), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); Christou v. Arlington Park-
Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920 (1982)
(personal injury action under state law); Newlin v. Foresman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1038,
432 N.E.2d 319 (1982) (personal injury action under state law); Louissaint v. Hudson
Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (limits
Hall to personal injury actions arising under state law); South v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980) (personal injury action under state law); Bar-
nette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981) (personal injury action under state law).
SE.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry, 125 N.E. 2d at 86 (personal injury action under
FELA); South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827 (N.D. 1980)
(personal injury action under state law).
17 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. Bar-
nette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981) (if juries are not to be instructed about
insurance or that plaintiff must bear his own attorneys fees, there is no reason to in-
struct regarding non-taxability of award); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960) (survivor in wrongful death action under FELA is not
overcompensated when award is based upon gross income because of offsetting factors
of attorneys' fees, inflation). But see Burlington N. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th
Cir. 1975) (attorneys' fees, unlike inflation and taxation, are not relevant to calculation
of decedent's pecuniary contributions to survivor).
* Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); See also
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d at 36 (where injured bachelor's
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a complex and administratively burdensome system in order
to approximate the tax treatment of the income if, in fact, it
had been earned over a period of time by the decedent."49
Upon initial examination the tax evidence issue and the
cautionary instruction issue seem to be one and the same.5 °
Professor Nordstrom, however, points out that the eviden-
tiary issue seeks to decrease the amount of the verdict by the
amount of taxes saved due to the wrongful death,5' whereas
the cautionary instruction seeks to prevent a jury from im-
properly inflating a verdict by the amount a jury might mis-
takenly believe the recipient would have to pay in taxes to
the federal government. 2 Therefore, the evidentiary issue
deals with the mitigation of damages, 53 and the instruction-
ary issue deals with cautioning the jury against overcompen-
sating the plaintiff.54
As jury verdicts increased and tax rates climbed, 55 courts
began to address these two issues. One of the earliest cases to
address the evidentiary issue was Stokes v. Un'ted States ,56 a
projected tax liability could fluctuate with advent of marriage, children and other ex-
emptions allowable under tax code, tax evidence was too complex for jury to consider);
c.f Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing with approval
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.; where projected tax liability is de minimis,
failure to admit evidence is not error in wrongful death actions under Federal Tort
Claims Act).
41 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 501.
Nordstrom, supra note 35, at 219-21.
Id at 212-13, 219. For example, if tax evidence were not admissible a jury would
base its award upon evidence of the decedent's gross earnings. If the decedent were in
the 50% tax bracket it is evident that a defendant would endeavor to admit tax evi-
dence to reduce the amount of damages he would have to pay should the plaintiff win
the suit.
2 Id at 234. Take, for example, the case of a jury which believes that based upon
the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to an award of $100,000. If the jury were not
instructed regarding the non-taxability of the $100,000 in the hands of the plaintiff, it
might mistakenly believe that taxes would take half of the award, leaving the plaintiff
with only $50,000. Consequently, in order to fully compensate the plaintiff, the jury
might add on the amount it mistakenly believes would be taken in taxes so that the
plaintifff would receive the full $100,000 in the end. Thus, in order to make sure the
plaintiff receives his full $100,000, the jury might double the amount to $200,000.
Id at 231.
'Id
Id at 212; Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1363 (1959).
144 F.2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1944).
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personal injury action brought under federal law57 which was
decided in 1944.58 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
simply and without explanation that evidence of the dece-
dent's potential tax liability was too conjectural for the jury's
consideration. 9
Ten years after Stokes the Supreme Court of Illinois de-
cided Hall v. Chicago & N W. Rj. ,60 a personal injury action
arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).6 t
Hall was a railroad switchman who was injured when he was
pressed between a freight platform and a moving freight
car.62 The court held that the defendant's closing argument
to the jury that any award would not be subject to federal
income taxes was improper, 63 and a new trial was granted for
fear that the jury's award had been tainted by the remark.64
Noting that the case was one of first impression in Illinois,6"
the court held that consideration of federal tax liability was
not proper either in oral argument or in a written instruction
to the jury.66
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois rea-
soned that: 1) this type of evidence was too conjectural; 67 2)
the status of the parties to a lawsuit was of no concern to the
court or j ury'-thus whether defendant was insured or what
,,7 Id.
rA Id
, Id at 87.
5 I1. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
a' 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. FELA, when applicable, is the exclusive remedy against a
railroad for injuries to its employees caused by negligence on the part of the employer
railroad when both are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Metropolitan Coal
Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1959), cited in 1 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
MANUAL § 1401 (M. Volz 2d ed. 1970).
62 125 N.E.2d at 78-79.




"'Id at 85-86 In citing Stokes, the court did not explain why it though tax evidence
was too conjectural, but only stated that "We are of the opinion that incidence of
taxation is not a proper factor for a jury's consideration, imparted either by oral argu-
ment or written instruction. It introduces an extraneous subject, giving rise to conjec-
ture and speculation." Id. at 86.
6 Id
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plaintiff did with his award (including whether or not he
paid taxes on it) was immaterial to the computation of dam-
ages;69 3) Congress intended a benefit to accrue to the injured
party which would be reaped instead by a tortfeasor if con-
sideration of income taxes were injected into the trial; 70 4) the
integrity of the jury's decision-making process must be pre-
sumed when it is properly instructed on the measure of dam-
ages-thus there could be no purpose served in mentioning
the non-taxability of the award. 71 Finally, the court reasoned
that even though it is a correct statement of the law that any
award would not be taxed, such a determination does not au-
tomatically make it a proper subject for a closing argument.72
In Hall, the Illinois court seemed to have adopted the ma-
jority rule, since at the time Hall was decided the vast major-
ity of American courts denied the admissibility of evidence of
a decedent's hypothetical potential tax liability and refused a
jury instruction regarding the non-taxability of any award.73
This was dictum, 74 however, as the only issue before the court
69 Id.
70 Id
7, The Illinois Supreme Court quoted with approval Mr. Justice Holmes who stated,
"But it must be assumed that the constitutional tribunal does its duty and finds facts
only because they are proved." 125 N.E.2d at 85 (quoting Aikens v. State of Wiscon-
sin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904)).
72 125 N.E.2d at 86. The court stated:
It does not necessarily follow that the argument is proper because it cor-
rectly states the law. For if the defendant's argument is proper on the
basis that it tells the jury what the law is then what objection can there
be for plaintiff's counsel to state that the expense of trial is not provided
for in the instruction concerning damages, that the cost of medical wit-
nesses is not paid by the defendant, that the expense of taking deposi-
tions, as well as court reporting at the trial, must be borne by the
individual litigants, that the fees of plaintiff's attorney are not recog-
nized as an element, that the defendant can deduct any award it pays
from its income and excess profits tax return and that the amounts of
awards are allowed as expenses in providing for increasing railroad
fares? This could be developed ad itfmitum, and all this is the law.
Id
73 Id at 85. See also Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1393 (1959).
11 "Dictum" is an abbreviated form of the latin word "obiter dictum." It means:
[A]n observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion
upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or
the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessar-
ily involved in the case or essential to its determination; any statement of
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was the propriety of an oral argument on the non-taxability
of the award.75 The Illinois Supreme Court thus interpreted
section 104 of the I.R.C.7 6 to authorize a plaintiff's entitle-
ment to some sort of windfall in excess of compensation. 7
Two years after Hall, the Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut 78 decided Floyd v. Fruit Industries,"' a wrongful death
action brought under Connecticut law.8 ° Plaintiffs decedent
was a passenger in the defendant's automobile which collided
with a truck.8 The court in Floyd held that because of the
compensatory nature of Connecticut's wrongful death stat-
ute,82 evidence of taxes "are an important factor which must
be offset against probable .. .earnings. '83 The court ex-
pressly declined to follow the Stokes reasoning8 4 stating that
juries are forced to decide many other matters no less specula-
tive than the approximation of tax liability such as the dece-
dent's probable future earnings and his probable future
personal living expenses.85 Instead of following Stokes, the
court focused on the fact that had the decedent lived, the sur-
vivor would not have had the use of the amount decedent
would have paid to the federal government in taxes.86 Thus,
the court found the tax evidence admissible.8 7
the law enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument,
analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion con-
cerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor
essential to determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the
force of any adjudication ....
BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 409 (5th ed. 1979).
7 5 125 N.E.2d at 84;In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, I11. on May 25, 1979, 701
F.2d at 1196.
76 See supra text accompanying note 43 for relevant portion of section 104.
77 125 N.E.2d at 86.
7R The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors is now the Connecticut Supreme
Court.
19 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
- 136 A.2d at 921.
a, Id.
62 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3230d (Supp. 1955) (current version at CONN. GEN STAT.
§ 52-555 (1983)).
136 A.2d at 925.
'Id.
'" Id See also supra note 31.
R' 136 A.2d at 925.
87 Id.
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In 1960, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the circuit
which decided Stokes, again addressed the evidentiary issue in
Mc Weeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,88 a per-
sonal injury action arising under FELA.8" McWeeney, a rail-
road employee, was injured when he was struck by a freight
car while he was standing on the side ladder of another
freight car.' Despite the compensatory measure of damages
defined in cases arising under FELA,9 ' the court applied the
rule in Stokes, holding that the tax evidence was too specula-
tive for the jury to consider.9 2 The court qualified its holding
by noting that when earnings are beyond the "middle reach
of the income scale," consideration of projected tax liability
may be necessary to avoid an "improper result." 93 Thus, the
flexible McWeeney rule was created.94 Some courts have ap-
plied MWeeney to bar tax evidence,95 while others have ap-
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S 870 (1960).
- 282 F.2d at 35.
9 Id
91 FELA itself does not state the measure of damages. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. See also
Michigan Central R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913).
92 282 F.2d at 37-39. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Stokes did
not explain why it found the tax evidence to be conjectural, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in McWeeney gave its own explanation. The MWeenev court stated that
because the plaintiff was a bachelor, there was no way to predict whether he would
marry or have children. Id. at 36. The decision to marry or procreate, said the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, would greatly affect the plaintiff's tax burden by increasing
the number of exemptions he could take, thus lowering his tax liability. Id. Therefore,
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court which had refused to allow the jury to
consider only the plaintiff's net income in reaching its verdict. Id. at 35.
91 Id at 38-39. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
For example, if a plaintiff or a plaintiff's decedent, had potential earn-
ings of $100,000 a year, more than half of which would have been con-
sumed by income taxes, an award of damages based on gross earnings
would be plainly excessive even after taking full account of [marriage,
procreation and inflation].
Id. at 38. In McWeeney's case, his potential yearly earnings were estimated at only
$4,800. Id at 35. Therefore, any tax effect was de minmnts. Id. at 38.
- Comment, supra note 24 at 183.
" See, e.g., In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir.
1966) (wrongful death action under both state law and Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688),
cert. denied sub. nom. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 365 U.S.
1005 (1967); Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1963) (wrongful
death action under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)); accord, In re United States Steel
Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1980) (personal injury action under Jones Act),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Draisma v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (personal injury action under FTCA).
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plied McWeeney to admit the evidence where plaintiff or
plaintiff's decedent had substantial earning power.96
The court in McWeeney, however, recognized that the cau-
tionary jury instruction issue was completely separate from
the tax evidence issue.97 The court reasoned that a caution-
ary jury instruction does not call for a parade of tax experts
or tables which might confuse the jury.98 Stating that a cau-
tionary instruction on the non-taxability of the award would
be permissible, the court noted that "it imposes no new bur-
dens on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it." 99
A cautionary instruction to the jury requires no additional
calculations and would seem to effectively prevent the jury
from over-compensating a plaintiff by an amount the jury
mistakenly believes he would have to pay to the federal gov-
ernment in taxes.1'°
In 1977, an Illinois appellate court addressed the tax evi-
dence issue in Peluso v. Sznger General Precision, Inc., "o a wrong-
ful death action brought under Illinois law 0 2 in which it was
noted that Hall was not controlling.10 3 In Peluso, plaintiff's
decedent was killed when a mixing machine exploded.10 4 On
appeal, defendant's claim of error was that the trial court had
improperly refused to allow cross-examination of plaintiff's
expert economist regarding federal income tax liability. 105
The Illinois appellate court, however, held that the claim of
error was not preserved for appeal. 0 6 A concurring opinion
- Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1967) (wrongful death
action arising under state law), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); LeRoy v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.) (wrongful death action arising
under state law), cert denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
97 282 F.2d at 39.
Id In MWeeney, plaintiffs future earning potential had been estimated, then dis-
counted to a present value of $100,000. Id at 40. Because the jury's verdict was
$87,000, the court refused to order a new trial although it stated that it would have
been proper for the trial court to have given the cautionary instruction. Id
-o Id
'0l 47 Ill. App. 3d 842, 365 N.E.2d 390 (1977).
,12 365 N.E. 2d at 399.
r03 Id
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in Peluso by Presiding Judge Sullivan, on the other hand,
found that the tax evidence issue had been properly pre-
served.117 He cited much of the same authority 0 8 which was
later cited by the United States Supreme Court in Norfolk &
Western Railway v. Liepeltlo9 in 1980. Sullivan stated that the
defendant should have been allowed "to develop the fact that
pecuniary loss was a net amount to be determined after de-
ductions for taxes and personal expenses."11
In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed
the issues of evidence and cautionary instructions on the non-
taxability of a jury award in the context of a wrongful death
action arising under FELA. "' In Norfolk & Western Railway v.
L'epelt,"1 2 the Court held that an Illinois appellate court im-
properly applied state law when it denied both the admission
of tax evidence and the cautionary instruction.' 13 Liepelt ef-
fectively overruled Hall, at least in the context of an action
under FELA." 4 In L z'pelt, plaintiff's decedent, a fireman em-
ployed by Norfolk, was killed in a collision between a locomo-
tive and a loaded hopper car."15 At trial, an economic expert
estimated gross damages, discounted to present value, to be
$302,000."16 The jury, however, returned a verdict of
$775,000,1 17 more than twice the figure calculated by the ex-
pert.18 The Illinois appellate court upheld the propriety of
trial court's refusal to admit evidence on the non-taxability of
107 Id at 402.
1- Id at 401-04.
1- 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (wrongful death action under FELA).
-o 365 N.E.2d at 402.
.. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. See supra note 61.
112 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
' Id at 492-93.
"' Liepelt seems to adopt McWeeney's reasoning regarding the exclusion of tax evi-
dence as proper where the projected tax effect is de minimis and introduction of the
evidence would be more confusing than its worth. 444 U.S. at 494, n.7 (comparing
FED. R. EVID. 403 exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time).
444 U.S. at 490.
Id at 492. The figure was computed by estimating the decedent's gross potential
earnings plus the value of his potential services to his family, less the decedent's per-
sonal expenses, discounted to present value. Id
117 Id.
,in Id
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the award or to give a cautionary instruction on the issue. 19
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
found the tax evidence admissible 120 and the cautionary in-
struction proper.1 2' The Court reasoned that the measure of
damages interpreted by cases arising under FELA was fed-
eral in character 122 and strictly pecuniary in nature.1 23 In a
footnote, the Supreme Court noted that "[o]ne of the pur-
poses of FELA was to 'create uniformity throughout the
Union' with respect to railroads' financial responsibility for
injuries to their employees. ' 124 Under FELA, the measure of
damages in a wrongful death action is the pecuniary loss to
the survivors1 25 and is not dependent upon the individual
state's measure of damages, even if the FELA case is brought
in a state court. 26 Therefore, the evidence on the tax exempt
status of the award was found to be relevant and admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence 127 because the proper
measure of damages was the amount of support by which the
survivor was deprived due to the wrongful death of the dece-
dent. 128 The Court stated that the survivor would not have
had use of the amount the decedent would have paid in
taxes, had decedent continued to live. 29 The Court found
nothing in the legislative history of the applicable tax code
that would "suggest that. . . [Sec. 104 of the I.R.C.] has any
... Id at 491.
, Id. at 494.
,2, Id. at 498.
122 Id. at 493.
123 Id.
2. Id at 493 n.5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1908)).
12r, 444 U.S. at 493.
2 I d
,27 The Court cited rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in support of
its determination that tax evidence was admissible. Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll rele-
vant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."
FED. R. EVID. 402.Rules 401 provides that " '[r]elevant evidence' means evidence hav-
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the actions more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
12a 444 U.S. at 493.
23 Id
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impact whatsoever on the proper measure of damages in a
wrongful death action."' 3 °  The United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the I.R.C. in Liepelt effectively over-
ruled the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation expressed in
Hall,13' at least in the context of FELA actions.
In addressing the cautionary instruction issue, the Court in
Liepelt observed that the verdict was double that of the figure
computed by the expert 32 and stated, "It is surely not fanci-
ful to suppose that the jury erroneously believed that a large
portion of the award would be payable to the Federal Gov-
ernment in taxes, and that therefore it improperly inflated
the recovery."''3 3 In holding that it was error to refuse the
cautionary instruction, the Court stated that it was not a
complicated instruction and would eliminate any doubt
which the jury might transform into an improper inflation of
damages. 34 The Court recognized an important federal in-
terest in uniformity 35 and held that a state court hearing an
action brought under FELA, where the measure of damages
is always federal in character, must apply federal law regard-
ing the tax evidence and cautionary instruction issues. 136
Hence, the Court held that both the tax evidence and cau-
tionary instruction should have been allowed.131
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that he
would have held proper both the refusal to admit the evi-
dence and the refusal to give the cautionary instruction. 38
Regarding the evidentiary issue, Blackmun stated that al-
though Congress had not articulated any intent to confer a
windfall to the survivor by not taxing the award,3 9 neither
-' Id. (emphasis added). The Court also reasoned that subtracting taxes from the
award "does not confer a benefit on the tortfeasor any more than netting out the dece-
dent's personal expenditures. Both subtractions are required" to determine the pecuni-
ary damages due the survivors. Id. at 496 n.10.
,31 See supra text accompanying notes 60-77 for a discussion of Hall.
132 444 U.S. at 497. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117.
1,' 444 U.S. at 497.
,.3 Id. at 498.
,.r, See supra text accompanying note 126.
,36 444 U.S. at 492-93.
137 See supra notes 120-121.
1- 444 U.S. at 498.
139 Id at 501.
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could it be supposed that Congress had intended to transfer
such benefit to the tortfeasor.140 In his treatment of the cau-
tionary instruction issue, Blackmun argued that state law
governs the giving of cautionary instructions in cases brought
in state court under FELA.141 While he agreed that state rules
should not interfere with federal policy, 142 he found no fed-
eral policy that required giving the cautionary instruction
contrary to Illinois law. 143
The issues in Lzipelt related to actions arising under FELA,
a federal law, and heard in a state court.1 44 As such, the
Court left open the question of whether Liepelt is to be ex-
tended to actions arising under state law and brought in fed-
eral court because of diversity of citizenship.1 45  Some
guidance on this question seems to have been offered by the
Court in Gulf Ofhore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 146 a case decided a
year after Liepell.
Gulf was a personal injury action arising under federal
law 147 and tried in a state court. 48 The Court was faced with
the propriety of a Texas court's refusal to allow a cautionary
," Id at 500-01. Blackmun quoted the following:
'The court can divine no societal purpose that would be furthered by
awarding wrongdoing defendants with the benefit of this Congressional
largesse. A societal purpose would be served by benefitting innocent vic-
tims of tortious conduct. Indeed, since the victims' chances of needing
public relief are thereby disminished, this concern would be greater, not
less, in the case of death, where the loss of earning capacity is total. This
court therefore concludes that Congress, as with all exemptions under
Section 104, "intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to
become ill or injured . ...
Id at 501 (quoting Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (N.J.), vacated on other grounds,
537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976), which quoted Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508,
511 (7th Cir. 1952)).
"' 444 U.S. at 503. Blackmun noted that the Supreme Court has asserted the right
to control certain elements of what might appear to be state procedure, apparently in
the interests of "protecting the rights of FELA plaintiffs." Id.
"1 Id at 504.
143 Id.
" See supra text accompanying notes 111-113.
, Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 487-88 (1981) (reserving the
question of whether Liepelt controls when action arising under federal law incorporates
state law).
14,i 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
-' See infra text accompanying note 152.
- 453 U.S. at 476.
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instruction regarding the non-taxability of the award.
149
Plaintiff was injured during a storm while being evacuated
from an oil drilling platform located off the Louisiana shore
over an area known as the Outer Continental Shelf.50 Plain-
tiff brought suit in a Texas state court.' 5 1 Under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 52 the content of the
federal law is borrowed from the law of the adjacent state, 153
(in this case, Louisiana), in recognition of the "special rela-
tionship between the men working on these [platforms] and
the adjacent shore to which they commute to visit their fami-
lies."'15 4 The "borrowed" state law is applicable as the sub-
stantive law of the case, but only "[t]o the extent [it is] not
inconsistent" with federal law. 15 The Court found that the
Texas court had not determined whether Louisiana law was
inconsistent with federal law as articulated in Liepet. 156 The
Court remanded the case to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
to determine whether the cautionary instruction was required
under Louisiana law, 57 and if it was not, whether Liepelt was
applicable. 58
Notably, the Court did not make a blanket statement that
Liepelt would require the cautionary instruction if Louisiana
law did not. 59 The Court stated that if OCSLA had not con-
tained a choice of law provision, Liepelt would control.'
60
The Court reasoned that the choice of law provision in OC-
SLA' 6' revealed Congress' intent to reject specifically " 'na-
149 Id
I- Id at 475-76.
... Id at 476.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
'" Id State laws apply as federal law "[t]o the extent that they are applicable and
not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws." 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)
(2).
15 453 U.S. at 484 (quoting Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365
(1969)).





- Id at 487.
6r, See supra note 153.
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tional uniformity' as a paramount goal." '16 2 In support of
that proposition the Court cited Chevron Oilv. Huson, 163 a per-
sonal injury case also decided under OCSLA.164 In Chevron,
there was inconsistency between the state's statute of limita-
tions and the federal common law statute of limitations. 16
5
The Court in Chevron found that the state's statute was appli-
cable. 166 In Gulf, the court stated:
In Chevron, we held that Louisiana rather than federal com-
mon law provided the federal statute of limitations for per-
sonal injury damages actions under OCSLA. We recognized
that 'Congress made clear provision for filling the 'gaps' in
federal law; it did not intend that federal courts fill those
'gaps' themselves by creating new federal common law' ....
In this case, we face an analogous question: does the incorpo-
ration of state law [through the OCSLA choice of law provi-
sion] preclude a court from finding that state law is
'inconsistent' with a federal common-law rule generally appli-
cable to federal damages actions?167
The Court in Gulf determined that this question need be an-
swered only if the Texas court found that Louisiana law
would not require the cautionary instruction. 168 Therefore,
the case was remanded to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to
make that determination. 69
The Court, by its action in remanding the case to the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals to determine whether Louisiana
law would require a cautionary instruction, 70 seemed to re-
gard the giving of such an instruction as substantive rather
than procedural.' If the Court had considered the giving of
the cautionary instruction as procedural, the law of the forum
,12 453 U.S. at 487.
6 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
1 Id. at 98.
, Id at 101.
66 Id at 105.
,67 453 U.S. at 487-88.
- Id. at 488.
16 Id.
170 Id
17, See supra note 11 and infra note 243.
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would control. 7 2 Consequently, if the law of the forum were
to control, the court would have remanded to the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals to determine whether Texas law re-
quired a cautionary instruction.
17 3
The Supreme Court's guidance in Gulf seems to clarify the
Court's position on the application of Liepelt to cases apply-
ing not federal, but state law.' 74 The Court recognized that
Liepelt applies when the cause of action arises under and ap-
plies federal law.'75 However, the Court also recognized that
Liepelt does not automatically control in actions heard in a
state court which applies state law as incorporated into fed-
eral law.'7 6 Essentially, the Court's guidance seems to indi-
cate that the giving of a cautionary instruction regarding the
non-taxability of the award is substantive and not proce-
dural.177  State substantive law is binding upon a federal
court sitting in diversity under the principles of Ere. 78
Therefore, it would seem to follow that if the Supreme Court
considered a cautionary instruction as substantive, and not
procedural, 79 then a federal court sitting in diversity and de-
ciding a non-federal cause of action should be bound by the
law of the state 80 and not by federally-created common law
as enunciated in Liepelt. "' The Supreme Court, however, has
still not ruled on whether L'epelt controls the admissibility of
tax evidence or the giving of a cautionary instruction on the
non-taxability of the award in state-created causes of action
tried in federal courts.18 2
72 Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1960). But see Liepelt,
supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (in certain instances where there are strong
federal concerns for uniformity, state courts may be required to follow federal proce-
dure in deciding cases which arise under federal law).
173 See supra note 171.
'74 See supra text accompanying notes 152-169.
",, 453 U.S. at 486.
,76 See supra text accompanying notes 159-162.
,77 453 U.S. at 488. See supra text accompanying notes 170-173.




'' Id See supra text accompanying notes 170-173.
82 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d at 1192.
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At the time Plaintiff Haider sought to preclude the tax evi-
dence and a cautionary instruction on the non-taxability of a
wrongful death award in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
Illinois on May 25, 1979,83 the majority of courts still did not
allow the introduction of tax evidence or the giving of a cau-
tionary instruction to the jury, 84 despite the Supreme Court's
ruling in Leipelt. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision
in Liepelt, and prior to Plaintiff Haider's motion in limine,185
the state of the law was: 1) several state courts had expressly
chosen to follow the reasoning in Liepelt to admit tax evi-
dence or to give a cautionary instruction in state-created
causes of action 186 and in those arising under federal law;87
2) several state courts had expressly rejected Liepelt's applica-
tion to actions not arising under federal law;' 8 3) some state
and federal courts had likewise declined to follow Liepelt in
'"3 526 F. Supp. 226.
,84 See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1394 (1959) & A.L.R.2d Later Case Services. See
supra note 29.
', See supra note 9 for the definition of motion in limine.
' Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330, 1332-34 (1982) (cautionary
instruction must be given upon request in personal injury case applying state law);
Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569, 417 A.2d 15, 18 (1980) (evidence admissible in
wrongful death case arising under state law).
,,, Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982) (extends Liepelt to
permit evidence and instruction in all claims arising under federal law); Austin v.
Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982) (evidence of tax deductions which plaintiffs
realized during period they held securities in dispute is admissible to determine proper
compensation in action arising under federal securities law); Crabtree v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 89 Ill. App. 3d 35, 411 N.E.2d 19 (1980) (applying Liepell regarding
instruction to personal injury action arising under FELA); Oltersdorf v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 83 Ill. App. 3d 457, 404 N.E.2d 320 (1980) (personal injury action arising
under FELA), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
- Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 709, 184 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1982) (trial court did not err in failing to give cautionary instruction in wrongful
death action). Illinois cases confirming vitality of Hall and Raines in non-FELA suits
holding trial court's refusal to give cautionary instruction as proper: Newlin v.
Foresman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 432 N.E.2d 319 (1982) (wrongful death); Christou v.
Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d
920 (1982) (personal injury). See also, Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d
218, (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (declines to follow Liepell regarding instruction, relying in-
stead on exclusivity of Missouri Approved Instructions in personal injury action);
South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N;W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980) (trial court did
not err when it refused cautionary instruction in personal injury action arising under
state law) (quoting Hall with approval); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534 (S.D. 1982)
(income tax liability is extraneous matter; thus refusing cautionary instruction in per-
sonal injury action was proper); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981) (cau-
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cases which arise under federal law, but which apply a state-
defined measure of damages, 18 9 such as cases arising under
OCSLA; 19° and 4) other federal courts, sitting in diversity
and applying Erie principles,1 9' had expressly declined to fol-
low Liepelt in non-federal actions, choosing instead to apply
the law of the state.1 92
II. IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
ON MAY 25, 1979
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979,93 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
two issues: 1) whether, in a diversity action applying the Illi-
nois wrongful death statute, 194 evidence could be introduced
regarding decedent's hypothetical tax liability on projected
earnings;' 95 and 2) whether a proposed cautionary jury in-
struction that any award would be non-taxable to the recipi-
ent was properly excluded.' 96  Regarding the evidentiary
issue, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that nor-
tionary instruction not required as it is not relevant to the proper computation of
damages) (quoting Hall with approval).
,89 Personal injury actions arising under FTCA, which applies state law regarding
measure of damages, where evidence held inadmissible: Erickson v. United States, 504
F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1980); Draisma v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Mich.
1980); see also, Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 443 N.Y.S.2d
678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (evidence not admissible in personal injury case arising under
1972 Longshoremens and Harbor Workers Act which applies state law regarding meas-
ure of damages).
-" E.g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), dscussedsupra in text
accompanying notes 146-173.
,9, See supra note 11 and infta note 243.
-2 Fenasci v. Travelers Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court applying
Louisiana law did not abuse its discretion in refusing tax evidence in wrongful death
action), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1980) (looks to Louisiana law to determine that district court's refusal to give
cautionary instruction in state wrongful death action arising from plane crash was not
error), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981). See also Spinosa v. International Harvester Co.,
621 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1980) (although there was no state law regarding admission of
evidence of taxation in wrongful death action, district court did not err in applying
majority rule when it refused the evidence, particularly since this was non-federal
action).
- 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 204 (1983).
- 701 F.2d at 1191 n.1.
- Id at 1193.
- Id at 1191.
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mally the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity
cases.' 97 The Seventh Circuit found, however, that to the ex-
tent a state evidentiary rule defines what is sought to be
proven, which in this case was the measure of damages, the
state evidentiary rule may be binding under Erie princi-
ples.198 The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that Illi-
nois had no settled law on point regarding the admissibility
of tax evidence in the context of wrongful death actions aris-
ing under state law.' 99 In predicting how the Supreme Court
of Illinois would rule if presented with the tax evidence is-
sue, 2 1 the Seventh Circuit determined that the Illinois court
would no longer find its reasoning in Hall determinative be-
cause the holding in Hall was based on a misinterpretation of
the I.R.C.20 ' The Seventh Circuit stated that, in view of the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the I.R.C. in
Liepelt, section 104202 merely "makes the recipient no worse
,17 Id. at 1193. The court reiterated that the Federal Rules of Evidence, a statutory
enactment, when combined with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)
demands "that the rules apply in federal court, unless Congress exceeded its powers to
regulate federal courts in enacting them. The parties have not urged us to find, and we
are not prepared to hold, that the rules are unconstitutional." 701 F.2d at 1193. See
also FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101(b).
,go 701 F.2d at 1193. The court pointed out that if Illinois did in fact exclude such
evidence in cases arising under state law, as do the majority of states, this "Erie prob-
lem would be quite difficult." Id. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
discussed supra at note 11 and infra t note 243. See also Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281
F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1960) (although rules of evidence are normally thought of as
procedural, they can also be substantive and hence binding upon a federal court sitting
in diversity).
1- 701 F.2d at 1195. The only cases the Illinois courts had decided regarding the
evidentiary issue had been in the context of personal injury actions arising under
FELA - Hall and Raines. Id The court also found the decision of the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F. Supp. 226 (ND. Ill.
1981), although ordinarily entitled to great weight, reviewable as a question of law.
701 F.2d at 1195.
- 701 F.2d at 1197. In a diversity action, where there is no controlling state law,
courts of appeal must construe state law as would the Supreme Court of the State if it
were faced with similar facts and issues. Id Thus, the Court of Appeals may consider
all data including Illinois law, the laws of other states, federal court decisions, "and the
general weight and trend of authority." Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567
(10th Cir. 1980); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
- 701 F.2d at 1196.
22 See supra notes 43 and 131 and accompanying text. But see supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
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off (in terms of taxes at any rate) than he would have been
had the injury not occurred, by excusing the payment of tax
on awards from which potential taxes have already been de-
ducted. ' 20 3 Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that section 104
does not have anything to do with the measure of damages.2 °4
Rather, it deals with the non-taxability of the damages after
they have been calculated and awarded to the survivor.20 5
The Seventh Circuit found that although Hall was over-
ruled by Liepelt in the context of FELA actions,20 6 Hall was
decided on the basis of general Illinois jurisprudence, and not
on the basis of FELA.20 ' Thus, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that the Illinois Supreme Court, if faced with the case
at bar, would still look to Hall for guidance. 20 8 The Seventh
Circuit, however, found that Hall's approval of the majority
rule, 0 9 without having articulated any policy reasons of its
own, was mere casual dicta to which no great deference must
be given.210
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed Peluso v. Snger General
Preci'si'n, Inc. ,21 a wrongful death action brought under Illi-
nois law in which it was noted that Hall was not control-
ling.2' 12 Although the Illinois appellate court held that the
evidentiary question was not preserved for appeal, 1 3 the Sev-
enth Circuit looked to the concurring opinion in Peluso.214
The concurring opinion in Peluso stated that the issue had
been properly preserved for appeal2 I5 and that the defendant
should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff's expert
witness regarding federal income taxes.216 Additionally, the
- 701 F.2d at 1196 (citing Lipdlt, 444 U.S. at 496 n.10).
2o8 Id.
23Id
See supra text accompanying notes 60-77, 111-137.
o 701 F.2d at 1195.
0Id
209 See supra text accompanying note 73.
210 701 F. 2d at 1196.
21 47 111. App. 3d 842, 365 N.E.2d 390 (1977).
212 Id at 399.
213 Id
214 701 F.2d at 1197.
2 , 365 N.E. 2d at 402.
216
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Seventh Circuit noted that Peluso's concurring opinion cited
much of the same authority which was to be later cited in
Liepelt.217 Thus, the Seventh Circuit found Peluso's concur-
ring opinion to be compelling evidence of the manner in
which the Illinois Supreme Court would view the evidentiary
issue."'
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found that Illinois courts
had a history of "scrupulously adjust[ing] its damage awards
to make them compensatory. ' 2'9 For example, Illinois courts
had permitted the introduction of mortality tables,220 had
permitted evidence enabling juries to reduce awards to pres-
ent value,221 had allowed the deduction of hypothetical per-
sonal expenses from decedent's lost future earnings in a
222 hawrongful death action, and had allowed income tax ad-
justments in the context of a wrongful death action under
FELA brought twenty-four years before Liepelt was de-
cided.223 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, found that an Illi-
2,, 701 F.2d at 1197.
2111 Id
219 Id at 1198.
2. Id at 1198 (citing Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 83-84, 55 N.E.2d 57, 60
(FELA action), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753 (1944)).
22, 701 F.2d at 1198 (citing Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill.2d 164, 178, 133
N.E. 2d 288, 296 (FELA action), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
222 701 F.2d at 1198 (citing Scully v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 200, 275
N.E.2d 905, 915 (1971) (wrongful death action arising under state law).
229 701 F.2d at 1198 (citing Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 181, 133
N.E.2d 288, 296, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). Although the Seventh Circuit in In re
Air Crash cites Allendorf in support of its statement that Illinois courts in practice may
make income tax adjustments, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Allendorf may be mis-
founded. In Allendorf, plaintiff's husband was killed while working as a switch foreman
for defendant railroad. 133 N.E.2d at 289. The trial court required the actuary to
compute the present value of decedent's future contributions after deduction of income
tax. Id. at 296. The resulting estimate was $10,000 less than it would have been with-
out the deduction for income tax. Id Plaintiff's attorney "acquiesced" in this ruling as
well as in the giving of a cautionary instruction regarding the non-taxability of a
wrongful death award. Id The jury returned a verdict which was almost $15,000 in
excess of the figure calculated by the actuary. Id at 289, 292. On appeal, defendant
contended the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the actuary to use
specific figures based upon what the decedent had been earning at the time of his
death and by allowing the actuary to deduct $50 per month as representative of dece-
dent's personal expenses merely because decedent regularly turned over all but $50 of
his paycheck to his wife. Id at 295. Defendant argued that "neutral" figures should
have been used and that the jury was thereby misled by the use of specific numbers.
Id. at 292. Defendant contended that the actuary's use of the amount decedent had
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nois court would not be opposed to having juries incorporate
evidence as abstract as the decedent's hypothetical tax liabil-
ity into the determination of their awards. 224 Consequently,
the Seventh Circuit held that because Illinois' measure of
damages under its wrongful death statute was pecuniary in
nature and hence identical to that interpreted by Lzipelt and
other cases arising under FELA, 2 5 the disputed evidence was
been earning at the time of his death misled the jury into believing that the decedent
would continue to earn the same amount. Id at 293. Defendant argued that the jury
failed to consider that decedent might have become unemployed and thus might not
have continued to earn the same amount. Id. at 294. Defendant also urged that the
actuary's deduction of $50 per month for decedent's personal expenses was an arbi-
trary figure not truly representative of decedent's personal expenses. Id at 292.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the defendant was afforded a fair trial with
no reversible error. Id at 297. The Illinois Supreme Court found that if there had
been disadvantages to the defendant in the actuary's testimony based on specific
figures instead of "neutral" figures, they were counterbalanced by other advantages
favoring the defendant: the jury could have used age 68.21 as decedent's age expec-
tancy as reflected on the mortality tables introduced into evidence instead of the rail-
road's average retirement age of 65; and the actuary's computation based on the
amount decedent had been earning at the time of his death did not take into consider-
ation that decedent was a young, healthy man with prospects of earning much more
than reflected by his last annual earnings. Id at 296. Additionally, the court found
that defendant had the opportunity, but failed, to produce evidence during the trial
that would have proven that decedent's personal expenses were more than the $50 per
month used in the computation by the actuary. Id at 295. Therefore, the verdict for
the plaintiff was affirmed.
The reason the Seventh Circuit's reliance upon Allendorf in In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago may be misplaced is because the tax evidence issue and the cautionary
instruction issue were not preserved for appeal due to the acquiescence of plaintiff's
attorney regarding these two matters in the trial court. Id at 296. Thus, even if plain-
tiff's attorney had raised the tax evidence and cautionary instruction issues for the first
time in the Illinois Supreme Court, the court would not have been able to decide the
two issues because they were not preserved for appeal. See Peluso v. Singer General
Precision, Inc., 47 111. App. 3d 842, 365 N.E.2d 390 (1977) discussed supra notes 101-110.
In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court in Allendorf stated that "the incident of taxation is
not a proper factor for a jury's consideration. . . . It introduces an extraneous subject,
giving rise to conjecture and speculation." 133 N.E.2d at 296 (quoting Hall v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 5 Il. 2d 135, 125 N.E. 2d 77 (1955)). Because the Illinois Supreme Court
in A/1endorf had not addressed the evidentiary and cautionary instruction issues (they
were not preserved for appeal) and in dicta had approved Hall, the Seventh Circuit's
use of Allendorf to support the proposition that Illinois courts may in practice already
take tax consequences into consideration in fixing wrongful death awards seems
misplaced.
22, 701 F.2d at 1198.
22r, 701 F. 2d at 1195. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The court also
found that under both FELA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, an award was
limited to pecuniary damages with punitive damages being unavailable. See, e.g. , cases
arising under FELA, defining measure of damages as pecuniary: Michigan Central
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admissible.226
Regarding the propriety of a cautionary jury instruction
that any award would not be taxable to the recipient,227 the
Seventh Circuit noted that it was proper to refuse the instruc-
tion under current Illinois law.228 Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the underlying substantive law to
which the instruction related was the I.R.C.229 which was not
state but federal law. Therefore, the cautionary instruction
on the non-taxability of the award was held permissible.
230
Ordinarily in diversity cases, while federal law governs the
R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913); Burlington N. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284
(9th Cir. 1975) (amount beneficiary reasonably could have expected to have been ap-
plied to her support but for the wrongful death). See also, In re Air Crash Disaster, 644
F.2d 594, 605 (7th Cir. 1981) (Illinois as place of injury does not allow punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death action) (citing Mattyasovzky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 I1.
App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), affd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975)); Elliott
v. Willis, 92 111. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982) (purpose of the Illinois Wrongful Death
Statute is to compensate survivors for pecuniary loss due to wrongful death, and the
measurement of damages is the pecuniary value decedent might have contributed had
he lived); Graul v. Adrian, 32 I1. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965) (damages under
wrongful death act limited to loss of support); Scully v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ill. App.
3d 185, 275 N.E.2d 905 (1971) (measure of pecuniary damages in wrongful death ac-
tion is the value of monetary support and personal services decedent would have con-
tributed had he lived).
226 701 F.2d at 1195, 1198. The court also quoted the Illinois Supreme Court Com-
mittee on Jury Instructions, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 31.04
(1971), which recommends that the following instruction be given in a wrongful death
action:
[Iln determining pecuniary loss . . . you may consider what benefits of
pecuniary value, including money, goods and services the decedent
might reasonably have been expected to contribute to the [survivor] had
the decedent lived, bearing in mind the following factors concerning the
decedent:
3. What he spent for customary personal expenses [and other deduc-
tions] ....
701 F.2d at 1198 n.6 and accompanying text of opinion. The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the pattern jury instructions quoted above further indicate that Illinois courts
would allow tax evidence and deduct income taxes as a "personal expense" or "other
deduction" in order to make the award compensatory. Id. at 1198.
221 Md at 1199.
228 Id The court cites Hall and Raines. Id. See also the following decisions confirming
the vitality of Hall in non-FELA suits, holding trial court's refusal to give cautionary
instruction as proper: Newlin v. Foresman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 432 N.E.2d 319
(1982) (wrongful death); Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks
Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920 (1982) (personal injury).
2 701 F.2d at 1199. See supra text accompanying note 43.
2- 701 F.2d at 1200.
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procedure of requesting and giving jury instructions, state
law controls the content of those instructions. 23 ' The Seventh
Circuit determined that despite several cases on point,232 Illi-
nois, in refusing to give the instruction altogether instead of
defining it, had failed to articulate an intent to allow what
the Seventh Circuit perceived as a possible "bonus beyond
compensatory damages. ' 233 The Seventh Circuit noted that
its decision might have been different had Illinois interpreted
its own substantive law to include a "right to receive an
award beyond compensation. ' 234 Thus, instead of adhering
to Illinois law which did not allow a cautionary instruc-
tion,235 the Seventh Circuit required more of the Illinois
courts. The Seventh Circuit seemed to say that the Illinois
court's refusal to allow a cautionary instruction is not enough
and that such a refusal should be accompanied by an articu-
lated intent to allow a bonus beyond compensation. 236 Be-
cause the Seventh Circuit found no such articulated intent in
Illinois case law, it looked instead to federal common law as
pronounced in Liepelt.237 The Seventh Circuit's rationale was
that the cautionary instruction related to the I.R.C. which is
federal law.238
The Seventh Circuit analyzed Hall and determined that
whatever substantive interest Illinois seemed to have in deny-
ing the instruction was either procedural, 239 and thus not
23, Id at 1199. See also Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). Accord Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1981) (cautionary instruction not permissible under New York Wrongful Death Act,
although act precribes a pecuniary measure of damages and does not allow punitive
damages; and federal court sitting in diversity must look to law of state to determine
whether the instruction is permissible); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1980) (federal court sitting in diversity is bound to apply state law regarding
whether cautionary instruction is permissible in wrongful death action), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 981 (1981).
232 See supra note 228.
21 701 F.2d at 1200. See a/so id at 1200 n.7.
23* 701 F.2d at 1200 n.7.
23r, 701 F.2d at 1199.
236 Id The Seventh Circuit stated that "[u]nless Illinois has a substantive interest in
refusing the instruction, therefore, perhaps federal law should control." Id
2." Id at 1199-1200.
238 Id at 1199.
239 Id at 1200.
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binding on a federal court sitting in diversity, 40 or based on a
misinterpretation of the federal tax code.241 In finding that
the award in wrongful death actions predicated on Illinois
law was limited to pecuniary damages,242 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the application of the outcome-determinative
test was inappropriate. 43 Giving the instruction might cause
a significant difference in the amount of the verdict rendered
240 See supra note 11.
2 , 701 F.2d at 1196. See supra text accompanying notes 201-205.
242 701 F.2d at 1196. See supra note 225.
21. 701 F.2d at 1200. Three concerns led to the formulation of the outcome-determi-
native test in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945): 1) the desirability of
uniform application of substantive law within a state in both state and federal courts,
id. at 108-09; 2) that an out-of-state plaintiff should not be able to "forum shop" be-
tween the state and federal courts in same jurisdiction for the more favorable law,
id. at 111; 3) that it is fundamentally unfair to allow the result in a suit to differ
between the state court and the federal court merely because of the diversity of the
parties to the suit, and because the suit was litigated in a federal court instead of a state
court, id at 112. Consequently, the York outcome-determinative test dictated that
state law must apply if the outcome in a federal court would materially differ from the
outcome reached if the case had been litigated in a state court. Id. at 108-09. After
several years of fear that the York outcome determinative test was destroying the inde-
pendence of the federal court system, the Supreme Court formulated the balancing
approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the
federal court submitted to the jury an issue that would have been decided by the judge
if the case had been tried in a state tribunal. Id at 531-32. The Supreme Court bal-
anced competing state and federal policies regarding jury trials to determine that state
laws "cannot alter the essential character or function of a federal court." Id at 539.
The Byrd balancing test was difficult to apply since the competing considerations of
federal and state courts were difficult to weigh in determining which entity had the
stongest considerations and, hence, the ultimately applicable rule. Boggs v. Blue Dia-
mond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1116 (E.D. Ky. 1980). Finally, in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized that, although it could be
argued that the application of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was outcome-determi-
native, the outcome-determinative test should only be applied in reference to the twin
aims ofEn'e. Id at 468 n.9. Thus the balancing test was abandoned. The twin-aims of
Erie are: (1) discouragement of forum-shopping and (2) avoidance of inequitable ad-
ministration of laws. Id. The Court emphasized that there must be a substantial devia-
tion in the enforcement of the state-created rights under issue before a federal rule will
yield to a state rule. Id at 469. The Court stated that,
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a
diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state
law, the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the
context of asking whether application of the rule would make so impor-
tant a difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to
enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum
State, or whether application of the rule would have so important an
effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to
enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.
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in a federal court, as opposed to that rendered a block away
in an Illinois state court where such an instruction is im-
proper.244 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the possi-
bility of a larger award than what would be compensatory
was an improper outcome in light of Illinois' strictly compen-
satory scheme for wrongful death actions.245 The Seventh
Circuit also reasoned that in view of Liepelt, the Illinois
court's interpretation of the federal tax code in Hall to in-
clude an intent on the part of Congress to confer a positive
benefit in the form of an award "beyond the stated measure
of damages" was without basis.24 6 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
held that the possibility of such a windfall in the absence of
the cautionary instruction was an improper outcome under
both Illinois and federal laws.247
The court also briefly considered Hall's other reasons for
refusing to instruct the jury on the non-taxability of the
award-the presumption of integrity of the jury's decision-
making processes and the possibility of a profusion of cau-
tionary instructions.248 Finding these concerns to be "matters
of court administration ' 249 and not in themselves outcome-
determinative so as to be so intertwined with the substantive
law as to bind a federal court sitting in diversity,250 the Sev-
enth Circuit held these concerns to be merely procedural and
hence subject to federal practice.25' Consequently, the Sev-
enth Circuit found permissible the cautionary instruction on
380 U.S. at 468 n.9. For a good discussion on the historical background of Erie and its
progeny, see Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
241 See Hall, 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Raines, 51 111. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d
230, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); New/in, 103 Il1. App. 3d 1038, 432 N.E.2d 319
(1982); Christou, 104 Il1. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920 (1982).
249 701 F.2d at 1200.
246 Id at 1199.
247 Id
248 Id See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
249 701 F.2d at 1200.
I2 d. (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958))
(state law cannot alter the essential character or functions of a federal court).
25, 701 F.2d at 1200. See also Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)
(state statutes which would interfere with the appropriate performance of functions of
a federal court are not binding upon federal court); Wright v. Farmers Co-Op of Ark.
& Okla., 620 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1980) (in diversity actions, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure govern grant or denial of jury instruction which is a procedural matter).
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the non-taxability of the award.2 52
III. CONCLUSION
Congress has specifically declined to enact a federal avia-
tion disaster law which would create uniformity within the
United States regarding liability and damages.253 Despite
this, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, has in effect in-
sured uniformity of practice and results concerning tax evi-
dence and the cautionary instruction within the federal
courts of the Seventh Circuit.2 54 The Seventh Circuit's ruling
would seem to control the evidentiary issue in wrongful death
actions brought under state law in federal courts within the
Seventh Circuit,255 at least where the state's measure of dam-
ages is identical to that of FELA.256 Similarly, the court's rul-
ing regarding the cautionary instruction would seem to
control where the state has not articulated an intent to allow
a recovery beyond compensation. 57
The Seventh Circuit, however, may have overstepped its
powers under Erie principles.2 58 Erie and its progeny taught
that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state sub-
stantive law when there is no applicable federal law.2 59 Al-
though perhaps properly interpreting Illinois case law to
determine that no Illinois precedent exists for the admissibil-
ity of evidence of a decedent's hypothetical tax liability,260
the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the items the Illinois court
would take into consideration in making a decision, were it
faced with the same issue, seems a bit strained. In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago was a wrongful death action brought
under not federal, but state law.26' Because a proposed "fed-
2,2 701 F.2d at 1200.
2 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
2- See supra text accompanying notes 193-252.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 197-226.
2% See supra text accompanying note 226.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 227-236.
2- See supra notes 11, 243.
2.9 See supra notes 11, 243.
2co See supra text accompanying note 199.
-' See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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eral aviation disaster law" was allowed to die in committee,262
there was no federal law applicable here as opposed to cases
like Liepelt and those arising under other federal laws.263
Therefore, Congress had not expressed an intent to provide
for uniformity of treatment of cases arising in the context of
aviation disasters as it had in the context of FELA actions.264
Had such a federal aviation disaster law been enacted, it
would seem reasonable that the Seventh Circuit could have
properly relied upon Liepelt. Here, the Seventh Circuit's reli-
ance upon analogies between Liepelt and other cases arising
under FELA and the present case seems totally misplaced
due to the lack of any federal interest in uniformity of treat-
ment of aviation disaster cases.2 65
Although federal rules exist for the admissibility of evi-
dence,266 the Seventh Circuit recognized that to the extent a
state evidentiary rule defines what is sought to be proven,
which in this case was the measure of damages, the state evi-
dentiary rule may be binding under Erie principles.267  Al-
though the Illinois courts perhaps have never directly ruled
on the question of the admissibility of tax evidence,268 there
exists a line of Illinois cases e',idencing a strong disposition
against admitting tax evidence. 269 Despite this evidence re-
garding how the Illinois court would respond to the issue, the
Seventh Circuit chose to rely upon a concurring opinion in
Pe uso270 and dicta in Allendorf. 271 The Seventh Circuit's reli-
ance upon these two cases seems tenuous at best in view of
the fact that in both Peluso and Allendorf the question of the
2 See supra note 23.
- See supra notes 56, 60, 88 and accompanying text.
2- See supra text accompanying note 23.
265 See supra text accompanying note 23.
2- See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
-7 See supra text accompanying notes 197-198.
26 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
269 Raines, 51 111. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230 (1972); Hall, 5 I1. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77
(1955); See also Peluso, 47 111. App. 3d 842, 365 N.E.2d 390 (1977); Allendorf, 8 Ill. 2d
164, 133 N.E. 2d. 288 (1956).
270 47 11. App. 842, 365 N.E.2d 390 (1977), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 101-110.
27, 8 Il. 2d 164, 133 N.E. 2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), discussed supra at
note 223.
CA SENOTES AND STA TUTE NOTES
admissibility of tax evidence was not preserved for appeal
and was therefore not properly before the court.2 72
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's analysis in reaching its
decision that the tax evidence was admissible because Illinois'
measure of damages was identical to that defined by cases
arising under FELA 273 seems ill-reasoned. Instead of con-
forming to Erz*e principles274 and applying the law of the
state even when the law has to be predicted where there is no
existing state precedent,275 the Seventh Circuit seems to have
substituted federal common law as enuciated in Liepell.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning regarding the
propriety of a cautionary instruction on the non-taxability of
a wrongful death award seems just as ill-reasoned. Although
the Seventh Circuit cited Gulf, 27 6 it failed to note the import
of the case: 1) that although Gulf arose under federal law, the
United States Supreme Court did not automatically apply
federal common law as enunciated in Liepelt to sanction the
giving of a cautionary instruction;277 and 2) that by remand-
ing to the Texas court to determine whether Louisiana law,
which was the law of the case according to OCSLA, would
require such an instruction it was tantamount to saying that
the question of such an instruction is one of substance and
not of procedure. 27  Had the Supreme Court considered the
question of a cautionary instruction to be procedural and
thus controlled by the law of the forum, 27 9 the Supreme
Court would have remanded to the Texas court to determine
whether Texas law required such an instruction. Had the
Seventh Circuit properly analyzed Gulf, it would have found
that the Supreme Court of the United States did not consider
272 Peluso, 365 N.E.2d at 399; Allendorf, 133 N.E.2d at 296.
-,: 701 F.2d at 1195.
274 See supra notes 11, 243.
275 See supra note 200.
2- 701 F.2d at 1192 (citing Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473
(1981), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 147-173.
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a cautionary instruction a procedural matter solely within the
province of the forum.
Furthermore, in reaching its decision regarding the cau-
tionary instruction, the Seventh Circuit may have disre-
garded the twin aims of EriSe, which are the discouragement
of forum shopping and the avoidance of inequitable admin-
stration of laws between citizens and non-citizens of a state.28°
Despite the fact that significant case law exists in Illinois on
the impropriety of such a cautionary instruction,281 the Sev-
enth Circuit chose to disregard such precedent and chose in-
stead to provide an alternative forum in which the cautionary
instruction may be given.282 Consequently, it is evident that
plaintiffs in those states barring evidence of taxation or the
giving of a cautionary instruction regarding the non-taxabil-
ity of an award will seek to bring their actions, and will en-
deavor to remain, in state court where they are assured of a
significantly larger verdict (at least in states where evidence
of taxation is improper). Consequently, forum shopping has
been encouraged rather than discouraged. Additionally, as
between a citizen and a non-citizen of a state, the Seventh
Circuit's decision has opened the doors to the inequitable ad-
ministration of the law. Should a non-citizen of a state de-
cide to bring his suit in a federal court of the Seventh Circuit
on the basis of diversity of citizenship, his recovery will be
limited (at least where evidence of taxation is improper in
that state), while the successful plaintiff who is a citizen and
who is able to remain in state court will receive a larger
award.
The cumulative effect of the Seventh Circuit's decision in
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chzcago is that in state-created
causes of action where state law differs from the federal com-
mon law as pronounced in Liepelt, there will be two distinct
interpretations and applications of each state's measure of
280 See supra notes 11, 243.
2B For significant cases see supra note 228.
282 701 F.2d at 1200. While Illinois courts refuse to give a cautionary instruction
regarding the non-taxibility ofjury awards, such an instruction may now be given in a
federal court sitting in diversity in Illinois. Id
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damages within that state. The state courts will continue to
apply their own laws regarding the admissibility of tax evi-
dence and the giving of a cautionary instruction, while the
federal district courts of the Seventh Circuit will apply fed-
eral common law as enunciated in Li'pelt to admit tax evi-
dence and a cautionary instruction. Another probable effect
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision is that there
will be a proliferation of removal cases from state courts28 3
due to the motivating factor that an unsuccessful defendant
will be assured of paying a lower damage award as between
federal and state courts. It is clear that no defendant will be
content to stay in a state court where tax evidence is not ad-
missible when through removal he can be assured of the ad-
missibility of tax evidence in order to lower the damage
award. Similarly, when the state in which the federal court
sits does not allow a cautionary instruction, defendants will
be sure to remove to federal court in order to be assured of
the propriety of such an instruction, which may protect the
defendant from paying an excess amount the jury mistakenly
believes the plaintiff will have to pay in taxes.
Still another possible effect will be that as defendants gear
up to present evidence of decedent's hypothetical tax liabil-
ity, plaintiffs will also gear up in their presentation of evi-
dence showing that their decedent was an exceptionally
shrewd tax planner and would have paid the least tax possi-
ble. Analogous evidence is presented when plaintiffs attempt
to prove that their decedent would have earned progressively
larger incomes in future years and defendants attempt to
prove the opposite. 284 Therefore, plaintiff's and defendant's
conflicting evidence may not unduly complicate the jury's
considerations as the jury is already required to sift through
abstract approximations. 5
There is logic and even desirability in admitting tax evi-
2,3 Removal of actions from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1450 (1976).
284 See, e.g., Allendorf, 8 Il 2d 164, 133 N.E. 2d 288, cerl. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956),
discussed supra at note 223.
20, Id See also supra text accompanying notes 220-223.
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dence and allowing the cautionary instruction when the
measure of damages is pecuniary in nature. Considered in a
vacuum, it makes sense that defendants should not have to
pay amounts that the survivors would never have received
from the decedent in the first place. However, In re Aircrash
Near Chicago cannot be considered in a vacuum. It must be
considered in the context of Illinois law which was the law of
the case.286 It would seem that without the benefit of a fed-
eral aviation disaster law287 and at the expense of the twin-
aims of Erie,288 uniformity regarding tax evidence and cau-
tionary instructions on the non-taxability of a wrongful death
award has been achieved within the federal courts of the Sev-
enth Circuit.
Claudia Kthano Parker
2.; See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
2- See supra notes 11, 243 and accompanying text.
CIVIL PROCEDURF--PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ORE-
GON-The Oregon Supreme Court Construes a New Long
Arm Statute, Adopts a Substantively Relevant Contact Test,
and Extends Jurisdiction to a Remote Aircraft Component
Manufacturer which Has No Direct Contacts with the Fo-
rum. State ex re. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or. 381,
657 P.2d 211 (1982).
State ex re. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale,' a mandamus pro-
ceeding,2 is a case of first impression for Oregon. The case
, 294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982).
2 657 P.2d at 211. The trial court refused a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and Hydraulic sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdicition. Id Mandamus proceedings are
brought against an inferior court to compel the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins. OR. REV. STAT. § 34.110 (1981). Alternative (temporary) writs are
issued while the higher court decides on whether to issue a peremptory (permanent)
writ, and to allow the inferior court to show cause why a peremptory writ should not
be granted. Id at § 34.150.
657 P.2d at 212. On the same day that the court decided Hydraulic Servocontrols, it
also decided State ex rel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 208 (1982). Michelin,
a mandamus proceeding, is also a case of first impression construing the constitutional
limits of Oregon's new long arm statute. 657 P.2d at 208. Joint examination of the
cases is necessary to properly understand the rationale and decision of each.
In Michelin, Lamb-Weston, an Oregon corporation, brought suit against Michelin
USA, the American distributor of Michelin tires, and Michelin France, the French
manufacturer, for damage to its truck and lost profit resulting from an alleged explo-
sion of a Michelin tire. 657 P.2d at 208. The complaint alleged that Michelin France
engaged in substantial activities in Oregon. Id The complaint alleged that the tire was
installed on Lamb-Weston's truck and that the tire was unreasonably dangerous and
defective at the time of manufacture. Id While the accident occurred in Washington,
the places of purchase and installation were not alleged in the complaint. Id.
The court pointed out that Michelin France had carefully structured its activities to
avoid corporate contacts in the United States in an attempt to avoid the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction over it. Id. at 208. Michelin France had no registered agent in
any state and sold its product only to two United States purchasers with whom it had
no corporate ties. Id. It had no direct marketing efforts in the United States. Id. In
other words, Michelin France had no direct contacts with Oregon or, for that matter,
with any other state. Id The court stated the issue as "whether Michelin France, which
seeks through others to serve a nationwide market, can be called into account in an
Oregon court on the sole basis that one of its products injures an Oregon resident." Id
at 209. The court granted the peremptory writ and held that personal jurisdiction
399
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construes the Constitutional limits of Oregon's new long arm
statute, rule 4 of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure 4
(ORCP), in light of World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.' Hy-
draulic Servocontrols Corporation, a New York corporation,6
manufactured a servo actuator,7 and delivered the servo ac-
tuator to AiResearch Manufacturing Company with knowl-
edge it would eventually be used in an aircraft.8 AiResearch
is a division of the Garret Corporation, a California corpora-
tion.9 Garret incorporated the servo actuator into an air-
plane engine ° and sold it to Cessna Aircraft Company, a
cannot be upheld under the Constitution of the United States if based only on the
general sales or use of Michelin's products in the state. Id at 210-11. Further, the court
held that to satisfy due process there must be a substantively relevant contact with the
state, a contact relevant to the substance of the claim for relief such as sale, use, acci-
dent or injury. Id
I OR. R. Civ. PROC. 4. Subsections B through K of rule 4 of the ORCP are specific
provisions that allow jurisdiction on facts that the United States Supreme Court has
deemed adequate. 657 P.2d at 213. The apparent rationale stems from Kulko v. Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), in which the Supreme Court found it signif-
icant that the state asserting jurisdiction had not expressed a particular jurisdictional
interest in the kind of case in which it was attempting to exercise jurisdiction. Id at 213
n.3. Hence Oregon is attempting to claim as much particularized interest as possible
to ensure that its courts have jurisdiction in close cases. Id Sections B through K also
aid judicial efficiency. Id at 213. If the jurisdictional facts fit within a provision, then
the court is aided in determining personal jurisdiction without having to litigate the
facts through a general due process clause. Id None of the subsections, however, fit
the Hydraulic Servocontrols' facts. Id at 212-13. Rule 4 of the ORCP has a catchall
provision allowing personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of due process. Rule 4(L)
provides: "Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B. through
K. of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this
state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the
United States." Id.
r World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), construed in Hydrau-
lic Servocontrols, 657 P.2d at 212, 214-16. In World-Wide Volkswagen the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that the contacts that are relevant are those that would
enable the defendant to anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. 444 U.S.
at 297. See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
657 P.2d at 212. The opinion does not specify the function of a servo actuator. Id
at 211-16. It would appear to be a motor or other form of device which transforms
fluid pressure into mechanical force and which receives a small signal from the control
device and exerts a large force to accomplish the desired work. J. FoYE & D. CRANE,
AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL DICTIONARY 3, 153 (1978) (combined definitions of servo and
actuator).
657 P.2d at 212.
Id
Id
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Kansas corporation. 1 Cessna incorporated the engine into
one of its Cessna aircraft 12 and sold it to a regional dealer,
Western Skyways, Inc., a Delaware corporation. 3 Western
Skyways, the regional dealer in Oregon sold the aircraft to
Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, an Oregon corporation. 4 Two
weeks later the aircraft crashed in California.' 5
Cascade brought suit in Oregon against all four corpora-
tions.'6 The complaint alleged that Hydraulic was liable
under theories of strict liability and negligence for the design
and manufacture of the actuator.' 7 Hydraulic contested per-
sonal jurisdiction. 8 Hydraulic did no business in Oregon,9
nor did it have any offices 20 or presence 2' or status in Ore-
gon.22 Its only place of business was in New York.23  Even
though the product was removed from Oregon through the
chain of manufacturing 24 and the component manufacturer
had no direct contacts with Oregon, 25 due process is not of-
fended if the product's use in Oregon was foreseeable and
there was a substantively relevant contact with the forum.2 6
Held, the alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed The Oregon
Supreme Court construes a new long arm statute, adopts a
substantively relevant contact test, and extends jurisdiction to
a remote aircraft component manufacturer which has no di-
rect contacts with the forum. State ex re. Hydraulic Servocontrols








I" Id. See supra note 2.







26i Id at 215-16.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Oregon Precedent
In Hydraulic Servocontrols, the defendant did not contend
that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate the Oregon
Constitution. 27 Rule 4(L) of the Oregon Rules of Civil Proce-
dure28 purports to extend to the limits of United States Con-
stitutional due process as limited by the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 29 Even prior
to the enactment of rule 4(L), the Supreme Court of Oregon
had judicially extended the previous long arm statute, section
14.035 of the Oregon Revised Statutes30 to the outer limits of
constitutional due process.31 Rule 4(L) merely codifies this
decision.32 Therefore, the inquiry by the Supreme Court of
Oregon was into the limits set by the United States Supreme
Court under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution with regard to the
21 Id. at 212 n.1.
28 See supra note 4 for the text of rule 4(L) ORCP.
- See supra note 4. Not all state statutes purport to extend jurisdiction to the limits
of due process. While no state may properly extend jurisdiction beyond the limits of
the due process clause as construed by the United States Supreme Court, a state is free
to impose further restrictions on its own long arm statute. For example, article 203 1b
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes previously required a nexus between the defend-
ant's contacts with the state and the cause of action. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
203 1b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982). Note, Civil Procedure - In Personam Jurisdiction In
Texas, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 360 (1982). Hall v. Helicol, 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982)
judicially relaxed the rigid nexus requirement for Texas.
o OR. REV. STAT. § 14.035 (1981) provides that:
(1) Any person, firm or corporation whether or not a citizen or a resident
of this state, who, in person or through an agent, does any of the actions
enumerated in this subsection thereby submits such person and, if an
individual, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state, as to any cause of action or suit or proceeding arising from any
of the following: [enumerated list omitted].
Id.
Stateex. rel. Academy Press v. Beckett, 282 Or. 701, 708, 581 P.2d 496, 500 (1978).
In Becktt an Oregon author brought suit in his home state against an Illinois publisher.
581 P.2d at 496. The publisher contested jurisdiction claiming that the contract was
negotiated and executed in Illinois and that he had no other contacts with Oregon.
Id at 497. The trial court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction. Id at 504. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that the publisher's requirement of a substantial revi-
sion, and the publisher's alleged misrepresentations were sufficient to state a cause of
action in Oregon that satisfied due process. Id at 504.
32 657 P.2d at 213 n.2.
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fact situation in Hjdrauhc Servocontrols. 33
B. United States Supreme Court Precedent
Traditionally, jurisdiction was based upon at least one of
four concepts: physical presence within the state, consent,
domicile, or an action in rem .3 An action in rem was either
against the property directly or quasi in rem, through the prop-
erty to reach the defendant.35 Any modern jurisdictional in-
quiry, however, must begin with the minimum contacts
theory as first elucidated in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton .36 International Shoe established the new test in place of the
3 Id. at 213, 657 P.2d at 209.
.34 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Pennoyer involved a collateral attack by Neff
on a default judgment entered against him and a suit in ejectment to regain his prop-
erty that had been sold pursuant to the default judgment. Neff had not been served
with process in Oregon, nor had his property been attached before the default judg-
ment. Id at 719-20. The Supreme Court ruled that in personam jurisdiction had never
been attained on Neff because he had not been served within the state. Id. at 727. In
rem jurisdiction had not been attained because the property was not attached before
suit. Id. at 728. For an explanation of in rem jurisdiction, see infra note 35. The Court
reasoned "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory"; and further, "that no State can exercise direct juris-
diction and authority over persons or property without its territory." 95 U.S. at 722.
Pennoyer did make exceptions for a person's status within the state, e.g., in divorce
proceedings; and it deemed a foreign corporation doing business within the state as
having consented to suit. Id at 735-36. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462
(1940) for a discussion of domicile as a basis for jurisdiction.
- The Supreme Court has explained the in rem exercises of jurisdiction as follows:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated prop-
erty. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in
designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is
seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to ex-
tinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular
persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be
the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1957).
- 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The State of Washington brought suit against International
Shoe for state employment insurance premiums. Id at 310-11. International Shoe had
employed several salesmen in the state and had shipped orders to Washington. Id at
313. International Shoe, a Missouri based Delaware corporation contested jurisdiction
because it had made no actual contracts in Washington, and it had no offices there. Id
at 312. The Supreme Court of Washington sustained jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed. Id at 322. The Supreme Court held that the
contacts through the salesmen and orders were of such a quality and nature so as not to
offend due process. Id. at 320.
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traditional bases of jurisdiction37 and the legal fictions that
had built upon them.3" The minimum contacts test requires
that for due process to be satisfied, the defendant must have
such minimum contacts within the forum state "that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' "" The Court in announc-
ing the test also emphasized that the quality and nature of
the activity was an essential measure of whether due process
had been satisfied.4 °  Basing their rationale on Intemati'nal
Shoe, state courts, unchecked between 1945 and 1977, ex-
panded their exercise of in personam jurisdiction, with many
state courts exercising jurisdiction in tenuous cases.4' During
this period there was only one case in which the Supreme
Court limited state court personal jurisdiction. 2
Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 43 the next major
personal jurisdiction case, decided by the Supreme Court af-
ter International Shoe, 44 allowed jurisdiction where the cause of
37 See supra text accompanying note 34.
3a 326 U.S. at 316. International Shoe dealt specifically with the fiction of presence,
but it is clear that the court meant to establish a new jurisdictional paradigm. Id.
.9 Id at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The important,
recent jurisdictional case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), reaffirmed the minimum contacts test, stating: "As has long been settled, and
we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exists 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and
the forum State." Id. at 291. For a discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen, see in/a text
accompanying notes 76-92.
- 326 U.S. at 319. In International Shoe the previous sales of shoes and the employ-
ment of several salesmen constituted contacts of a quality and nature that jurisdiction
could properly be asserted. Id.
4 See Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Products Liabity." Beyond World- Wide Volkswagen,
11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 351, 353 n.19 (1981).
12 Id at 353. The case which limited personal jurisdiction is Hanson v. Denkla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), discussed in/a in text accompanying notes 56-58. Even though state
long arm jurisdiction has generally expanded, no Supreme Court case has actually
sustained inpersonam jurisdiction since 1957. 657 P.2d at 213.
- 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins, a non-resident plaintiff brought suit against a
Philippine corporation in Ohio with a cause of action not related to Ohio. The corpo-
ration was temporarily carrying on limited corporate business in Ohio during the Jap-
anese occupation of the Philippines. Id. at 438-39. The state court refused to maintain
jurisdiction over the corporation on what appeared to be due process grounds. Id at
448-49. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the corporation's
activities within the state were of such a continuous and systematic nature that due
process would not be offended by maintenance of the suit. Id
44 Note, supra note 29, at 263.
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action was not related to the forum state.45  Nor was the
plaintiff a citizen of the forum state.46 The Court held that
jurisdiction could properly be maintained where the corpora-
tion's activities within the forum were continuous and sys-
tematic. 7 The Supreme Court has termed the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation as the
"central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction. ' 48
One author, however, has aptly stated, "The Supreme Court
has never required that a nexus exist between the cause of
action and the defendant's forum contact. To the contrary,
the Perkins decision disavows such a requirement by allowing
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident on
a cause of action unrelated to the forum contact."'4 9
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 50 is the most expan-
sive jurisdictional case decided by the Court.51 In McGee ju-
risdiction was upheld in California by the single contact of an
insurer's offer to reinsure the plaintiff being sent to the plain-
tiff in California. 52 All the insurance policy premiums were
mailed by the California insured to the insurance company in
Texas. 53 The Texas company had no other contacts whatso-
ever with California.54 Nevertheless, emphazing the quality
and nature of the single contact, the Court upheld
jurisdiction.55
4r 342 U.S. at 445.
46 R.
47 Id.
48 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
49 Note, supra note 29, at 366.
- 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a Texas insurance company had assumed a Cali-
fornia resident's life insurance policy from an Arizona corporation. The Texas com-
pany mailed an offer to the resident offering to insure him under the terms of the
original policy. Id After acceptance, and continued payment of premiums, the resi-
dent-insured died. The company refused to pay on the policy contending the insured
had committed suicide. Id The beneficiaries sought relief and obtained judgment in
the California courts, but the Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment ruling that
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Only a year later in Hanson v. Denckla 56 the Supreme Court
began restricting the expansion of state long arm jurisdic-
tion.57 In Hanson, the Supreme Court established the pur-
poseful availment measure for minimum contacts by holding
that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws."' 58 The Supreme
Court did not decide another personal jurisdiction case for
almost twenty years, while state courts discounted Hanson, for
example, as a mere majority decision and continued to in-
crease their long arm grasp.59 Shaffer v. HeIner,6 ° the first case
- 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The facts of Hanson are as follows: A Pennsylvania resident
set up a trust in Delaware. Id at 238. The grantor subsequently moved to Florida
where payments were made to her and where she exercised her power of appointment
over the assets of the trust. Id Both Delaware and Florida attempted to exercise juris-
diction over the trust assets and the trustee, a Delaware corporation, which assets
would go to different individuals depending on which state law was applied. Id at
238-40. The Supreme Court held that Florida's exercise of jurisdiction was improper
and that jurisdiction could not be sustained merely by the trust's relations and contacts
with the grantor. Id. at 251. The Court reasoned that the contacts amounted to unilat-
eral activity by a nondefendant and that the "unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of con-
tact with the forum State." Id at 253.
" Note, supra note 41, at 353. State courts continued to expand their 'n personam
long arm jurisdiction despite the warnings given in Hanson. Id In Hanson the Court
stated:
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . . . Those
restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on
the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of de-
fending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do
so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
Hanson, 357 -U.S. at 251.
- Id at 253.
- Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jursdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach.- A Comment on
World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson Corp. and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 412
(1980).
433 U.S. 186 (1977). Heitner, a holder of one share of the Greyhound Corpora-
tion, a Delaware corporation, brought a shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware
against the corporation and 28 of its individual directors. Id at 189-90. The same day
the suit was filed a motion was signed sequestering the individual director's Delaware
property (stocks, warrants, options). The seizure was accomplished by placing a stop
transfer on the corporate books; none of the certificates were actually present in Dela-
ware. Id at 191-92. The directors contested jurisdiction, but the Delaware courts re-
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decided after the long silence, ruled that all state assertions of
jurisdiction, including in rem, must satisfy the minimum con-
tacts standard.6'
The Supreme Court again decided an in personam case in
1978, and again, they rejected the assertion of jurisdiction.62
In Kulko v. Califom'a Superior Court,63 a California court was
attempting to maintain i'n personam jurisdiction over a New
York resident to establish a Haitian divorce as a California
judgment and to modify the judgment concerning custody
and child support. The defendant appeared specially and
moved to quash the service of the summons. 64 The defend-
ant's only contacts with the forum were two short military
stopovers several years earlier, his acquiescence in allowing
his daughter to move to California, and the purchase of a
ticket for her to do so. 65 The Supreme Court of California
reasoned that Kulko's allowing his daughter to move to Cali-
fornia to live with her mother and buying the ticket had
made an "effect" in California.66 The court held that by this
action Kulko had purposely availed himself of the benefits
and protections of the laws of California.6 7
The United States Supreme Court rejected the California
rationale for several reasons.68 First, the Court held that by
simply acquiesing to his child's wishes, the father could
"hardly be said to have 'purposely availed himself' of the
'benefits and protections' of California laws."'69 Second, the
jected their minimum contacts analysis because it was a quasi zn rem proceeding. Id. at
195-96.
1, Id at 212. The Shaffer court would not allow an in rem exercise of jurisdiction
independent of the minimum contacts standard. Id. at 212. The Court stated: "The
fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of
jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substan-
tial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state
court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant." Id





67 Id at 94.
'9 Id
M. at 94 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
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Court held that an "effect" in the forum, if properly under-
stood, should mean a type of wrongful activity outside of the
state that causes personal injury or a commercial effect within
the state, and not a mere effect in domestic relations.7" The
third reason the rationale was rejected was because the state
had not expressed a particularized interest in this type of
matter.7 1 Finally, the California rationale was rejected be-
cause general fairness dictated that the jurisdiction not be
sustained.7 2 Kulko had no purposeful contacts with Califor-
nia; he had merely assented to the desire of his child.7 3 The
plaintiff had moved to California and not the defendant;
thus the "effect" had been caused by the unilateral activity of
the plaintiff.75
The most recent in personam case which is germane to the
analysis is World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson .76 The Supreme
Court again reversed an exercise of state personal jurisdic-
tion.7 7 The decision is so strongly defendant-oriented7" that
70 Id at 96-97. This test is derived from section 37 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Second, Con/hct of Laws and has been incorporated into California
law. It provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any
cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects
and of the individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such
jurisdiction unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
, 436 U.S. at 98. California had not enacted a special provision in its jurisdictional
statute to cover this factual situation, and thus, it has not claimed a special interest in
keeping a case of this kind in California. Id The Supreme Court had previously em-
phasized the importance of a special jurisdictional statute in McGee. Id See also McGee,
355 U.S. 220, 221, 224 (1975). See supra note 50 for discussion of McGee.




- 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
77 Id at 299.
11 The World- Wide Volkswagen court even defined the functions of the minimum con-
tacts test in defendant protective terms:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.
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some commentators have considered it at least a limited re-
turn to Pennoyer v. Neff.79
In World- Wide Volkswagen the plaintiff sued a local New
York automobile dealer, the regional distributor, the national
distributor, and the manufacturer of the automobile. 80 The
automobile was purchased in New York and was involved in
a crash in Oklahoma as the plaintiffs were moving from New
York to Arizona.81 The New York dealer and regional dis-
tributor had no contacts with Oklahoma and had neither ad-
vertised nor soliticited business there.8
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma concluded that the as-
sertion of jurisdiction was proper because an automobile is an
intrinsically mobile product and its use is foreseeable in
Oklahoma. 3 While acknowledging that limits had properly
become more relaxed with modern interstate commerce, the
United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen re-
turned to an emphasis on interstate federalism and the consti-
tutional limits of state in personam jurisdiction. 4 The Court
repeated the caveat from Hanson that it is a mistake to think
all restrictions on inpersonam jurisdiction will be eliminated. 5
The Court held that "foreseeability alone has never been a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due
Id at 291-92.
79 95 U.S. 714 (1878), discussedsupra note 34. See Jay, Minimum Contacts as a Unified
Theory of PersonalJurisdicton, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 475 (1981); see also Comment, Civil
Procedure - PersonalJunsidiction, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 541, 547-58 (1981).
- 444 U.S. at 288. Only the local dealer and regional distributor, however, made
special appearances and continued their appeal to the Supreme Court. Id.
B1 d.
82 Id at 289.
81 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
84 444 U.S. at 293-94. The priority of federalism was strongly emphasized. The
Court stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.
Id. at 294.
-1 Id See supra note 56 for the facts of Hanson.
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Process Clause."86 The Court further stated that foreseeabil-
ity could not be the proper criterion because "[e]very seller of
chattel would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for serv-
ice of process." 7 As a result, the seller's "amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel."'88 The Court reasoned that
the real test of foreseeability is not foreseeing a product's use
in another state but "that [the defendant] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state]." 9 This
test, as well as the purposeful availment test, is subjeclive.9° A
third aspect of foreseeability was pointed out by the Court.91
The Court stated that if a manufacturer or distributor seeks
to serve a market directly or indirectly, for example, to de-
liver its product into a state's stream of commerce, and that
product causes injury there, then jurisdiction can be main-
tained against it.9 2
II. THE OREGON DECISION
In Hydraulc Servocontrols,9 the Oregon court faced a diffi-
cult factual situation on the edge of tn personam jurisdictional
law.94 The court acknowledged that World-Wide Volkswagen
was the major controlling precedent. 95 Besides following
World- Wide Volkswagen the court also filtered the facts in Hy-
" 444 U.S' at 295. The court later qualifies itself. It states:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather,
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.
Id at 297.
87 Id at 296.
Id at 297.
-' Comment, supra note 79, at 560. According to one commentator even the dissent
in World-Wide Volkswagen acknowledged that the test is subjective. Id
' 444 U.S. at 297-98.
Id at 298-99. The Court muddied the water somewhat by its vague reference to
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). See Jay, supra note 79, at 442-44.
13 State ex. rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211 (1982).
Hydraulic Semvocontrols, 657 P.2d at 214.
I /d
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draulic Servocontrols through the United States Supreme
Court's in personam precedent.06
After construing that rule 4(L) of ORCP extended to the
outer limits of due process, 97 the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Hydraulic Servocontrols analyzed Hydraulic's contacts with Or-
egon. 8 In its analysis the court summarized the holdings of
International Shoe, 99  Perkins , °°  McGee,' ' Hanson ,102
Kulko ,° 3and World- Wide Volkswagen't 4 and stated that "[t]he
Supreme Court's cases since McGee tell us what minimum
contacts are not rather than what they are."' 0 5 The court
also considered itself as going into virgin territory, stating
that "[n]one of the cases following International Shoe have con-
sidered whether a manufacturer is subject to an action on a
products liability theory in a state where it has no direct con-
tacts."' 6 In analyzing the factual situation in light of World-
Wide Volkswagen, the court summarized its position in terms
of the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in light of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state and stated that
"[o]ne way to judge that reasonableness is by the foreseeabil-
ity of suit in the forum state."'0 7
The Hydraulic Servocontrols decision emphasizes and quotes
extensively from the analysis concerning foreseeability and
the stream of commerce in World-Wide Volkswagen. °8 The
Id. at 212, 214. The court construes the facts in regard to the principles set out in
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Hanson, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and other prece-
dent. Id.
9, 657 P.2d at 212.
Id. at 213-16.
326 U.S. 310 (1945), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 36-40.
1- 342 U.S. 437 (1952), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 43-47.
- 355 U.S. 220 (1957), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 50-55.
102 357 U.S. 235 (1958), dicussed supra in text accompanying notes 56-58.
03 436 U.S. 235 (1958), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 62-75.
, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 76-92.
657 P.2d at 213.
, Id at 214.
107 Id
- Id at 215. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. The same analysis was
used in State ex tel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 207 (1981), discussed supra
at note 3. The plaintiff in Michehn failed to allege any relation between the cause of
action and Oregon, and further failed to properly establish substantial Michelin
France commercial activity in Oregon. 657 P.2d at 210. Nevertheless, the Supreme
19841
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court reasoned that, by selling its product to a national man-
ufacturer of airplanes, Hydraulic was releasing its product
into a national stream of commerce, and it could foresee its
use within the forum state and hence was purposely availing
itself of that national market, including Oregon.o 9 The court
distinguished its exercise of jurisdiction from World- Wide Volk-
swagen's refusal to recognize jurisdiction by pointing out the
difference in distribution and manufacturing." 0 The court
held that by selling servo actuators to Garret, Hydraulic was
seeking to serve a national market". and therefore should ex-
pect to be haled into an Oregon court." 12 Further, the court
ruled that Hydraulic was benefiting indirectly from the pro-
tection of Oregon's laws and that it was benefiting because it
"sold a product with the intention of deriving economic bene-
fit from a national market, including Oregon .""' The court
held, finally, that there was a substantively relevant contact
because the servo actuator [airplane] was sold in Oregon.'"'
Thus, the Oregon court upheld jurisidiction over
Hydraulic. 5
III. IMPLICATIONS
The Oregon decision is important to other state jurisdic-
Court of Oregon construed the pleadings liberally in its jurisdictional analysis by as-
suming that Michelin France had "sought indirectly to serve the Oregon market
through a system of distribution by others which covers the Unitd States." Id. Al-
though the court found this to be a substantial indirect relationship with the forum, it
was still unwilling to sustain jurisdiction. Id at 211. The court construed the reference
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), concerning a "relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation," as a requisite to maintaining jurisdiction.
657 P.2d at 211. It termed this nexus relationship as a "substantively relevant con-
tact," and gave examples such as sale or use of the product within the forum, or acci-
dent or injury within the forum resulting from the product. Id. Hence, because the
cause of action arose in Washington, and no other such contact was established, the
court refused to maintain jurisdiction, reasoning that plaintiffs residence in Oregon
and the existence of general sales or use of Michelin France's products in Oregon is not
enough for Oregon jurisdiction. Id at 208-11.
" 657 P.2d at 215.




.. Id at 216.
1 InId
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tional law for two reasons. The first reason involves the sub-
stantively relevant contact test employed by the court." 6
Other states use an equivalent test." 7 The Oregon decision
may act to give more credibility and weight to a trend not
absolutely required by due process as construed by the
United States Supreme Court."" The second and potentially
more important reason is the Oregon court's construction of
the World- Wide Volkswagen foreseeability of suit test when it
concerns remote component manufacturers." 9  Hydraulc
Servocontrols acts to extend the scope of in personam jurisdiction
for remote component manufacturers. As long as a court
finds a substantively relevant contact such as sale, use, acci-
dent or injury occurring in Oregon, the Hydraulc Servocontrols
"6Id at 210-11.
Note, supra note 29.
"" The discussion of Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co. 342 U.S. 437 (1952),
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 43-47, has shown that a nexus between the
cause of action and the forum is not an absolute prerequisite to sustaining in personam
jurisdiction. The Oregon court in applying the "substantively relevant contact" test in
State ex rel Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 208 (1982), dtcussed supra in note 3,
appears to defeat the very purpose of Oregon's new long arm statute, rule 4(L) of
ORCP. The only contacts required are those necessary to satisfy the "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Michelin France, as the Oregon court concedes, met the basic
criteria of Constitutional in personam jurisdiction. It obtained economic benefit from
the marketing of its product in Oregon, and therefore, it could expect to be haled into
an Oregon court. 657 P.2d at 210. Thus, the key test of World-Wide Volkswagen was
satisfied. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Nor were
these marketing contacts the result of the unilateral activity of the plaintiff. See supra
notes 56-57. Further, its products, through a distributor, received the benefits and pro-
tections of Oregon's laws. 657 P.2d at 210. The court admits that Oregon would be as
fair as any other forum except for the lack of a substantively relevant contact, and it
appears to suggest that jurisdiction would have been proper if a substantively relevant
contact had existed. The court, however, refuses, stating that "the general distribution
of Michelin France's products nationally and in Oregon has no relevance to the sub-
stance of this claim for relief."Id at 211. If, as the court admits, Michelin France's tires
are generally distributed in Oregon, then why should an Oregon plaintiff be precluded
from suing Michelin France in Oregon? Although the nexus relationship is an impor-
tant analytical tool, the United States Supreme Court has never limited in personam
jurisdiction to only those cases where there are substantively relevant contacts. See
supra note 29 for the discussion concerning the nexus requirement. The cases may be
few, but there will no doubt be situations in which a defendant's activities within Ore-
gon are continuous and systematic, and yet an Oregon plaintiff will not be able to
sustain in personam jurisdiction because the cause of action relates to an out of state
activity. Id.
,,. See supra note 86 for the foreseeability of suit test.
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decision should act to sustain jurisdiction over all component
manufacturers putting their products into a nationally mar-
keted product.'20 In Hydraulic Servocontrols the component
manufacturer was thrice removed in privity from the actual
seller; 2' however, the same rationale should apply to the nth
manufacturer who makes any component part for a nation-
ally marketed product.122 If other states are persuaded by
this analysis, any component manufacturer, no matter how
remote, may some day find itself subject to suit anywhere in
the country.' 23 If other states adopt Oregon's position, a
manufacturer of any aircraft part should be prepared to liti-
gate anywhere because of an aircraft's inherently mobile and
national nature. 24 The only way a component manufacturer
could limit its amenability to jurisdiction in a forum is simply
not to manufacture at all.
2 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oregon court faced a difficult factual situation. By
adopting the substantively relevant contact test, the court ac-
ted to restrict future permissible exercises of jurisdiction. 26
The Hydraulic Servocontrols rationale concerning remote manu-
facturers, however, extends the permissible scope of in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Finding that a court has jurisdiction over
a national manufacturer or a national distributor is not unu-
, See 657 P.2d at 215 for an explanation of the logic extending jurisdiction to Hy-
draulic Servocontrols, a removed component manufacturer.
12, 657 P.2d at 212.
122 See supra note 119.
121 Id.
124 Id
12. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) seeks to add pre-
dictability to the system so that potential defendants can structure their primary
human conduct and their basic business relationships to have a minimum assurance of
where they will be liable for suit. Id A manufacturer cannot legally limit the disburse-
ment of its product to a state or group of states. A purchaser cannot be forbidden to
take a product across state lines. Note, supra note 41, at 369. Oregon's rationale leaves
a component manufacturer no viable alternative; either he will be completely vulnera-
ble to suit, or he must cease making his product. Oregon has left him no way to struc-
ture his primary human conduct to avoid suit.
'- See Note, supra note 29, at 382 for a discussion of how the past Texas nexus re-
quirement restricted jurisdiction.
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sual nor would it be argued improper. 127 But the case for a
remote component manufacturer is not as clear. 28  World-
Wide Volkswagen did not simply repeat earlier foreseeability
criteria.' 29 First, it emphasized that foreseeability of use of a
product in another state alone was not sufficient to sustain per-
sonal jurisdiction. 30 Second, the Court set forth its subjective
test of whether the defendant could "reasonably anticipate
being haled into court."''13 This test is the foreseeability test
"that is critical to due process."'' 32 After emphasizing the first
two aspects of the analysis, the Court then dealt with manu-
facturers and distributors and the stream of commerce.
133
Unfortunately, the passage concerning manufacturers and
distributors and its reference to the stream of commerce is
unclear. 13
4
The World- Wide Volkswagen passage concerning the stream
of commerce did not expressly mention foreseeability. 35 The
Court uses a subjective term: expectation .136 The opinion states
that if a corporation purposely avails itself of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum, then it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there. 37 In the passage the Court used a hypo-
thetical in explanation of the stream of commerce theory. 38
The hypothetical uses the examples of a national distributor,
Volkswagen, and the final manufacturer, Audi. 39 The Court
simply stated in conclusory terms that due process would not
be offended by asserting "jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its product into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
127 See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
128 Note, supra note 41, at 368.
444 U.S. at 295.
3 Id.
,3, Id. at 297.
;32 Id
, Id Audi, the manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the distributor, were the exam-
pies. Id
,14 Note, supra note 41, at 368.
444 U.S. at 297-98.
, Id at 298.
,3' Id at 297.
I38 Id
,99 Id at 298.
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forum State.'
' 40
There are several potential problems with the Hydraulic
Serocontrols decision. The first problem involves the emphasis
by the court on Hydraulic's serving a national market.
1 4 1
The court holds that because the airplane's ultimate sale in
Oregon was an expected result, Hydraulic had effectively de-
livered its product into a stream of commerce involving Ore-
gon. 142 This conclusion, however, may be begging the
question. Under a subjective test, it seems questionable to
impute Hydraulic with expectation of suit nationally when
its product was twice removed from the final manufacturer.
It appears that the Oregon court is applying a mere foresee-
ability test although the court purports to be evaluating ex-
pectation. According to World-W'de Volkswagen, it is
foreseeability of suit that is critical, not mere foreseeability. 1
43
Second, the state court considers Hydraulic to have purposely
availed itself of the benefits of the laws of the forum through
the sale of the airplane in Oregon. 44 This second conclusion
is tenuous; Hydraulic was thrice removed from the actual sale
to the plaintiff in Oregon. 45 A distributor and a final, or
possibly even a secondary, manufacturer 46 could theoretical-
lly be tied together as acting in concert or partnership with
the distributor and therefore availing themselves of the bene-
fits of the laws of Oregon. But there must come a point when
this fiction becomes ludicrous. For example, it would be ab-
surd to sustain jurisdiction over a local New York manufac-
turer of an allegedly defective screw sold to Hydraulic to
make the servo actuator if it knew the screws would eventu-
ally be used in an airplane.
For a national manufacturer or distributor, the subjective
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court" test can al-
140 Id
'4, 657 P.2d at 215.
142 Id
14 444 U.S. at 296-97.
1" 657 P.2d at 215.
'4 Id at 212.
-6 See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) for a case in which a secondary manufacturer was held liable.
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most be assumed as automatically met. 147 This assumption is
not so clear for a thrice-removed component manufacturer.
By selling a servo actuator to an engine manufacturer, Hy-
draulic did not subjectively anticipate being haled into an
Oregon court. Being so far removed from Oregon through the
chain of manufacturing makes it highly questionable whether
Hydraulic was on clear notice that it was subject to suit in
Oregon. 48 A reasonable expectation might be that Hydrau-
lic could expect to be answerable to the engine maker or the
airplane manufacturer for indemnity in one of their respec-
tive states.
Justice Blackmun said in World-Wide Volkswagen that he
was not sure why the plaintiff wanted to sue the dealer and
regional distributor when he had access to the manufacturer
and national distributor.'49 Also, Hydraulic might reason-
ably expect litigation with Garret or Cessna, as mentioned
above, but not with an individual in Oregon, and Hydraulic
might reasonably expect that the individual buyer would
have its recourse against Cessna or the distributor. The final
problem involves the scope of the stream of commerce pas-
sage in World- Wide Volkswagen. '50 That it covers a component
manufacturer is not clear; that it covers a thrice-removed
component manufacturer is certainly not clear.
Frank Schuble
444 U.S. at 297.
,48 Id The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen held that a corporation that purposely
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state has clear
notice that it is subject to suit there. Id (emphasis added).
- Id at 317-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15o Id at 297-98.
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FEDERAL LAW-WORKERS' COMPENSATION-The Exclu-
sive Liability Provision of the Federal Employees' Compen-
sation Act Does Not Bar Third-Party Indemnity Actions
against the United States. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983).
On April 4, 1975 a Lockheed manufactured C5A aircraft
left Saigon Airport as a part of "Operation Babylift,"' an
evacuation program for Vietnamese orphans. Some fifteen
minutes after take-off, the aft ramp and pressure and cargo
doors fell off due to a failure in the aft ramp locking system.2
The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but ultimately
crash-landed in a rice paddy. Approximately 150 persons
died in the crash?
Among those killed was Ann Nash Bottorff, a civilian em-
ployee of the United States Navy.4 The government paid
death benefits to the Bottorff estate as required by the Fed-
eral Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) .5 The adminis-
trator of the estate then filed a wrongful death claim against
' Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
orphans were being flown to the United States for adoption by American families. Id
2 Id at 838-39. The failure was primarily due to improper maintenance of the door
by the Air Force. Joint Appendix at 62-65, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v United States,
103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983). Despite contrary regulations, the Air Force maintenance per-
sonnel would customarily remove parts from various C5A aircraft at their air base and
use them on others which were being readied for flight. Id. This "robbing of Peter to
pay Paul" was necessitated by a shortage of spare parts. Id As a result, maintenance
personnel used "borrowed" tie rods and other cannabalized parts in rigging the cargo
door of the C5A involved in this case. Id
3 Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For
other descriptions of this accident and actions arising therefrom, see Schneider v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Saigon, South Vietnam on April 4, 1975, 476 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1979).
Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 665 F.2d 1330, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
r, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976). The Act provides in pertinent part that the
"United States shall pay compensation . . . for the disability or death of an employee
resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty. 5
U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1976).
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Lockheed, seeking damages under a products liability the-
ory.6 Lockheed impleaded the United States for indemnity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),7 alleging that
the government was primarily responsible for the crash and
subsequent deaths.8
After settling the claim with Bottorff's administrator, Lock-
heed moved for summary judgment against the United
States, which had never disputed its primary responsibility
for the disaster.9 In defense, the government argued that
such a third-party indemnity claim was barred by the
FECA's exclusive liability provision.'I The district court dis-
agreed and granted Lockheed's motion. 1 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals concluded on appeal that
the language of the FECA did indeed bar the claim.'2 It re-
versed the district court and remanded Lockheed's action
against the government.1 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.14 HELD: The Fed-
eral Employees' Compensation Act does not bar third-party
indemnity actions against the United States. 5
6 Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 665 F.2d 1330, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a
discussion of third-party claims in a product liability context, see O'Connell, Barganing
for Waivers of Third Party Tort Claims.- An Answer to Product Liability Woes for Employers and
Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435; Phillips, Contributon and Indemnity in
Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974).
1 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1976) (hereinafter FTCA).
The Act provides that:
[The United States is] liable for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope or office
of his employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occured. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1976).
Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 665 F.2d 1330, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033, 1035 (1983).
o Id For the text of the exclusive liability provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)(1976), see
infra text accompanying note 17.
" Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 665 F.2d 1330, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
12 Id.
3, Id at 1333-34.
14 103 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
If, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033, 1038 (1983).
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I. "THE MOST EVENLY BALANCED CONTROVERSY"
Section 8116(c) of the FECA limits the government's liabil-
ity for the injury or death of its employees to those benefits
established under the Act. 16  The section provides, in perti-
nent part:
The liability of the United States . . with respect to the in-
jury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all
other liability of the United States . . .to the employee, his
legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any
other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the
United States . . .because of the injury or death . . 7
Although the language of this provision appears to preclude
any suit which might arise from an injury to a government
employee, sharply conflicting interpretations of the provision
have arisen since the FECA's enactment in 1949.18 The issue
presented to the courts has been whether the provision should
preclude third-party plaintiffs from actions for indemnity or
contribution against the government for damages paid to fed-
eral employees.' 9
This issue has been referred to by Professor Larson as per-
haps "the most evenly balanced controversy in all of work-
men's compensation law" because of the irreconcilable con-
flict between the interests of the employer and those of the
61 For a discussion of the benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act
(hereinafter FECA), see inf/a text accompanying notes 28-33.
" 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976). The 1949 enactment, see in/a note 33, differed only
slightly in wording. It read, in pertinent part:
The liability of the United States. . .with respect to the injury or death
of an employee shall be exclusive, and in place of all other liability of the
United States . . .to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, de-
pendents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the United States on account of such injury or death ....
Federal Employees' Compensation Act, § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1949). References in
the text to the "exclusive liability provision" will refer to either version unless otherwise
noted. Substantively, the two versions are the same. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033, 1036 (1983).
In This paper will address the various interpretations of this provision in a generally
chronological order as they were developed prior to the principal case.
,9 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033, 1036 (1983). See also
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures. Recommendationsfor Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 227-28, 283-84 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Commission on Revision].
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third-party claimant. 20 The employer is primarily interested
in limiting its liability for injuries to its employees to a pre-
dictable amount against which it can insure.2' In return for
this scheduled compensation, the employer accepts strict lia-
bility for injuries to its employees and thus gives up the right
to defend itself against claims for injury for which the em-
ployer is not actually at fault.22 Third-party claims for con-
tribution and indemnity,23 if they are allowed, will expand
the employer's liability beyond the limitations guaranteed by
the compensation act and defeat the employer's expectations
of fixed liability.2 4 At the same time, a third party who is
only partially or secondarily at fault in causing the em-
ployee's injury expects to obtain contribution or indemnity
from the other tortfeasor, and does not expect to be charged
with the entire loss due merely to the fortuitous circumstance
that the other parties involved are under a compensation
act.25 If suit is precluded, the third party's otherwise valid
claim will be vitiated, and a loss which should be borne by
two will fall to only one.2 6 This casenote will examine the
Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 483, 484.
21 Id; 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10 (1976); Lar-
son, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L.
REV. 351 (1970) [hereinafter Larson, Workmen's Compensation]; Note, Contribution and
Indemnity Under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 273 (1974).
2 Note, supra note 21, at 277-78.
23 Contribution and indemnity are distinct theories in the law of torts, though they
are at times confused. Both are founded on equitable principles which seek to protect
a party from bearing more than its deserved share of a loss. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§§ 50-51 (4th ed. 1971). Contribution is a statutory creation which splits damage
awards proportionately between joint tortfeasors, each of whom is independently liable
in tort to the plaintiff. Indemnity is a judicial creation which shifts the entire responsi-
bility for a loss from one party to another. This shift is made because of the relation-
ship between the defendant parties (such as respondeat superior), the difference in the
comparative duty owed by each defendant to the injured plaintiff, or the difference in
kind and degree of fault attributable to each tortfeasor. Id For discussions comparing
and explaining indemnity and contribution, see id.; Larson, Workmen's Compensation,
supra note 21, at 351; Leflar, Contribution and Indemniy Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REv. 130 (1932); Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace. The Effect of Workers' Com-
pensation on the Rights and Liabilites of Third Parties, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 1035; Note, To-
ward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 123 (1965).
2, Larson, supra note 20, at 485.
25 Id
26 Id
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various federal judicial approaches to this controversy and its
recent resolution by the Supreme Court.
A. The Balance Defined-Early Historical Background
In 1916, Congress passed the FECA and thereby provided
federal employees with statutory compensation for accidental
injuries suffered while working.27 The FECA was the only
legal remedy available to injured employees at the time of its
enactment, for the government was immune from suit in
tort.28 In 1946, however, Congress created a general waiver
of sovereign immunity in tort when it passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).2 9 As a result, injured federal employees
had an alternative when seeking a remedy: they could collect
their benefits under the FECA, or they could sue for damages
under the FTCA.30  The FECA benefits had become inade-
27 The Federal Employees' Compensation Act, ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)(1976)). The Act provided for disability and death bene-
fits based on a percentage of the injured employee's regular earnings prior to the injury
or death. For example, a widow without dependent children would receive 35% of her
husband's wages for a specified period, and a totally disabled employee could receive
up to 66% of his or her prior earnings. Id., 39 Stat. 743-44, §§ 6-10.
-8 H.R. REP. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st. Sess. 14 (1949) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
729]; see also PROSSER, supra note 23, at 970-72.
- The Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-60 1, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842
(1949)(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C §§1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411,
2412, 2671-2680 (1976)). See also PROSSER, supra note 23, at 970-72. See generally
WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT (1957); Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liabihty
for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1325 (1954); Comment, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947); NoteJoinder of the Government Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 59 YALE L.J. 1515 (1950).
Prior to enacting the FTCA, Congress had authorized other general waivers of im-
munity through such acts as the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§741-752
(1920) (allowing in personam libel against the United States) and the Public Vessels Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1925)(allowing libel or impleader in admiralty of the United
States). See generally, Borchard, Governmental Immunity in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924);
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Borchard, Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort, VII, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577 (1928).
-' H.R. REP. No. 729, supra note 28, at 14; H.R. 3191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1949), reprnted in Hearings on HR. 3191 Before a Special Subcommittee on Education and
Labor, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1949).
The House Report explained the existence of the dual remedies as a historical acci-
dent. The FECA was enacted in 1916 when the government was immune from suit in
tort. There was no need for an exclusive liability provision because the Act was the
exclusive remedy of the employees, who could not sue the United States for damages.
According to the report, the 1916 Congress did not anticipate that the employee would
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quate by 1946,'3 1 so employees often chose to forego their as-
sured but meager compensation in favor of litigating for a
better recovery. 2 Naturally, this produced a greater cost to
the government than was allowed under the FECA alone.
Congress responded to this situation in two ways. First, it
increased the benefits awarded under the FECA 3 Second, it
made those increased benefits the exclusive remedy for in-
jured employees and their beneficiaries or dependents.3 4 The
reasoning behind this exclusion, as expressed in the legislative
history of section 8116(c),35 focused on the benefits both to
the government and the injured workers. 6 The amendments
would assure the employees and their dependents "a planned
and substantial protection" as a substitute for their right to a
costly and time-consuming action at law for damages.37 At
the same time, the government could realize significant sav-
ings by limiting its liability while avoiding litigation.3 8  Ac-
cording to the legislative reports, section 8116(c) was enacted
as a quidpro quo exchange for the mutual benefit of the gov-
ernment and of its employees and their dependents. 39 As be-
have an alternative remedy against the government when it fashioned the Act. H.R.
REP. No. 729, supra note 28, at 14-15.
.1 H.R. REP. No. 729, supra note 28, at 15. The original Act of 1916 provided for a
maximum benefit of only $66.67 per month for total disability or death. This schedule
was not amended until 1949. See infra note 33.
.2 H.R. REP. No. 729, supra note 28, at 15. Under the FECA, the government be-
came strictly liable to its employees. The injured worker could thus collect benefits
without the requirement or expense of proving the government's fault through litiga-
tion. See PROSSER, supra note 23, at 530-31.
3 Federal Employees' Compensation Act Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 357, 63
Stat. 860 [hereinafter 1949 Amendments]. In the 1949 Amendments, Congress raised
the maximum benefit available from 66.67% of an employee's normal compensation to
75% with no upper dollar limit such as that ($66.67) found in the 1916 Act. Instead,
the 1949 Amendments linked the percentages to the general government pay schedule
based on the employee's classification. See 1949 Amendments, §§ 750-759, 63 Stat. 860
(now codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8102-8113 (1976)).
'4 H.R. REP. No. 729, supra note 28; S. REP. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23





11 Id The reports make no mention whatsoever of unrelated third parties in the
reasons for creating the exclusive liability provision. There are frequent references to
the dependents and beneficiaries of employees, and even one mention of "persons pro-
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tween those two groups, the remedy under the FECA became
exclusive.4 °
Two years after the 1949 Amendments were enacted, the
Supreme Court decided a tort claim which did not involve
the FECA, but which established the general right to make
third-party claims against the government under the
FTCA.41 In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 42 several private
citizens were injured when the taxi in which they were riding
collided with a United States mail truck. The combined neg-
ligence of the two drivers caused the accident. 43 The passen-
gers sued Yellow Cab, which in turn impleaded the United
States for contribution." The trial court allowed the claim,
and the court of appeals affirmed. 45 The government ap-
pealed the allowance of this third-party action, arguing that
the Federal Tort Claims Act allowed only direct actions
against the government, not derivative tort claims such as
contribution. 6 The United States Supreme Court disagreed,
holding instead that the government had consented through
the FTCA to be sued both in third-party and separate ac-
tions.47 Looking to the language of the Act, the Court held
that the United States was liable in third-party actions to
whatever extent the law of the place of injury imposed liabil-
ity on a similarly-situated private person.48
In 1956, the Supreme Court reviewed an exclusive liability
provision nearly identical49 to that of the FECA in Ryan Steve-
doring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic SS Corp. ,5o and held that it did not
preclude third-party claims for contractual indemnity.51 The
tected" under the Act. Id There is thus no record of Congress' intent, if any, regard-
ing the rights of third parties.
- See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963).
4' Note, supra note 21, at 277.
42 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
.3 Id. at 544.
Id.
SId. at 545.
46 Id. at 544-45.
4' Id at 556-57.
4 Id. For the relevant language of the Act, see supra note 5.
41 See infra note 58.
" 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
r" Id. at 128-32.
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case arose when Ryan's improper loading of materials onto
the defendant's ship resulted in injury to one of Ryan's own
employees. 52 Rather than accept his benefits under the Long-
shoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act (LHWCA),53 the em-
ployee sued the shipowner who then impleaded Ryan for
indemnity. 54 The trial court denied the claim for lack of an
express contract of indemnity between the parties,55 but the
appellate court reversed on the basis of an implied contract of
indemnity between the primarily negligent party (Ryan) and
the indemnitor.56 Neither court discussed the effect of the
LHWCA on the claim.57 The question presented was
whether the LHWCA's exclusive liability provision pre-
cluded the shipowner from asserting such an indemnity
claim.58 The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusive li-
ability provision did not preclude the claim when the claim
was founded on an independent contractual or implied con-
tractual duty of the employer to the third party.59
In its analysis, the Court noted that the LHWCA would
not have precluded claims based on an express indemnity
contract between Ryan and Pan-Atlantic.6 ° Although there
was no actual contract, the Court reasoned that the nature of
the relationship between the two parties implied one.6 In
other words, Ryan impliedly warranted its stowage work
against any damage which improper stowage might cause.6 2
.2 Id. at 126-27.
- The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1976). An injured employee covered under the Act has the option of receiving
compensation or suing a liable third party for damages. Id § 933.
Ryan, 350 U.S. at 127.
, Palazzolo v. Pan At. S.S. Corp., Il1 F. Supp. 505, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
Palazzolo v. Pan At. S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1954).
.5 Ryan, 350 U.S. at 128.
- Id The exclusive liability provision of the LHWCA is contained in 33 U.S.C
§ 905 (1976), which provides in pertinent part that the "liability of an employer ...
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages . . . on account of. . . injury or death.
33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976).
- Ryan, 350 U.S. at 131-32.
Id at 130.
Id at 133-34.
'2 Id. at 130.
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The independent contractual right in Pan-Atlantic which de-
volved from this work relationship was not "on account of"
any injury to Ryan's employees, and thus this contractual
claim was not precluded by the exclusive liability provision of
the LHWCA.63 The Court, however, made no finding re-
garding non-contractual indemnity claims because the case
involved none.
64
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court examined the
scope of the FECA's exclusive liability provision in Weerhaeu-
ser S S Co. v. United States.65 In Weerhaeuser, a United States
Army dredge collided with the FE. Weyerhaeuser off the coast
of Oregon. 66  Weyerhaeuser Steamship Company subse-
quently brought an action against the United States under
the Public Vessels Act. 67 Finding both vessels at fault in the
collision, the district court applied the admiralty rule of di-
vided damages6' and split the aggregate losses between the
two parties.69 Weyerhaeuser included among its provable
damages a $16,000 award to a federal employee who had suc-
cessfully sued Weyerhaeuser for injuries sustained in the colli-
sion.7° Although the government agreed that such an award
would normally be included in the aggregate total, it con-
tended that the FECA's exclusive liability provision qualified
the divided damages rule as to that item when a federal em-
I d.
.Id at 133.
' 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
.Id at 597-98.
67 Id at 598; Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C §§ 781-790 (1927). The Act provides in
pertinent part that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the
United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States ... "
46 U.S.C. § 781.
- Under established admiralty law of that time, when a collision occurred in open
waters between two vessels, and both vessels were at fault, all provable damages and
reasonable court costs for each vessel were aggregated and the loss divided evenly be-
tween the vessels. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (in
which Court examines history of the divided damages rule). In 1975, however, the
Supreme Court replaced this rule with the comparative negligence standard. Id See
also Owen, The Or'gins and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759
(1977).
69 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Cal. 1959), supple-
mentedat 178 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
70 Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 599.
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ployee was involved.7 The government argued that its liabil-
ity to the employee under the FECA was exclusive of all
other liability "to anyone otherwise entitled to recover, '72 and
that therefore recovery of the $8,000 by Weyerhaeuser was
precluded.73 The court of appeals agreed and reversed the
trial court on that point.74 Upon review, the Supreme Court
addressed the narrow question of whether the exclusive liabil-
ity provision of the FECA modified the admiralty rule of di-
vided damages in mutual fault collisions.7 5  The Court
analyzed the provision from three perspectives, 76 but found
no basis for such a modification of the divided damages
rule.77
The Court first examined the statutory construction of the
provision by applying the rule of eyusdem generis.78 Under this
rule, the specific language of a statute qualifies the general,
limiting the general to the same class of matters as those spe-
cifically mentioned.79 In the exclusive liability provision of
the FECA, the general language "anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages" follows the explicitly enumerated cate-
gories of employees, their dependents, and their representa-
tives."0 In light of that construction, the Court held that the
language did not clearly include unrelated third parties such
as Weyerhaeuser.8"
Turning to the Act's legislative history, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress' purpose in adding section 8116(c)
to the FECA was to establish an exclusive statutory remedy
between the United States and its employees and their repre-
7' Id
72 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1949) (emphasis added).
13 Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 599.
74 1d.
7. Id. at 600-01.
76 See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
77 Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 600-03.
78 In Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936), the Court defined ejusdem
generis as a firmly established rule "for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when
there is uncertainty . . . . [Ilt limits general terms which follow specific ones to mat-
ters similar to those specified.
79 Id.
- Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 600-01.
" Id
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sentatives or dependents.82 Moreover, the Court stated that
"[t]here is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned
with the rights of unrelated third parties, much less of any
purpose to disturb settled doctrines of admiralty law affecting
the mutual rights and liabilities of private shipowners in colli-
sion cases."83 Weyerhaeuser Steamship Company was thus
not within the intended purview of the provision, according
to the Court."4
Finally, the Court analogized the FECA's exclusive liabil-
ity provision to the nearly identical provision of the
LHWCA85 on which section 8116(c) was partially based.86
The Court noted that in Ryan Slevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic SS
Corp. ,87 it had held that the LHWCA provision did not pre-
clude indemnity claims sounding in contract.8 8 Moreover,
the Court pointed out that the same result (of allowing third-
party claims) had been reached in a series of cases subsequent
to Ryan89 even though "the contractual relationship was con-
82 Id. at 601.
83 Id.
84 Id
.r 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976). For the actual language of the provision, see supra note
58. Compare the language of 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1949), supra note 17, with the lan-
guage of 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976), supra text accompanying note 17.
H.R. 3191, § 201, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in Hearngs on HR. 3191
Before a Special Subcommittee ofthe House Committee on Education and Labor, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1949). The report stated that the provision (5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1949)) was
based on the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1927), and on N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11
(McKinney 1938) ("The liability of an employer.., shall be exclusive and in place of
any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband,
parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
. ... ). Significantly, by the time the FECA was amended in 1949, the New York
statute had been held not to preclude third-party recovery actions against employers.
See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938)(allowing third-party claim against employer for damages
paid on account of injuries to employee); Larson, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 21,
at 409-11.
87 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 602.
Id. at 603. The Supreme Court allowed third-party claims based on implied con-
tract in the following cases (all involving the exclusive liability provision of the
LHWCA): Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355. U.S. 563 (1958);
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Waterman S.S. Corp v.
Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960).
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siderably more attenuated" than that in Ryan. 90 Although
the Weyerhaeuser case presented no contractual claim, it did
involve a well-established rule of admiralty law9' which the
Court held to be equally clear in defining the rights and du-
ties of the parties involved.92 The Court concluded that the
FECA's exclusive liability provision did not modify a ship-
owner's right to split losses with the government under the
admiralty rule of divided damages.93
B. The Controversy Addressed- Treadwell to Thomas
In 1962, just prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wey-
erhaeuser, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Drake v.
Treadwell Construction Co. 94 that the exclusive liability provi-
sion of the FECA precludes a third-party claim against the
United States for contribution resulting from injuries to a
federal employee.95 The case arose when a steel expansion
tank exploded and injured Joseph Drake, a federal employee.
The accident was due to negligent construction of the tank by
Treadwell and negligent maintenance by the United States.96
Treadwell sought contribution from the government for dam-
ages paid to Drake. 7 The trial court entered judgment for
Treadwell,98 but the Third Circuit dismissed the claim, hold-
ing that it was precluded by the FECA's exclusive liability
provision.9 9 The court reasoned that civil liability can be im-
posed upon a sovereign only to the extent that the sovereign
Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 602-03.
9, Id. at 603. For a discussion of the divided damages rule which the court held to
govern this situation, see supra note 68.
92 Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 603.
93 Id at 604
299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1962).
- Id at 790.
Id. at 790-91.
97 Id Treadwell also had based its third party claim on a contractual theory, but
the court refused to hear it for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1964), the Court of Claims had primary jurisdiction over contractual claims
against the government in excess of $10,000, which Treadwell's claim exceeded. Tread-
well, 299 F.2d at 791-92.
-, Id at 790.
Id at 791-92.
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consents."° Although the United States had consented to be
impleaded for third-party claims through the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 1 ' the court concluded that the language of sec-
tion 8116(c) of the FECA 10 2 withdrew that consent when the
claims were for damages awarded to a federal employee.10 3
The Third Circuit dismissed the contribution claim, and
Treadwell sought certiorari. 0 4 The Supreme Court vacated
the decision without opinion and remanded it to the trial
court for reconsideration in light of Weyerhaeuser.'0 5 Upon re-
mand, the court concluded that the FECA's exclusive liabil-
ity provision did not preclude third-party contribution
claims, and entered judgment for Treadwell. °6 The United
States maintained its position to the contrary, but ultimately
settled without appealing this adverse decision.'0 7
In 1964, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
issue of whether third-party claims were available against the
United States for awards paid to persons covered by the
FECA in United Air Lines v. Weiner.'0 8 The case involved a
mid-air collision between a commercial airliner and a United
States Air Force jet fighter that resulted in the deaths of
forty-nine persons, including seven civilian government em-
ployees.'0 9 The trial court found that United and the govern-
ment were both at fault in causing the crash and dismissed all
claims for indemnity by United."0 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, allowed indemnity"' against the government for all
' Id.
,o, See supra notes 42-48.
,02 See sura text accompanying note 17 for the language of section 8116(c).
-0 Treadwell, 299 F.2d at 790-91.
-o Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963).
1 Id
,o Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109, 111 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
07 Id The government originally filed an appeal, but later moved for dismissal of
the appeal when the United States Solicitor General recommended against it for rea-
sons not known. Id
- 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
- Id at 384-85.
11o Id.
I Id The trial and appellate courts both found United and the United States neg-
ligent. The appellate court, however, overturned the lower court's finding that the
parties were in pan" delto, holding instead that the character of the government's fault
warranted indemnity rather than mere contribution. Id at 398-402.
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damages incurred by United in the deaths of non-govern-
ment workers, but affirmed the trial court in disallowing in-
demnity in the cases of the government employees." t2 The
court held that under the controlling law, indemnity can only
be had where the indemnitor is liable in tort to the injured
party.' The government, however, has no such tort liability
to its employees, according to the court, because the FECA
replaced the government's common law tort liability with a
strict liability which operates regardless of fault on the part of
the United States." 4 The holdings in Weyerhaeuser and Ryan
offered no support, the court concluded, because the former
applies only when a rule of law (such as the divided damages
rule in admiralty)" 5 creates a duty in the government to the
third party, and the latter applies only when an actual or
implied contract supplies the duty. ' 6 The court held that
United's claim for indemnity was not based on a duty run-
ning between it and the government, but on tort liability." 7
As the government had no liability in tort to its employees," 
8
the court held that United's claim for indemnity must fail." 9
The exclusive liability provision of the FECA, said the court,
2 Id. at 402-04, 409.
Id The FTCA requires application of the law of the place where the injury oc-
cured. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946). The court found that Nevada (the situs of the
accident) had no statutes regarding indemnity, but that Nevada courts would apply
American common law instead. Weiner, 335 F.2d at 398. The court then reviewed the
common law, and found that indemnity was available when there was an extreme
difference in the character of the fault of the parties, as the court found in this case. Id
at 398-401. The court awarded indemnity in favor of United Air Lines, the original
defendant, and against the United States, the third-party defendant, in all non-govern-
ment employee suits. Id. at 398-402. See also Note, Contribution and Indemnity in Califor-
nia, 57 CALIF L. REV. 490, 496-99 (1969).
"1 Weiner, 335 F.2d at 402-04.
i, Id. at 404. The court held that indemnity was not an established rule compara-
ble to the divided damages rule, and thus it created no actionable duty under the
FECA. Id
- Id. at 403-04.
117 Id at 402-04.
HR Id at 402.
-, Id. at 403. The Ninth Circuit rejected United's contention that the Supreme
Court's remand of Treadwell, 372 U.S. 772 (1969), discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 94-104, indicated a broader interpretation of Weerhaeuser and Ryan. The court,
however, did not develop its rationale for this decision, but merely noted how well-
settled the workers' compensation exclusive liability principles were which United
wished to overturn. Id
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precluded third-party claims for tort indemnity. 120
In 1968, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted a third-party contribution claim in Murray v.
United States .121 The suit arose when a federal employee was
injured when an elevator fell in a building which Murray
leased to the government.1 22  The employee received her
FECA benefits and sued Murray for negligence. 123 Murray,
alleging that the United States was primarily at fault, sought
contribution, but the trial court dismissed the claim upon a
motion for summary judgment by the United States. 24 The
Second Circuit was thus presented with the question of
whether contribution could be awarded against the govern-
ment in the face of the exclusive liability provision of the
FECA. 25 The court held that although both parties were at
fault in the accident, the FECA's exclusive liability provision
precluded Murray's third-party claim against the govern-
ment as a matter of local law.' 26 The court noted that the
FTCA subjected the government to third-party suits to the
same extent that a private party could be sued under District
of Columbia law. 27 The court reasoned that under the ap-
plicable law, contribution was available only between joint
tortfeasors.128 Since workers' compensation laws replaced the
- Id The Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Weiner on two other occasions:
Wein Alaska Airlines v. United States, 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940
(1967)(affirming its holding in Weiner); Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 535 F.2d
489 (9th Cir. 1976)(rejecting the contention that the Ninth Circuit's earlier reasoning
was overruled by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v.
United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 165-191).
,2, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2 Id at 1363.
23 Id
,24 Id Murray also added claims for indemnity, but these were dismissed for two
reasons: the court had no jurisdiction over the contractual claim, see supra note 97, and
the non-contractual claim was too poorly developed to merit review. Id at 1363, 1367-
68.
'" Id. at 1363.
126 Id
'27 Id. The FTCA requires that the law of the state in which the claim arises be used
to try the case. 28 U.S.C § 1346(b) (1949).
,28 Murray, 405 F.2d at 1364; George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219
(D.C. Cir. 1945)(establishing the common law rights of contribution between joint
tortfeasors).
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employer's common law tort liability with strict liability, the
court held that the employer could not be liable to its em-
ployees in tort, and thus could not be a joint tortfeasor. 2 9
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
Murray's contribution claim. 3 °
The court rejected Murray's contention that the Supreme
Court holding in Weyerhaeuser S.S Co. v. United States 3 ' al-
lowed a contribution claim against the government despite
the exclusive liability provision of the FECA.132 In Weyerhaeu-
ser, the Supreme Court held that FECA section 8116(c) did
not bar a third-party claim against the government for one
half of the damages paid by the third party to a federal em-
ployee.133 The District of Columbia Circuit Court limited
the application of this holding to those situations involving
the admiralty rule of divided damages such as in the Weer-
haeuser case.' 34 The court thus held that the exclusive liabil-
ity provision of the FECA did bar a third-party contribution
claim against the government for damages awarded to a fed-
eral employee. 35
In 1969, the First Circuit expanded on the concept of un-
derlying tort liability as a basis for third-party claims in New
port Air Park, Inc. v. United States .136 The case arose when the
combined negligence of the United States and Newport Air
Park caused an aircraft collision which resulted in the death
of a civilian federal employee and others.137 Newport sought
119 Murray, 405 F.2d at 1364.
130 Id
":1'372 U.S. 597 (1963), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 65-67.
,12 Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 597.
13:1 Id
1:4 Murray, 405 F.2d at 1364.
1- Id Although contribution was disallowed, the court reduced the award against
Murray by half. Id at 1365-66. The court stated that contribution was equitable in
nature, and any inequity arising from the decision was mitigated by a District of Co-
lumbia rule which provided that where one joint tortfeasor compromised a claim, the
other tortfeasor was protected from added injury by having his tort judgment reduced
by one-half. Id The court, however, did not note that this might contradict its overall
reasoning in that it had earlier stated that the government could not be considered a
joint tortfeasor for purposes of contribution. Id at 1364-66.
36 419 F.2d 342 (Ist Cir. 1969).
'37 Id at 343.
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contribution for damages assessed against it for the death of
the civilian employee, and the trial court allowed the claim,
finding that the FECA's exclusive liability provision did not
bar a third-party claim against the government. 13  On ap-
peal, the First Circuit agreed that the provision did not bar
the claim, but redefined the issue of whether section 8116(c)
of the FECA affected Newport's right to sue as a third-party
plaintiff by rephrasing it as the question of whether the third
party had an enforceable right at all. 139 The court held as a
matter of federal law that Newport had no enforceable right
because the government was under no tort liability to its
employees. 140
The court analyzed the FECA's exclusive liability provi-
sion as a federally created immunity, and held that the extent
of that immunity is a matter of federal law.1 4' Relying on the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in United Air Lines v.
Weiner' 42 that the United States has no tort liability to its
employees, 143 the First Circuit concluded that a third party
has no right of contribution from another party which is stat-
utorily immune from tort liability. 144 The court acknowl-
edged that the FECA provision does not bar a third party's
direct, independent claims against the government.' 45  The
court reasoned, however, that contribution is an indirect
right which arises when one of several joint tortfeasors satis-
fies a judgment levied against all. 146 Since section 8116(c) of
,38 Newport Air Park v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 811-12 (D.R.I. 1968).
- Newport Air Park, 419 F.2d at 344.
-0 Id. at 347.
141 Id. at 344, 346-47. The court noted that under the applicable Rhode Island law
as established in Farrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966), the United
States might have been liable to third-party suit despite its exclusive liability under the
FECA. The court, however, held that the government's immunity was a federal, not a
state, creation so that the otherwise applicable law was inapposite. Newport Air Park,
419 F.2d at 346-47.
"4 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
", Id at 404.
"4 Newport Air Park, 419 F.2d at 347.
' Id at 344-45. The court held that Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. 597 (1963), discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 65-67, involved an independent, personal right of the
third party against the government. Newport Air Park, 419 F.2d at 345.
1- Id. at 346.
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the FECA removes the government's liability in tort to its
employees, the court concluded that the government cannot
be a joint tortfeasor with the contribution claimant. 47 The
court thus held that a third party has no right to contribution
against the United States for damages awarded to an injured
federal employee who is covered under the FECA. 148
In 1975, the Second Circuit addressed this same issue in
Gah'mi v. Jetco, Inc. 149 The initial suit was brought by Galimi,
a civilian Coast Guard employee who was injured while load-
ing a truck leased by Jetco. 5 Galimi received disability and
medical benefits under the FECA and sued Jetco for dam-
ages.'5 1 Jetco interpleaded the government for contribu-
tion,'52 charging negligence, but the trial court dismissed the
action as barred by the FECA. 15 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court
and held as a matter of federal law that the FECA precluded
a third-party claim for contribution for damages paid to an
injured federal employee who had been injured through the
combined negligence of Jetco and the United States. 15  The
court recognized the irreconcilable conflict in this "most
evenly balanced controversy"' 155 between the employer's in-
terest in fixed liability and the third party's interest in the
equitable distribution of loss, 56 but held that the employer's
interests prevailed in a federal context. 157 The court's reason-
ing was simple: Congress had waived sovereign immunity
through the FTCA, but never gave up its power to modify
147 Id at 345-47.
148 Id at 347.
,49 514 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975).
- Id. at 951.
Id
Id Jetco also sought indemnity on a contractual theory, but the trial court dis-
missed the claim for lack ofjurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Id See supra note 97 for
an explanation of the Tucker Act regarding jurisdiction of contractual claims against
the government.
Gah'mi, 514 F.2d at 951.
Id. at 956.
Its Id at 952 (citing Larson, Workmen's Compensation, supra note 21).
- Gaimi, 514 F. 2d at 952.
- Id at 952, 956. The court declined to address interpretations of controlling state
law once it determined that federal law prevailed. Id
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that waiver. 158 The court reasoned that when Congress ad-
ded the exclusive liability provision of the FECA, it did so as
a modification of that waiver out of concern for "limiting the
costs to government of litigating suits and paying substantial
damages to its injured employees." '59 The court recognized
that Congress may not have clearly expressed its intent to bar
third-party contribution and indemnity suits.'6° Even so, the
court noted, a literal reading of the provision would produce
that result since the section denies recovery to "any other per-
son otherwise entitled to recover."' 6' Moreover, the section
removed the government's underlying tort liability which is
necessary to maintain such claims.' 62 The court further ob-
served that the majority of circuits which had addressed the
issue had found section 8116(c) of the FECA a bar to third-
party claims against the government.'63 The Second Circuit
suggested that the Supreme Court would agree if faced with a
similar third-party claim.'
64
Despite the supposed "even balance" in this workers' com-
pensation controversy, the only circuit court of appeals to al-
low a third party recovery was the Fourth Circuit. In the
,- Id. at 952.
, Id. at 953.
16(- Id
16, Id; 5 U.S.C § 8116(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
162 Ga/imi, 514 F.2d at 953.
,6:1 Id The court here cited the decisions of the First, Ninth and District of Colum-
bia Circuits discussed above, supra notes 136-147, 108-120, 121-107, respectively, plus a
Third Circuit case, Traveler's Insurance Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir.
1974) (denying indemnity and contribution as a matter of federal law on the rationale
of Wener). One year after Galimi, the Seventh Circuit joined the majority in Kudelka
v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976) (denying indemnity and
contribution as a matter of federal law). The Kud/ka court incorporated the Gah'ni
opinion by reference, without extending the rationale. Id at 659.
- Id at 956. The Gahmi court concluded that it was in accord with the Supreme
Court on the basis of two observations. First, the Second Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had never squarely faced the issue before it. Gahmi, 514 F.2d at 955.
(Weyerhaeuser and Ryan were dismissed by the court as involving admiralty law and
contractual claims, respectively, not third-party tort claims.) Second, the court ob-
served that in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 406 U.S. 340
(1972), certain dicta by the Supreme Court suggested that the LHWCA exclusive lia-
bility provision precluded such third-party claims. Galimi, 514 F.2d at 955. The Galimi
court felt that this dicta replaced the dicta in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963), that Congress was not concerned with the rights of unrelated
third parties when it enacted FECA section 8116(c). Ga/ini, 514 F.2d at 955.
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1969 case of Wallenius Bremen G m.b.H v. United States,165 a gov-
ernment employee settled with Bremen for injuries sustained
while inspecting a ship owned by that corporation.
1 66
Bremen then sought indemnity from the United States on a
negligence theory,' 67 but the trial court dismissed the claim
upon a motion by the government for summary judgment. 168
Bremen appealed and thus presented the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals with the question of "whether the exclusive
remedy provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act bars the claim of a third party for indemnity against the
federal government for damages paid an injured government
employee.' '
69
The Fourth Circuit employed a three-pronged analysis in
rejecting the reasoning of the other circuits which had denied
such claims. 70 First, the court concluded that language of
the exclusive liability clause specifically excluded from bring-
ing suit only those who derived their claims from a personal
relationship to the injured federal employee.' 7' The words
"anyone otherwise entitled" were, according to the court, a
"catch-all" phrase designed by a cautious Congress to avoid
missing other related groups such as adopted children.' 72 In
the court's view, Congress did not intend to include strangers
to the FECA in this list. 7 3  This lack of Congressional desire
to include strangers was further evidenced by the quidpro quo
basis of the Act,' 74 which excluded the employees' benefi-
16, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
- Id at 995.
6'1 Id Bremen contended that the United States was primarily negligent in al-
lowing the employee to work because the employee's physical condition was so poor
that he could not work safely. Id. at 995. The court, however, did not address the
merits of this claim. Id
1 Id
69 Id at 994-95.
- Id at 995, 998. The court specifically addressed only the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 108-120.
7, Bremen, 409 F.2d at 995. The exclusive liability provision of the FECA specifi-
cally mentioned "the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents [and] next
of kin." 5 U.S.C § 757(b) (1949) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)(1980)).
,72 Bremen, 409 F.2d at 995.
173 fd
174Id
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ciaries under the scheme because they benefitted from it.' 75
The court thus reasoned that Congress could not have in-
tended that an unrelated third party lose its otherwise valid
rights without any reciprocal benefit being derived from the
legislation. 176
Next, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
had already permitted indemnity in other situations. '77 In
Ryan, the Supreme Court had held that a theory of contrac-
tual indemnity defeated a similar exclusive liability provi-
sion.' 78 The Court in Weyerhaeuser had permitted indemnity
to a third party who had satisfied the claim of an injured
federal employee, even though the employee himself was ex-
cluded from maintaining suit against the government. 79 Al-
though this indemnification was framed in principles of
admiralty law, the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme
Court's conclusion that Congress had not intended to affect
the rights of unrelated third parties' 80 was of controlling im-
portance. 8' Finally, the Supreme Court vacated a lower
court's denial of an indemnity claim in Treadwell and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of Weyerhaeu-
ser.'82 According to the Fourth Circuit, this remand was
evidence that "the Court may have thought that other types
of obligations, as well as the divided damages rule, were in-
tended to be undisturbed by the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Act."'' 83
In the third prong of its analysis, the Bremen court rede-
fined the liability issue as established by the Ninth Circuit in
-, Id The beneficiaries were entitled by the FECA to receive swift and sure com-
pensation, without having to prove negligence on the government's part. See generaly,
2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.10 (1982).
,76 Bremen, 409 F.2d at 995.
, Id at 996.
7 350 U.S. 124 (1956), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 88-90.
,79 Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963), cited in Bremen, 409
F.2d at 996.
Weyerhaeuser, 372 U.S. at 601. The Court stated that "[t]here is no evidence
whatever that Congress was concerned with the rights of unrelated third parties." Id
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Wiener.'84 According to the Ninth Circuit, the FECA's exclu-
sive liability provision precludes indemnity actions because it
erases the underlying governmental liability necessary to sup-
port the claim. 1 5 The Fourth Circuit rejected this approach
and held that tort indemnity. 6 shifted the burden of loss ac-
cording to primary and secondary liability.'87 The party
with the primary or active fault can be required to indemnify
another whose fault is merely passive or secondary. 8 Con-
cluding that the determination of the relative degree of fault
rests on the breach of a duty of care, 8 9 the court reasoned
that indemnity could be sought only where the indemnitor
(the government here) "owed a duty of his own to the injured
person."' 9 ° The court held that the right of indemnity rests
not merely upon liability, but upon "violation of a duty of
care to the injured person" which had nothing to do with
whether that injured person could directly sue the one who
caused the injury.' 9'
In 1977, the Supreme Court addressed a similar third-party
indemnity claim in Stencel Aero Engineertng Corp. v. United
States. 192 Stencel arose when the ejection system in a fighter
aircraft malfunctioned during flight and injured a military
pilot.' 9' The pilot, who was awarded a lifetime pension
184 Id (discussing United Air Lines v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964)).
,B United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
86 Bremen, 409 F.2d at 998-99. The court recognized three possible theories of in-
demnity: contractual, strict tort, and independent tort based on an independent duty
of care owed by the government to the third party, not to the plaintiff. Id. It estab-
lished the validity of all three approaches, then remanded to the trial court to deter-
mine whether the facts would support any of the indemnity claims. Id The trial court
had granted summary judgment in favor of the United States on the sole ground that
the FECA barred suit by the original plaintiff (the injured federal employee) against
the government. Id at 995, 998-99.




t Id In 1981, this decision was vehemently criticized from inside the Fourth Cir-
cuit itself in Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 1981). Judge
Hall (concurring in result) flatly stated that Bremen was wrong and was based upon
faulty analysis. Id
02 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
19, Id at 667.
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under the Veterans' Benefits Act, 9 4 sued the United States
and Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system, for their
individual and joint negligence in designing the defective sys-
tem.1 95 Stencel cross-claimed against the government for in-
demnity.'96 The trial court dismissed both claims against the
government on the authority of Feres v. United States,' 97 and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 98 Stencel ap-
pealed the decision and thereby presented the Supreme
Court with the issue of whether the Feres doctrine limited the
right of a third party to recover in an indemnity action
against the United States. The Court held that Feres did
limit the right.' 99
In deciding this third-party claim, the Stencel Court enu-
merated the three factors from Feres which justified dismissal
of the pilot's direct claim against the government and then
applied those principles to Stencel's indirect claim. 20 0  First,
the Court determined that the relationship of the government
38 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
Stencel, 431 U.S. at 668.
Id.
,97 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres doctrine, which formed the basis for the Court's
holding in Stencel, arose from a suit in which a serviceman who was injured on duty
sued the government for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id The
Supreme Court held that the unique nature of the military relationship was distinctly
federal in character, thus precluding application of local law as required by the FTCA,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946). Id at 141-42. The Feres Court noted that the Veterans'
Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 135 (1959) provided for limited benefits to injured service-
men. Id at 144. Although the Veterans' Benefits Act had no exclusive liability provi-
sion, the Court held that the unique nature of the military relationship and the
Congressionally defined limited benefits under the Veterans' Benefit Act combined to
limit a serviceman's otherwise valid tort claims against the government. Id at 141-42.
Further, the Court held that allowing suit by a serviceman against his superiors would
have a potentially disruptive effect on military discipline, because it would require
courts to second-guess military decisions in order to establish or dismiss allegations of
negligent military orders. Id at 138-46. See also United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110
(1954) (in which the Court examined "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given. . . in the course of military duty"). For a discussion of the Feres
doctrine, see Comment, The Feres Doctrine. Should It Continue To Bar FTCA Actions By
Servicemen Who Are Injured While Involved In Activities Incident To Their Service? 49 J. AIR L.
& COMM. 177 (1983).
- Stencel, 431 U.S. at 669.
d. at 674.
- Id at 671.
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to its military suppliers is no less "distinctively federal in
character" than that between the government and its
soldiers. Because of that federal character, local law which
might allow this claim under the FTCA was inapposite.2°'
Second, the Court established that a compensation scheme
such as the Veterans' Benefits Act was not enacted only as a
quidpro quo agreement between the government and its mili-
tary employees; it was also enacted as "an upper limit of lia-
bility for the government as to service-connected injuries. 20 2
In light of this intentional limitation of liability, the Court
reasoned that permitting the third-party claim would "admit
at the back door that which has been legislatively turned
away at the front door. ' 20 3 Third, the Court concluded that
allowing the third-party tort suit would be just as disruptive
to military discipline as would a negligence suit against the
government by military personnel. 20 4  Either would require
second-guessing military orders at the trial and might necessi-
tate calling on military personnel to testify against each other
concerning the propriety of the military orders which led to
the injury.2 3 The Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not give a third party the right to indemnity
from the United States for damages arising from injuries to
military personnel.20 6
The weight of opinion was balanced heavily against al-
lowing third-party indemnity claims 20 7 when Thomas v. Lock-
2- Id at 672.
22 Id. at 672-73.
- Id at 673.
20 Id
205 Id
2-, Id The same result was reached in United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir. 1964), dzsawsedsupra in text accompanying notes 80-120, in regard to two
servicemen killed in the collision of a commercial airliner and a military fighter air-
craft. The court held that "United's claim for indemnity must fall for the reason that
the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to service-
men when the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity related to service . . ..
Feres." Id at 404. The Wiener case is noteworthy in that it addresses indemnity claims
against the government for awards paid by a third party to private citizens, civilian
federal employees, and military federal employees. The only claim allowed was one
based on losses arising from the injuries to private citizens. Id
27 Seven circuit courts of appeal have disagreed with Bremen. See Kudelka v. Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976)(indemnity barred as a matter of
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heed Aircraft Corp. 208 came to bar in 1981. In Thomas, the
estate of a deceased civilian federal employee sought a judg-
ment for damages against Lockheed for Lockheed's part in
the C5A crash which caused the employee's death.2 0 9 Lock-
heed argued that the government was primarily responsible
for the crash and moved for summary judgment for indem-
nity.21 0 The trial court granted Lockheed's motion. 1' On
the government's apppeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the exclusive liability provision of
the FECA barred any third-party claim against the govern-
ment arising from injury to a federal employee which is not
based on an independent duty owed by the government to
the purported indemnitee 2  Finding that Lockheed had al-
leged only derivative tort claims which arose from the gov-
ernment's duty to its employees, the court dismissed the claim
as barred by FECA's exclusive liability provision. 3
II. THE CONTROVERSY RESOLVED-LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT
CORP V UNITED STA TES
Lockheed appealed the circuit court's adverse decision,
thus presenting the Supreme Court in Lockheed Aircrafl Corp. v.
United States2 4 the issue of whether the exclusive liability pro-
vision of the FECA, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) directly bars a third-
federal law); Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975) (contribution barred as a
matter of federal law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir.
1974)(indemnity and contribution barred as a matter of federal law); Newport Air
Park v. United States, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969)(contribution barred as a matter of
federal law); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968)(contribution
barred as a matter of local law); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967)(contri-
bution barred as a matter of federal law); United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir. 1964)(indemnity barred as a matter of local law) (the Ninth Circuit expressly af-
firmed this holding in two later cases, Wien Alaska Airlines v. United States, 375 F.2d
736 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1968), and in Adams v. General Dynam-
ics Corp., 535 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905 (1977)).
665 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Thomas, 665 F.2d at 1331.
210 (d.
211 Id.
212 Id at 1331.
213 Id.
214 103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983).
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party action for indemnity against the United States. 215 The
Court began its analysis by noting that the language of the
provision is specific and detailed as to the parties excluded
from recovery.216 Finding that Lockheed was not a federal
"employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependent, [or]
next of kin," the Court held that Lockheed could only be ex-
cluded under the Act as an "other person otherwise entitled
to recover." 2 7 That, in turn, depended on whether Congress
intended that the scope of the provision should include a
party such as Lockheed.21 8
In concluding that Congress did not intend to affect the
rights of third parties such as Lockheed, the Supreme Court
placed much emphasis on the "quidpro quo" nature of work-
ers' compensation agreements: employees give up their rights
to sue the employer in return for fixed, immediate benefits
which are given whether the employer was at fault in the
injury or not.2 9 The Court also noted that section 8116(c)
was based on a New York Workers' Compensation scheme
which allowed contribution. 220 The Court then confirmed its
conclusion in Weyerhaeuser that Congress did not intend to af-
fect the rights of unrelated third parties when it enacted the
FECA's exclusive liability provision.221
The Supreme Court explained its 1963 holding in Weyer-
haeuser as one that had implications outside of admiralty
law.2 22 The Court noted that Weyerhaeuser went beyond the
Ryan holding that allowed contractual indemnity in the face
of an exclusive liability provision.223 It reasoned that whereas
indemnity claims after Ryan may have been allowed under
increasingly attenuated implied contracts, Weyerhaeuser al-
2'1 Id at 1034-35.
216 Id at 1035-36.
217 Id The quoted languge is drawn from FECA, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1980).
2," Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1036.
219 Id. at 1036, 1038. ("[E]mployees are guaranteed the right to receive immediate,
fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in return they lose
the right to sue the government.").
220 Id at 1036 n.4. For the text of the relevant New York law, see supra note 86.
22, Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1036-37.
222 Id. at 1037.
223 Id
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lowed payment where there was no contract at all.2 24 The
Court concluded that the exclusive liability provision of the
FECA did not affect the rights of unrelated third parties, re-
gardless of the basis for the underlying cause of action.2 25
Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Writing for the dissent,226
Rehnquist contended that a principal purpose of workers'
compensation exclusive liability provisions is to limit the
amount that an employer will have to pay on account of inju-
ries to its employees. 227 The proper test for allowing recovery,
according to Rehnquist, is whether "the plaintiffs right to
recover outweigh[s] the limitation of liability provision of the
[FECA]. 228 In Weyerhaeuser, the "ancient" rule of divided
damages2 29 created a direct right of recovery against the gov-
ernment which necessarily prevailed over the limitation.3 0
Rehnquist likewise concluded that an independent contrac-
tual right such as that in Ryan should produce the same re-
sult.2 3 1 On the other hand, he concluded that the limitation
of liability provision overcomes an indirect claim based
merely on the difference in degree of the parties' individual
fault, such as the tort indemnity claim in Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States.232 The result of the Court's decision,
according to Rehnquist, is to expand greatly the govern-
ment's liability stemming from injuries to its employees by
224 Id (discussing Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963)).
22r, Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1038. The Court decided the case with only one reference
to substantive tort law (and then only to mark it as irrelevant to the holding), despite
the mass of legal literature produced in lower court litigation. See supra note 208. The
Court declared that "[t]o the extent that the basis for the underlying cause of action
could make any di~ference, the indemnity theories on which Lockheed relies are as well-
established as the divided damages rule was in Weyerhaeuser." Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at
1038 (emphasis added).
22, Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1038-41 (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227 Id at 1039.
228 Id
2- Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of the divided damages rule by
noting that it dates back to the 12th Century. Id at 1039 n.1. See The North Star, 106
U.S. 17 (1882) (tracing the history of the rule); see also Owen, The Origins and Develop-
ment of Marine Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759 (1977).
2- Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
2.1 Id at 1040.
2 2 Id The majority distinguished the decision in Stencel as standing only for the
proposition that the government had not waived its sovereign immunity in military
matters and found the case to be inapposite to the FECA. d at 1037 n.8.
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allowing "inappropriate kind[s] of claim[s]" '233 to defeat the
provision by which Congress had clearly intended to limit the
liability of the United States.234 Despite this vigorous dissent,
the Court held that the exclusive liability provision of the
FECA does not bar a third-party indemnity action against
the United States.
III CONCLUSION
The immediate effect of the Lockheed decision is to settle the
controversy between the circuits, 235 and in so doing halt any
tendency toward forum shopping which may have been in-
spired by the variety of holdings.2 36 Although the holding is
explicitly framed only in terms of indemnity, the underlying
reasoning of the Court suggests that contribution should also
be allowed. Indeed, the federal courts should no longer dis-
miss any third-party claims for awards against the govern-
ment unless the claims fail on their own merits. Any
continuing controversy at the judicial level arising from sec-
tion 8116(c) of the FECA should center only on whether the
third party is truly "unrelated" to the employee. 37
The rift between the majority and dissent is due to a differ-
ence in focus; the majority is concerned more with the equita-
ble allocation of loss and the dissent with limitation of
liability.2 38 In terms of honoring the interests of third parties,
233 Id at 1040. Justice Rehnquist never explicitly identified which actions he consid-
ered to be "inappropriate." His other statements indicate, however, that he considers
any "indirect" or "derivative" action (such as contribution or indemnity) inappropri-
ate to defeat an "established" right (such as exclusive liability in workers' compensa-
tion or divided damages in admiralty). Id at 1039-41.
2:14 Id at 1041.
21 In light of the fact that only one circuit has held for allowing the third party's
claim, "controversy" may be a misnomer. The Court's decision has dramatically
shifted the "balance." See supra note 207 for those circuits which disagree with Bremen.
236 See Commission on Revision, supra note 19 (suggesting that resolution of the in-
ter-circuit conflict would halt forum-shopping).
237 It would not be surprising to see arguments being presented and accepted which
allege either an implied employment or beneficiary relationship between the third
party and the injured employee, or to see the "quidpro quo" analysis artfully stretched
to include the third party.
23. See Larson, supra note 20, 1982 DUKE L.J. at 535-40 for an elaboration of this
division and possible solutions according to interests and values to be served.
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the Court's decision appears to be quite equitable. Contribu-
tion and indemnity were developed in tort law to keep a
party from having to shoulder more of a loss than it de-
served.239 Prior to this decision, the government could cause
an injury through its active negligence and pay little, while a
third party would have to bear the greater loss though it had
less fault.24°
The problem with this "equitable" solution is that it gives
no regard to the interests of the United States as an employer
under the workers' compensation program. As Justice Rehn-
quist pointed out,24 ' this decision greatly expands the govern-
ment's liability for injuries to its employees, despite the very
compelling interest of the government in limiting that liabil-
ity. With the purported FECA bar now clearly removed, the
ever persistent plaintiff's pursuit of the deep pocket will un-
doubtedly produce more lawsuits involving third-party liabil-
ity for injuries to government workers. Plaintiffs will bring
suit against potentially liable third parties who can inter-
plead the government for contribution or indemnity. This
liability will be compounded to the extent that the govern-
ment foregoes subrogation of its employees' claims lest the
suit to recover from the third party becomes a suit against
itself.242
Congress has been asked without result on more than one
occasion to legislate a balance of the conflicting interests in-
volved here.243 Perhaps this newly expanded governmental
liability will serve as the catalyst for change. If so, Congress
has ample precedent in the state courts from which to draw
as they seek to reach a workable compromise between the
three interested groups.244 Hopefully Congress will respond
2.9 See supra note 23.
241 PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS at 310.
24, Lockheed, 103 S. Ct. at 1040.
242 Larson suggests that the subrogation interest of the workers' compensation in-
surer is actually relatively minor. Larson, supra note 20. Even so, inability to subro-
gate will increase liabilities.
24.3 Stt, e.g., Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1975)(noting Congress'
failure to address this conflict); Commission on Revision, supra note 19 (specifically
suggesting legislative action).
244 The three groups and their interests are: 1.) the government which, as employer,
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to this judicial interpretation of the FECA by producing such
a compromise.
Wade Channell
wishes to limit its liabilites; 2.) the third parties who wish an equitable allocation of
loss; and 3.) the injured employees who desire full compensation for their injuries. Lar-
son, supra note 20, at 535-38.
For a comprehensive review of state approaches to this problem, see Larson, supra
note 20 (suggesting how the revisions in this field should be fashioned). See also Weis-
gall, Product Liabiliy in the Workplace: The E#ct of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and
Liabilities of ThirdParties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035 (recommending various approaches
to balancing the interests of employers and third parties).
LABOR-APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES FOR EMPLOYEE'S
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE - Apportionment of Damages is
Required Where Damages Sustained by the Employee Are
Caused Initially by the Employer's Unlawful Discharge and
Are Increased by a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation. Bowen v. United States Postal Servi'ce, 103 S. Ct. 588
(1983).
Charles Bowen, an employee of the United States Postal
Service (Postal Service) and a member of the American Pos-
tal Worker's Union, American Federation of Labor - Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), was harassed
by his supervisors and fellow employees.1 On February 21,
1976, Bowen asked to go home early after a particular em-
ployee had badgered him.2 As he was leaving, Bowen met
the employee on the stairs and scuffled with him briefly.3 Al-
though neither employee thought the matter was important
enough to report, Bowen was suspended from his job without
pay when the Postmaster indirectly learned of the incident.4
Bowen was formally discharged on March 30, 1976, s and
thereafter filed a grievance with the AFL-CIO pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement.6 The local AFL-CIO
president personally investigated the discharge and at each
step of the grievance procedure recommended the case for
further pursuit.7 A national AFL-CIO official, however, de-
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588




4 Id at 4-5.
Id at 5.
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1981).
7 Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983). The AFL-CIO's investigation revealed unnecessarily
harsh treatment of Bowen by co-workers and supervisors and that Bowen's principal
supervisor had often commented that he was going to "get rid of" Bowen. Id.
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clined to recommend Bowen's case for arbitration and the
claim was not arbitrated.8
In December of 1976, Bowen filed suit in United States
District Court, pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA)9 and section 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 ° The complaint alleged that
a Id. at 4-5. The AFL-CIO official faced a backlog of cases at the time Bowen's case
came before him for review. After spending fifteen to thirty minutes reviewing
Bowen's file and ignoring tape recorded interviews of witnesses, the official refused to
recommend the case for arbitration. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bowen.
9 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976)). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties.
10 Id National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 9(a), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449, 453 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976)). Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such a unit for purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargain-
ing representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided frther, That the bargaining representative has been given the
opportunity to be present at such an adjustment.
Id. Although no party contested the jurisdictional basis, both the Postal Service and
the AFL-CIO pointed out in their briefs that jurisdiction should have been founded on
analogous provisions in the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1976).
See Brief for Federal Respondent at 3, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct.
588 (1983), Brief for Respondent Union at 1-2, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
39 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1976) is analogous to § 9(a) of the NLRA and provides in its
pertinent part:
The Postal Service shall accord exclusive recognition to a labor organi-
zation when the organization has been selected by a majority of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit as their representative. . ..
Id. 39 U.S.C.§ 1208(b) (1976) is analogous to § 301 of the LMRA and provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between the Postal Service and a labor
organization representing Postal Employees, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the amount in
controversy.
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the Postal Service discharged Bowen, without just cause, in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement"1 and that the
Union breached its duty of fair representation (DFR). 2 The
district court submitted interrogatories to a jury sitting as an
advisory panel.' 3 The trial judge instructed the jury to ap-
portion damages between both defendants if the jury found
that the AFL-CIO breached its DFR and that the Postal
Service wrongfully discharged Bowen.14 The court suggested
that the jury might apportion backpay based on the date on
which Bowen would have been reinstated had the AFL-CIO
not breached its DFR. 15 The jury found for Bowen, assessing
damages for lost wages and benefits in the amount of
$47,000.16 Determining that the AFL-CIO was responsible
for approximately two-thirds of the period Bowen was unem-
ployed up to the time of trial, the court found the AFL-CIO
liable for $30,000 compensatory damages and the Postal
Service liable for $17,000."7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the award of damages against the AFL-CIO.'" The court held
that because the Postal Service, as the employer, is solely re-
The Postal Service was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the
American Postal Worker's Union which required that an employee could be dis-
charged only for just cause. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127,
1129 (W.D. Va. 1979).
,2 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981).
,1 Id. The jury could only act as an advisory panel on Bowen's claims against the
Postal Service. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) provides: "Any action against the United
States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury." See generally, C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (3d ed. 1976).
' Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 591 n.2 (1983).
Id. at 591. The District Court found that the grievance would have been arbi-
trated by August, 1977. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. at 1127,
1129 (W.D. Va. 1979).
16 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (W.D. Va. 1979).
17 Id. at 1130-32. The trial judge added $5,954.12 for losses incurred between the
date of trial and the hearing on post-trial motions, assessing the full amount to the
Postal Service because it refused to reinstate Bowen. The court also awarded the plain-
tiff $20,000 in attorney's fees, $15,000 to be paid by the Postal Service and $5000 by
the AFL-CIO. Id. at 1130. The court gave no reason for apportioning attorneys' fees
differently than backpay damages. For a brief discussion pertaining to the apportion-
ment of attorney's fees, see Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 155, 173 n.128.
m Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1981).
452 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
sponsible for the payment of Bowen's compensation, it is lia-
ble for all backpay.' 9 The original opinion was issued on
February 23, 1981, but the court issued a "rewritten" opin-
ion on July 7, 1981,20 adding only a single footnote.2 ' The
effect of this footnote was to reduce Bowen's original judg-
ment from $52,954, the amount assessed against both the
Union and the Service, to $22,954, the amount assessed
against the Postal Service alone.22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in or-
der to determine whether a union may be assessed a share of
backpay damages awarded to a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee when the union has breached its DFR.23 Held, reversed
and remanded: Apportionment of damages is required where
damages sustained by the employee are caused initially by
the employer's unlawful discharge and are increased by a
union's breach of its duty of fair representation. Bowen v.
United States Postal Service, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Duty of Fair Representation
Prior to the 1920's, employees organizing to demand
higher wages or better working conditions faced either crimi-
nal prosecution as conspirators or court-ordered civil injunc-
tions.24 In the late 1920's and 1930's, Congress enacted a
series of federal labor laws designed to promote industrial
1, Id. at 82.
- Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983).
21 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 n.6 (4th Cir. 1981). Note 6
states, "We make no revision in the judgment of $22,954.12 against the Postal Service.
In this connection we note that no appeal was entered by the plaintiff from the judg-
ment against the Service in the amount of $22,954.12." The Supreme Court pointed
out that the court's view that the judgment could not be increased because of Bowen's
failure to appeal was erroneous. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588,
592 n.7. (1983).
22 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 592 (1983).
21 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 454 U.S. 1097 (1981). Certiorari was granted
because a conflict existed between the Fourth Circuit and the other circuit courts of
appeals. See injfa text accompanying notes 107-110.
21 Martucci, Employer Liabityfor Union Unfair Representation, 46 Mo. L. REV. 78, 79-
80 (1981).
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peace through a system of employee organization and collec-
tive bargaining.25 In 1926, the Railway Labor Act (RLA),
the first of the federal labor laws, 26 proposed to avoid inter-
ruption of commerce or the operation of carriers27 by provid-
ing administrative methods of settling disputes before service
was interrupted by strikes.28 In 1932, Congress, by enacting
the Norris-La Guardia Act, another of the federal labor laws,
ensured workers the freedom to organize and bargain collec-
tively by declaring such freedoms to fall within the public
policy of the United States.29
In 1935, Congress expanded the scope of the federal labor
law by passing the NLRA ° The NLRA expressly estab-
lished the principle of representation by the majority and en-
dorsed the practice of collective bargaining. 3' Inherent in
these principles and practices was the concept of subjugation
of the individual employee's preference to that of the major-
ity.32 Exclusivity and majority rule led to conflicts with the
25 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
- 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976).
27 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(1976).
28 Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 339 U.S. 239, 242 (1950). The plan was to
prevent interruption of railway service by strikes. This goal was to be implemented
through the creation of various Adjustment Boards created by voluntary agreements.
Id. When the results were unsatisfactory, Congress amended the RLA in 1934 in order
to create a National Adjustment Board (Adjustment Board) composed of representa-
tives of railroads and unions. Id. at 242-43. The Adjustment Board is empowered to
hold hearings, make findings, and grant awards in disputes between carriers and their
employees. Id. at 240.
45 U.S.C. § 181 (1976 & Supp. I 1978) expanded most of the provisions of the RLA
to include the airline industry.
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976) (originally Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-15,
47 Stat. 70-73 (1932)). Section 101 now severely limits the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes.
v 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (original version at 45 Stat. 449
(1935)).
,, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See supra note 10 for text of section 159(a). Exclusiv-
ity of representation is also established under the RLA at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1976
& Supp. 11 1978).
32 Martucci, supra note 24, at 81-82. The policy of encouraging collective bargaining
is predicated on the belief that majority representation is the most efficient and effec-
tive means to improve employee benefits and achieve industrial stability. Id. at 81. If
majority representation is to function, the individual must allow his interests to be
expressed collectively through a majority representative. Id. at 81-82.
454 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
competing interests of the minority and majority.3 Specifi-
cally, the courts were faced with the necessity of dealing with
racial discrimination by both management and unions. 4 In
dealing with the issue of racial discrimination, the Supreme
Court first propounded a duty on the part of the unions to
represent all employees fairly. 5
On December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court handed down
three decisions that heralded the birth of the DFR 6 In Steele
v. Louiville & Nashville R.R. 3' and its companion case, Tun-
stall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,38 the
Court invalidated a seniority clause which placed blacks at
the bottom of the seniority list.3 9 In Steele, the Court intro-
duced the standard of the DFR when it held that the RLA
imposed on the bargaining representative of a class or craft
. Id at 83.
Jones, The Origins of the Concept of the Duty of Fair Representation, in THE DUTY OF
FMR REPRESENTION 25 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
35 Id.
36 The DFR is not specifically mentioned in the NLRA or the RLA; it is derived
from section 9(a) of the NLRA (quoted supra note 9) and section 2 of the RLA, 45
U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, (1976), which provides in part: "The majority of any craft or
class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of
the craft or class for the purposes of this Chapter." See Aaron, The Duty of Fair Represen-
tation. An Overview, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
17 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
3R 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
39 According to one commentator, the economic and political climate of the country
in 1944 made it desirable for the Court to strike down racial discrimination. Jones,
supra note 34, at 26. Having the will to decide the issue, the Court sought a rationale.
While citing such cases as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (prohibiting the
enforcement of an ordinance in a discriminatory manner against Chinese laundry own-
ers) and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (holding that a county court could not
summarily exclude all blacks from serving on the grand jury), the Court invoked more
general concepts when it stated:
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted
power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of
a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a
grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those
for whom it is exercised unless so expressed.
323 U.S. 192 at 202.
Some commentators perceive the DFR as stemming from the status of the individ-
ual under collective bargaining agreements. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text. Others find support in trust law and agency. Jones, supra note 34, at 2 7-29; Sum-
mers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement in THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION 61 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
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the duty to represent all employees "without hostile discrimi-
nation, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."' 40 In Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB',4 the Court applied the DFR in a non-racial
context to a union falling under the NLRA.42
Although Steele stated the basic DFR standard, Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffm an43 made clear that unions would not be held to
rigid requirements. In Ford Motor Co. v. HuFfnan, the Court
upheld the validity of an agreement between the union and
the employer which gave seniority credit to veterans. 44 Re-
garding the competing interests of veteran and non-veteran
employees, the Court explained that "[a] wide range of rea-
sonableness" must be allowed a bargaining representative,
subject to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the
exercise of discretion.45 The Court further defined the scope
of the DFR in Conley v. Gibson46 which involved black employ-
ees who were discharged and replaced by whites.47 The Court
held that the exclusive collective bargaining agent must fairly
represent all employees in the administration of the collective
bargaining agreement.48 Furthermore, the Court held that
breach of the DFR presents a cause of action within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of federal courts, even absent diversity
of citizenship.4 9
- 323 U.S. at 204.
4, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
42 Id. In Wallace, the union brought about the discharge of employees who had
supported the union's rival. In disapproving the union's conduct, the Court empha-
sized that "[b]y its selection as bargaining representative, [the union] has become the
agent of all the employees charged with the responsibility of representing their interests
fairly and impartially." Id. at 255.
43 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
44 Id. at 343.
45 Id. at 338.
46 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
67 Id.
4a Id.
4I Id. at 44. The lower courts dismissed the employee's complaint for lack ofjuris-
diction based on the belief that the RLA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Adjust-
ment Board. Id. at 43-44. The Supreme Court dismissed the lower courts' view as
erroneous because the suit did not involve a dispute between employee and employer
but rather a controversy between employees and the bargaining agent. Id. at 44.
Under the provisions of the RLA, the Adjustment Board had no power to protect the
employees from discrimination. Id. at 44-45.
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B. Origins of Sec/ion 301 Actions
Paralleling the DFR suits were cases involving employee
and employer controversies arising under collective bargain-
ing contracts. In Smith v. Evening News Association ,50 for exam-
ple, members of one union went on strike and employees who
were members of another union were not permitted to report
to work.5' Smith, a maintenance employee, alleged violation
of a clause in the collective bargaining contract. 52 Although
the lower courts dismissed on the ground that the subject
matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ,5 the Supreme Court recog-
nized the right of individual employees to bring suit under
section 301 of the LMRA for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement in the federal courts.54
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,'- the Court limited the
scope of section 301 actions. An employee seeking severance
pay declined to utilize the collective bargaining agreement's
grievance procedure, instead suing for breach of contract.56
The Supreme Court held that before an employee may bring
such a suit against his employer, he must attempt to exhaust
grievance and arbitration procedures established by the col-
lective bargaining agreement.5 1 In so holding, the Court em-
phasized that Congress, through the LMRA, has expressly
endorsed grievance procedures as a preferred method of set-
- 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
" Id. at 196.
52 Id. The collective bargaining contract prohibited discrimination on the basis of
union membership or activity. Id.
53 Id.
.4 Id. at 197-201. Under section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), courts have juris-
diction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements even though the em-
ployer's conduct may also be an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. See 371 U.S. at 197. See supra note 9 for the text of Section 301.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 692 (1963),
the Court emphasized that an agreement under section 204 of the RLA is parallel to a
section 301 contract under the LMRA - a federal contract governed and enforceable
by federal law in federal courts. See 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1976).
- 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
Id. at 650-51.
57 Id. at 658-59.
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tling disputes.58 If a grievance procedure can be avoided, the
procedure loses its appeal to the employer and union as a
method of settlement.59
C. The Section 301/DFR Suit
While the Supreme Court endorsed an employee's right to
sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement' ° and his union for breach of the DFR,6' the
Court first recognized in Humphrey v. Moore62 that an em-
ployee could bring both suits in the same action. It was not
until Vaca v. Slpes,63 however, that the Court firmly estab-
lished the hybrid section 301/DFR suit. In Vaca, an employee
was discharged on the ground of poor health. When, during
the grievance procedure, the employee received an unfavora-
ble physician's report, the union decided not to take the
grievance to arbitration.64
The employer's defense to the employee's section 301 suit
was that the employee, through his union, had failed to ex-
haust the contractual grievance procedures.6 5 The Court
held that a wrongfully discharged employee may bring an
action against his employer, even though he has not ex-
hausted all remedies, as long as the employee can prove that
the union breached its DFR in handling the grievance. 66 Al-
though the Court held on the merits that the union had not
breached its DFR,67 it stressed that a breach of the DFR "oc-
curs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the
- Id at 653.
- Id.
- See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
62 375 U.S. 335 (1964). In Humphrey a joint employer-employee committee decided
to dovetail the seniority lists of two companies. Id at 337. Moore brought a class
action suit, alleging that the decision of the committee was obtained by dishonest con-
duct in breach of the union's DFR. Id at 340. Moore also alleged that by implement-
ing the decision, the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
336-44.
63 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
- Id. at 174-75.
65 Id. at 186.
" Id.
67 Id. at 194-95.
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collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith"68 and that a "union may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion."69
The Court then addressed a number of other topics, 7° in-
cluding the appropriate apportionment of damages when
both union and employer actions have injured an employee.7'
The Court stressed that an award against a union may not
include damages solely attributable to the employer's breach
of contract.72 The Court explained that
[t]he governing principle, then, is to apportion liability be-
tween the employer and the union according to the damage
caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable
solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be
charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should
-* Id. at 190-91.
61 Id. at 191. A continuing source of confusion among litigants and discussion
among commentators is the question of the exact standard of representation required
of the union. See Aaron, supra note 36, at 18-22; Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation,
51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Jones, supra note 34, at 37-42; Rabin, The Duty of Fair
Representation in Arbitration, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 84, 86-89 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1977).
Although both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in Bowen state only that
the Union had in fact breached its DFR, the District Court found as fact that the
Union handled Bowen's "apparently meritorious grievance . . . in an arbitrary and
perfunctory manner and in so doing acted in reckless and callous disregard of plain-
tiff's rights." 470 F. Supp. at 1129.
70 As Clyde W. Summers, author of The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective
Agreement, stated:
The Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes is like a giant squid. It has
a number of procedural tentacles, any one of which may be more than
we can master, but with all of which we must ultimately contend. There
is always the danger that we shall be so preoccupied with avoiding the
entwining arms that we shall never see the head from which the tenta-
cles grow, and the whole problem will escape in a cloud of ink.
Summers, supra note 39, at 60.
Besides propounding the standard of fair representation, noting remedies available
to a damaged employee and combining section 301 and DFR suits, the Court held
that an employee had no absolute right to have a grievance taken to arbitration, dealt
with the exercise of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies, federal labor pol-
icy, and examined the competing interests among the employer, the employee, the
union, and society. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
,, 346 U.S. at 196-98.
72 Id. at 197.
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not be charged to the employer. 73
This language constituted the Court's mandate that damages
be apportioned between the union and the employer. Al-
though the Court did not specifically prescribe the manner of
apportionment until the Bowen decision, several cases follow-
ing Vaca shed light on the apportionment issue.
D. Apportionment of Damages After Vaca v. Sipes
The Supreme Court addressed the next suit involving an
alleged breach of the DFR in 1970. In Czosek v. O'Mara,7 em-
ployees discharged after furlough brought suit in federal dis-
trict court, seeking compensatory damages against the
employer, the union, or both.7 5 The district court dismissed
for failure to exhaust remedies prescribed by the RLA.76 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal as to
the union 77 but affirmed as to the employer.78  The court
gave leave on remand for the employees to amend their com-
plaint to allege employer involvement in the union miscon-
duct in order to retain the previously dismissed employer as a
defendant.79
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a suit against a
union for breach of the DFR is not within the jurisdiction of
the Adjustment Board or subject to the ordinary exhaustion
rule under the RLA.80 The Court assured the union that
although it may be sued alone, it would not have to pay dam-
ages for which the employer is responsible.8 1 Citing Vaca, the
Court emphasized that damages may be assessed against a
71 Id. at 197-98.
7 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
75 Id.
" Id. at 27.
" O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second
Circuit pointed out that a charge against a union for breach of DFR does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. The charge may therefore be the
basis of a suit in federal district court. Id
' Id. at 677. The contract dispute between the railroad and its employees fell within
the primary jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. Id.
71 Id. at 679.
- 397 U.S. at 27-28.
a, Id. at 29.
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union for only those losses flowing from its own conduct and
that backpay "damages against the union for loss of employ-
ment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to
handle the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of
collecting from the employer. 8
2
In H'nes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,3 employees were
charged by their employer with dishonesty and discharged.84
Although the union submitted the allegations to an arbitra-
tion committee which upheld the discharge, the employees
sued the employer and the union, claiming that the charges
of dishonesty were false and that the error in the charges
could have been discovered with a minimum of investigation
by the union.85 The district court granted the union's and the
employer's motion for summary judgment, 6 and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that employees cannot relitigate
charges already taken to arbitration. 7
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that an arbitra-
tor's decision is reviewable in the courts if tainted by a
union's breach of DFR.88 The Court mentioned apportion-
ment in dictum, stating that if the employees prove wrongful
discharge and breach of DFR, they are "entitled to an appro-
priate remedy against the employer as well as the Union. ' 9
Justice Stewart, however, filed a separate concurrence which
emphasized that if the employer relies in good faith on a final
decision by the arbitration committee, liability for the wages
lost after arbitration should be charged to the union.'
R2 Id.
11 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
- Id. at 556. The employer claimed that the employees attempted to be reimbursed
for motel expenses in excess of what was actually paid by them. Id
-' Id. at 557-58.
- Id. at 559. The district court found that the decision of the arbitration committee
was binding on the employees and that the employees failed "to show facts comprising
bad faith, arbitrariness or perfunctoriness on the part of the Unions." Id.
7 Id. at 559-60.
-8 Id. at 567.
- Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
- Id. at 572-73 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stressed that:
[i]f an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision, then
his failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be anything but
rightful, until there is a contrary determination. Liability for the inter-
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The DFR also arose in International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Foust9P ' in which a railroad employee was dis-
charged and the union filed the employee's grievance after
the deadline for submission of the claim to the employer had
passed.92 Although the employee settled his dispute with his
employer out of court,93 he filed suit against the union for
breach of DFR.94 The jury found for the employee, assessing
$40,000 actual damages and $75,000 punitive damages
against the union.95 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court in most respects, but remanded for
determination of whether the punitive damage award was
96excessive.
The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
RLA permits an employee to recover punitive damages for a
union's breach of the DFR.97 While the Court disallowed the
punitive damage award, 9 it specifically permitted the award
of compensatory damages against the union. 99 Discussing ap-
portionment, the Court recalled that under Vaca "all or al-
most all" of the employee's damages were attribrutable to the
discharge. 00 Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, but
vening wage loss must fall not on the employer but on the union. Such
an apportionment of damages is mandated by Vaca's holding. . . . To
hold an employer liable for back wages for the period during which he
rightfully refuses to rehire discharged employees would be to charge
him with a contractual violation on the basis of conduct precisely in
accord with the dictates of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Id. at 573.
9, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
12 Id at 43-44.
9, Id. at 45 n.3.
Id. at 44-45.
- Id. at 45.
% Id.
-' Id. at 46.
- Id. at 48-52. The Court reasoned that national labor policy disfavors punishment.
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the economic consequence of having to pay
large awards would present a substantial burden to a union, impairing its effectiveness
as a collective bargaining agent. Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 45 n.4. The Court explained that its grant of certiorari was limited to the
punitive damages question. For purposes of its analysis, the Court took as correct the
findings that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that the $40,000
compensatory damages award was proper. Id.
- Id. at 50 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198 (1967)). The Foust court stated
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disagreed with the majority's blanket rule that unions should
never have to pay punitive damages, reasoning "the damages
a union will be forced to pay in a typical unfair representa-
tion suit are minimal. . . .Union treasuries . . . will emerge
unscathed [in most cases.]"' 0 '
In Clayton v. International Union, United Auto Workers 'o2 the
Court held that an employee need not exhaust internal union
appeals procedures prior to filing a section 301/DFR ac-
tion. 10 3 In reaffirming that damages may be assessed against
both the employer and the union,'0 4 the Court examined
union procedures in similar actions decided by the union's
Public Review Board. °5 The Court indicated that the Re-
view Board is empowered to award backpay damages against
a union in an appropriate case."°6
Although Vaca and subsequent Supreme Court cases made
clear that courts were to apportion damages between breach-
ing employer and union, lower courts' application of Vaca's
that although such apportionment might immunize a clearly breaching union, that
risk was insufficient to justify endangering the financial stability of unions. Id.
lo, Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun commented that "under
Vaca's apportionment formula, the bulk of the award will be paid by the employer, the
perpetrator of the wrongful discharge, in a parallel § 301 action." Id.
Justice Stevens voiced a different opinion in his dissenting and concurring opinion
in United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), a hybrid section 301/DFR suit.
Although the Court had no occasion to discuss damages, Justice Stevens revealed his
view that a union may bear liability for backpay damages due to its breach. Id. at 73
n.2, 73-74 n.4.
,02 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
,01 Id. at 685.
Id. at 690 n.15.
0, Id. at 692-94.
,o Id. at 690-92. The Public Review Board was presumably following NLRB prece-
dent in assessing backpay relief against the union. The NLRB has mandated such
awards when the union's unfair representation is found to be an unfair labor practice
in violation of the NLRA. See, e.g., Steelworkers (InterRoyal Corp.), 223 N.L.R.B.
1184, 92 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1976) (union liable for all backpay because it refused to
process employee's grievance); IBEW, Local 2088 (Fed. Elec. Corp.), 218 N.L.R.B. 396,
89 L.R.R.M. 1590 (1975) (because the union violated the NLRA by failing to process a
non-member's grievance the union was ordered to compensate the employee for all loss
of earnings); Port Drum Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 590, 73 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1970) (because the
union failed to take steps to fulfill its obligation of fair representation, the union was
ordered to make the estate of the employee whole). See generaly Comment, Unfair Repre-
sentation and the National Labor Relations Board, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 89 (1971); Brief for
Petitioner at 35-40, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
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"governing principle" varied. While some courts held that
only the employer may be liable for lost wages,1"7 others as-
serted that the measure of damages assessed against a union
may include liability for backpay.1 08 Some courts appor-
tioned damages according to the fault of each, 0 9 while one
declared the union and the employer jointly and severally lia-
107 Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (employee not entitled to recover lost wages from his union); Wyatt v. Inter-
state Ocean and Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980) (backpay cannot be recov-
ered against a union unless it has contributed to the discharge or exacerbated the
employee's loss); Self v. Drivers, 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980) (union not liable for
backpay - only for expenses employees incurred in pursuing their claim); De Arroyo v.
Sindicato de Trabajodores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. De
Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (entire backpay award charged to
the company; union is not liable unless it participated in the discharge, or but for the
union's conduct the employees would have been reinstated at an earlier date); Craw-
ford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Wyo. 1974) ("the
backpay due, if any, is not attributable to actions of the union"); Holodnak v. Avco
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.)
(2d Cir. expressly affirmed backpay award), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) ("[slince
essentially all the loss suffered here was due to [the employer's] improper discharge of
the plaintiff, it must be held liable for the plaintiff's backpay").
- Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982) (the employer should not be
relieved of the natural consequences flowing from his discharge merely because the
union has breached a separate duty); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1978) (union liable for a portion of backpay if but for the union's conduct,
the employee would have been reinstated earlier); Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co., 580
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979) (employer's liability may be
limited if he justifiably relied on the finality of the arbitration decision); Harrison v.
United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976)
(union liable for backpay when its breach of duty extinguished employee's right to
pursue his own grievance); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 367
F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1966) (lost wages charged to union and not challenged on appeal);
Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or. 1977) (employer should
not be denied the presence of the union as a party should the case reach the apportion-
ment stage).
- Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977) (damages recoverable
from the union and the employer are distinct and attributable to the fault of each);
Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972) (damage may be appor-
tioned to the union to the extent that it shares responsibility for the whole harm); St.
Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969) ("the incre-
ment of damages caused by the union's breach of duty is virtually de minimis" because
the union did not procure the employee's discharge); Ruzicka v. General Motors
Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (a proper apportionment of damages must
consider not only the chronology of the employer and union's conduct but also the
gravity and nature of their wrongdoing), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 649 F. 2d
1207 (6th Cir.) (union relieved from liability if it can show its delay in filing grievance
was due to reliance on company policy), dzsmissed, 519 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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ble." O Because this controversy existed, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case of Bowen v. United States Postal
Service. ' 11
II. BOWEN V. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Justice Powell began his opinion for the Court by quoting
the "governing principle" of Vaca 1 2 but acknowledged that
application of the principle has not been an easy task for the
lower courts.' 3  The AFL-CIO argued that because its
breach of the DFR was unrelated to the Postal Service's
breach of the collective bargaining contract, the breach itself
should not give rise to any backpay liability."' The Court
agreed with the AFL-CIO's claim that its default merely
lifted the bar to the employee's suit on the contract against
the employer, stressing that Vaca permits an employee to
forego exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures if he
can prove that the union has breached its DFR, and that
Hines removed the bar of finality from an arbitral decision
when the union has breached its DFR." 5 The Court empha-
sized, however, that a union's breach of DFR does more than
merely lift the exhaustion bar."6 A collective bargaining
agreement creates relationships among the union, employer,
and employee not present in a traditional common law em-
ployment contract;" 7 the collective bargaining agreement
"° Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d
1123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980) (because the union and the employer
were equally culpable, the court held them jointly and severally liable for any damages
awarded).
11 454 U.S. 1097 (1981).
,,2 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967). See supra text accompanying note 73 for explanation
of the term "governing principle."
-1 103 S. Ct. 588, 593 (1983). See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
.. 103 S. Ct. at 593-94. The AFL-CIO maintained that because the Postal Service
had the sole duty to pay wages and the sole power to reinstate Bowen, all backpay
should be charged to the Service. The AFL-CIO contended that an award of attor-
ney's fees and other litigation expenses would provide sufficient deterrence to miscon-
duct. See Brief for Respondent Union at 219-29, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
" 103 S. Ct. at 595.
6 d. at 594.
117 Id.
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may not be treated as an employment contract terminable at
will without ignoring the dictates of the federal common law
of labor policy. 18
Although the Court placed great emphasis on the federal
labor policy,119 it affirmed that the greatest concern is the in-
jured employee's right to be made whole.1 20 Justice Powell
noted that an employer should not be shielded from the "nat-
ural consequences" of its wrongful conduct,1 2 ' but indicated
that Vaca mandates an allocation according to responsibil-
ity. 122 The Court held that the union is responsible for the
increase in damages caused by its breach of the DFR.1 23
The Supreme Court declared that an employer is entitled
to rely on a union's decision not to pursue a grievance be-
cause by acquiring the exclusive power to speak for the em-
ployees the union assumes a corresponding duty to fulfill its
obligations faithfully.1 24 Justice Powell pointed out that if the
employer could not rely on the union's decision, the griev-
ance procedure would not provide "the uniform and exclu-
sive method for [the] orderly settlement of employee
grievances" which is essential to national labor policy.1 25 The
Court reasoned that incentives to comply with the grievance
procedure would be diminished and employers might be re-
luctant to agree to the customary arbitration clauses if dam-
ages were not apportioned.1 26  The Court added that
requiring the union to pay compensatory damages would not
impose the great burden about which it was concerned in
Foust because an award of backpay would be finite and lim-
"" Id. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) and cases
cited therein regarding the federal labor policy.
- 103 S. Ct. at 594-95.
- Id. at 595.
12, Id. at 595 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967)).
,22 Id. at 595.
21 Id. The Court ruled that if the employee cannot collect the damages apportioned
against the union, the employer remains secondarily liable for the full loss of backpay.
Id. at 595 n. 12.
,Id. at 597.
,1. 103 S.Ct. (quoting Clayton v. International Union, United Auto Workers, 451
U.S. 679, 686-87 (1981)).
1 103 S.Ct. at 597.
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ited.'2 7 The Court asserted that the potential liability for a
breach of the DFR would provide an incentive for the union
to carefully scrutinize its members' claims.128
Although the AFL-CIO contended that Czosek made clear
that a union could not be held liable for backpay damages," 9
the Court limited Czosek to the RLA context.130 The RLA
provides alternate procedures which an individual employee
can pursue if the the union refuses to process his grievance,
and a breach by the union does not deprive the employee of
access to a remedy.' 3 ' Because the employee had such access,
the union in Czosek did not increase the employer's liability
and the union was liable only for the employee's added litiga-
tion expenses. 32 The Court pointed out that Czosek was con-
sistent with Vaca's mandate that damages be apportioned
according to fault.' 33
The Court dealt with its other precedents summarily,
stressing that it had consistently applied Vaca's "governing
principle" in its various remarks on remedies provided to in-
jured employees.33 The Court remanded for allocation of
damages against both the Postal Service and the AFL-
CIO.135 Justice Powell commented that the Court was not re-
quired to decide whether the district court's instructions on
apportionment were proper because the AFL-CIO had not
,21 Id. at 597 n.16.
128 Id. at 597-98.
129 Brief for Respondent Union at 23, Bowen v. United Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588
(1983).
n- 103 S. Ct. at 599. Although the Court distinguished cases arising under the RLA
from those arising under the NLRA, the dissent insisted that the distinction was irrele-
vant because Czosek applied Vaca's apportionment rule. Id. at 602 n.5.
Because the Court did point to one of the major differences between the labor acts,
it is possible that the Bowen rule will apply only to cases falling under the NLRA in
which the employee has no alternate remedy. Under such strict construction, Bowen's
apportionment rule would not be applied to the railroad or airline industries falling
under the RLA. At the least, the Bowen decision reflects the Court's disposition toward
apportionment of damages and provides an insight into how the Court might decide a
section 301/DFR suit in the future under the RLA.
,,, 103 S. Ct. at 602.
132 Id.
33 Id.
'3 Id. at 598 n.17.
3- Id. at 599.
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objected to the manner of apportionment, if such damages
were to be assessed.136 The Court concluded that apportion-
ment of backpay damages between a breaching employer
and a union is required by Vaca.' 37
Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist. 38 He asserted that the employer
who discharges an employee in breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement should be primarily liable for all
backpay. 39 .I support of his position Justice White quoted
Vaca's explicit statement that the union's violation of its DFR
in no way "exempt[ed] the employer from contractual dam-
ages which he would otherwise have to pay."' 4 ° The dissent
further noted that the Court's decision in Hines reiterated
that a union's breach of duty does not shield an employer
from damages it would otherwise owe.' Justice White
stated that prior to the Bowen decision, under the Court's pre-
vious holdings,'42 the union's breach did not affect the em-
ployer's potential liability where the employee prevails
against the employer in a section 301 suit.
4 3
The dissent looked also to Czosek's assurance to the union
of minimal liability'44 to provide support for its view that a
union is not primarily liable for backpay. 45 In addition, the
'- Id. at 599 n. 19. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for discussion of
the method of apportionment employed by the trial court.
117 103 S.Ct. at 599.
- Id Although the Justices concurred in part and dissented in part, their opinion
will be referred to as the dissent because the dissenting portion concerned the appor-
tionment issue. Id at 607. The concurring portion (Part IV), to which Rehnquist filed
a separate dissent, concerned the Court of Appeal's ruling that the Service was only
liable for the amount originally apportioned because Bowen failed to appeal the man-
ner in which the district court apportioned the award in his favor. Id. at 606-08.
,31 Id. at 600.
"° Id. at 601 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967)).
i4 103 S.Ct. at 601.




15Id. at 601-02. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the employee was discharged
in 1960, the union refused to arbitrate in 1961, the employee filed suit in 1962, the trial
began in 1964 and was finally adjudicated by the Supreme Court in 1967. The Bowen
Court reasoned that, because an arbitration award would have been made less than
one year after the grievance was filed, well over half of the wage loss would have been
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dissent considered Czosek to be the guide to the proper meas-
ure of damages in a hybrid section 301/DFR suit. 146 Justice
White also pointed to the concurrence in Foust in which Jus-
tice Blackmun speculated that the damages a union would
have to pay in a DFR case would be minimal.' 47  The dissent
asserted that the majority had abandoned the Vaca rationale
of apportionment in light of the apportionment language in
Czosek, Hnes, and Foust.148 The dissent accused the majority
of having effectively insulated the employer from most liabil-
ity although the employer alone has the ability to stop the
accretion of damages by reinstating the employee. 149 Justice
White reasoned that the "bulk of the award" will be borne by
the union and not by the employer; although the hypotheti-
cal arbitration date 50 will usually fall less than a year after
the discharge, t5 ' such cases take from three to ten years to run
their course in the judicial system. 52 The dissent claimed
that the employer is the actual cause of the damage because
but for the employer's breach of the collective bargaining
contract, no one would have to reimburse the employee. 53
Justice White also disagreed with the Court's distinction
between the collective bargaining agreement and traditional
contract law. '54 The dissent asserted that the matter should
be governed by the general rule in contract law that a
breaching defendant must pay damages equivalent to the to-
tal harm suffered even though there were other contributing
attributable to the union's refusal to arbitrate. 103 S. Ct. at 601 n.4. The Bowen dis-
sent, however, agreed with Vaca's dictum that "all or almost all" of the employee's
damage would be attributable to the employer. 103 S.Ct. at 601.
1' 103 S.Ct. at 602. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
" 103 S.Ct. at 602. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Justices Burger,
Rehnquist, and Stevens joined the Foust concurrence.
- See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
- 103 S. Ct. at 602-03.
-" The dissent assumed that the hypothetical arbitration date was endorsed by the
Court as the proper dividing line for apportionment. Id. at 603. See supra text accom-
panying note 136.
'' Id. at 603. The dissent observed that the average time between the filing of a
grievance and the rendering of a final arbitral award ranged from 223.5 to 268.3 days.
Md. at 601 n.4.
,.2 Id. See Comment, supra note 17, at 171 n.110.
103 S. Ct. at 603.
'M' Id. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
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factors. 5 ' Following general contract law, the employer
would be liable for the total backpay amount, even though
the union contributed to the harm through its breach of the
DFR. 156
Although the Court found that the nature of the collective
bargaining agreement entitles the employer to rely on the
union's decisions, the dissent emphasized that a union's duty
is to fairly represent the employees. 57 Justice White accused
the majority of reading an indemnification provision into the
agreement which would require the union to somehow pro-
tect the employer. 58 The enactment of such a provision, the
dissent claimed, would amount to modification of the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement without the authority to
do so.159
Justice White conceded that where the union has affirma-
tively induced the employer to commit a breach of collective
bargaining contract, the union and the employer should be
jointly and severally liable for the backpay damages.' 6 In
situations involving a union which has not participated in the
discharge, the dissent opined that the union should be secon-
darily liable.1 61 The dissent speculated, however, that unions
knowledgable of the Court's method of apportionment will
take many unmeritorious grievances to arbitration, simply to
avoid the prospect of liability for the major portion of the
backpay award.16 2
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
By affirming the district court's manner of apportionment,
the Supreme Court has held in effect that, in a hybrid section
301/breach of DFR suit, where the employee can prove that
Id. (quoting 5A CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 999 (1964)).
103 S. Ct. at 603.
Id. at 604.
5 Id.
I, d. at 605.
6¢ Id.
61 Id. See supra text accompanying note 117 where the Court took the opposite
approach.
1- 103 S.Ct. at 605.
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the employer has discharged him in breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and that the union has breached its
DFR, the employer will be liable for only those lost wages
which accrue prior to the date at which arbitration would
have taken place had the union processed the grievance.' 63
The union will be liable for all backpay damages which ac-
crue from the hypothetical arbitration date to the date of
final adjudication. 6 4 As the dissent pointed out, a union
breaching its DFR will consistently be liable for the greater
portion of the backpay award.165  The possibility of being
held liable for such damages may force unions to more care-
fully scrutinize their members' grievances, 66 strengthening
the bargaining process by forcing the union to adhere to its
duty to represent all employees fairly. 67
The Court's decision, however, may have the opposite ef-
fect, that of discouraging the settlement of grievances'68 and
encouraging the furtherance of many unmeritorious
claims. 69  Courts should stem the flow of grievances taken
to arbitration by clearly defining exactly what quality of per-
formance is required to fulfill the DFR. 70  Additionally,
there are two possible effects of allowing employers to rely on
the union's arbitration decisions. First, employer reliance
may protect the parties' expectations by allowing the system
to operate as designed. 71 On the other hand, such an "in-
163 Id. at 599 n.19.
- See supra text accompanying notes 151-152.
- 103 S. Ct. at 603. If, for example, a case would have gone to arbitration in one
year but would not be finally adjudicated in the courts for three years, the employer
would be liable for 25% of the damages (one year out of four) and the union would be
liable for 75%. If the case remained unsettled in the courts for nine years, see Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 171 n. 110, the employer would be liable for only 10% of the
award and the union would be forced to pay 90%. For an illustration of the Bowen
approach, see Comment, supra note 17, at 171.
, 103 S. Ct. at 597-98.
'' Brief for Petitioner at 25, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588
(1983). See also, Comment, supra note 17, at 180.
- Brief for Respondent Union at 45, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S.
Ct. 588 (1983).
1-' 103 S. Ct. at 605.
"0 See supra note 69.
"' Brief for Petitioner at 25, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588
(1983).
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demnification" provision may create reliance on imphied
agreements, defeating the expectations of the parties.172 Fur-
thermore, employers may perceive an incentive not to settle
cases because their potential backpay liability will already be
fixed as of a date past. 1 3
Although the Bowen decision may provide comfort to em-
ployers who have breached their collective bargaining agree-
ments and incentive for unions to make grievance decisions
more cautiously, the Court may have misconstrued the inten-
tion of the Vaca decision. Given the reality of the slow judi-
cial system, choosing to apportion damages according to the
hypothetical arbitration date implies that the union is pri-
marily responsible for the entire situation although the union
has no authority to stop the accretion of damages by reinstat-
ing the employee. Such apportionment seems inconsistent
with Vaca's mandate that each party pay damages attributa-
ble to its fault.
Beth Pace Baker
,12 Brief for Respondent Union at 48, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S.
Ct. 588 (1983).




TARY AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY-The Actions of Two Contrac-
tors under a Military Arms Contract and Teaming
Agreement Are Not Per Se Violations of the Antitrust Laws
but Are To Be Governed by the "Rule of Reason" Analysis
Despite the Existence of Heavy Governmental Regulation in
the Industry. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705
F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983).
In 1974, the United States Navy announced the Navy Air
Combat Fighter (NACF) competition to develop a
lightweight fighter suitable for aircraft carriers.' Proposals
were limited to use of technology developed in General Dy-
namic's YF-16 and Northrop Corporation's (Northrop) YF-
17 land-based air combat fighter programs.2 As a result the
competition was effectively limited to General Dynamics and
Northrop.3 Neither, however, possessed the necessary experi-
ence in producing carrier-suitable aircraft.4
The solution as suggested by the Defense Department and
the Navy was to "team ' 5 the manufacturer winning the con-
, Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983).
2 Id. By limiting the proposals to this particular technology, the Navy would satisfy
the congressional goal to cut costs. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498
F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1980). In 1972, the United States Air Force had an-
nounced a similar program for lightweight, land-based, air combat fighters in which
Northrop and General Dynamics were awarded contracts to develop the YF- 17 and
YF-16, respectively. McDonnell did not compete because it concentrated on contin-
ued research and development on the F-4 and F-15. Id.
705 F.2d at 1037.
- Id. Both had concentrated their efforts in the past on land based aircraft. See supra
note 2.
r, Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 4-117 (1982). Section 4-117
provides in full:
(a) Definition. A contractor team arrangement is one whereby two or
more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act as a potential
prime contractor or whereby a potential prime contractor agrees with
one or more other companies to act as his subcontractor(s) under a speci-
fied Government procurement or program.
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tract with other companies having the requisite experience in
Naval aircraft development.6 McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion (McDonnell) had the requisite naval experience.7 On
October 2, 1974, Northrop and McDonnell executed a
"Teaming Agreement"8 to develop and propose variants of
the YF- 17 to the Air Force and Navy.9
(b) Pohcy. There are times when it may be desirable, both from the Gov-
ernment and Industry standpoints, for companies to enter into a team
arrangement prior to a Government contract award or thereafter. Team
arrangements may be particularly appropriate for engineering and oper-
ational system developments, but may be used in other appropriate situ-
ations, including production procurement. Team arrangements allow a
prime contractor and subcontractor to complement the unique capabili-
ties of each and to offer the Government the best combination of capa-
bilities to achieve the system performance, cost, and delivery desired for
the system being produced. The Government will recognize the integ-
rity and validity of contractor team arrangements,provided they are iden-
tifed and company relationships are stated in a proposal. Under a
contractor team arrangement, the prime contractor is fully responsible
for the performance of the contract. The Government normally will not
require or encourage dissolution of contractor team arrangements.
These policies do not authorize arrangements in violation of anti-trust
statutes and do not limit the Government's rights to:
(i) approve subcontracts in accordance with ASPR requirements;
(ii) determine the responsibility of a prime contractor on the basis of
the stated contractor team arrangement;
(iii) provide the selected prime contractor with data rights owned or
controlled by the Government; and
(iv) pursue its policies on competitive procurement, subcontracting and
component breakout, after initial production procurement or at any
other time.
Id.
In teaming arrangements, often used in large military projects, two or more private
contractors pool their financial and technological resources to work on a project they
would be unable to handle alone. Experimental Eng'g v. United Technologies Corp.,
614 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1980); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp.
492, 501-02 (D.D.C. 1971).
705 F.2d at 1037. The Navy was forced to encourage teaming because they were
faced with "a crap game in which the two potential participants did not know how to
play." Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1115.
7 705 F.2d at 1037. It should be noted that it was unclear who was the pursuer and
the pursuee; however, both were in desperate need of each other if they were to be
successful in taking advantage of the opportunity represented by the Navy's need for a
new carrier-suitable aircraft to meet the military needs of the nation. Northrop, 498 F.
Supp. at 1115.
a This "Teaming Agreement" would be the first of three agreements between the
two contractors. 705 F.2d at 1037.
1 Id. The USAF version would be a land-based, light-weight fighter from the YF-17
prototype, while the USN version would be carrier-suitable. Id. The Teaming Agree-
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On January 14,1975, Northrop lost the Air Force competi-
tion to General Dynamic's YF-16,' ° while on May 2, 1975,
McDonnell won the NACF competition based on its design.l
Two months later McDonnell and Northrop executed the
second agreement between themselves. 12 This "Basic Agree-
ment" paralleled the Teaming Agreement for the most part,13
although the Contract Responsibilities Clause of this new
ment stated that Northrop would concentrate on the Air Force's ACF competition
while McDonnell would center its efforts on the Navy's NACF competition. Id. The
central idea behind the joint effort was to combine the knowledge and skills of both
companies to successfully design fighter aircraft for both competitions based on the
groundwork laid down by Northrop. Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1115. Northrop had
spent a large amount of time and energy in the development of the lightweight
fighters. Id. at 1114. In 1965, Northrop began development of a new lightweight
supersonic fighter from which emerged its prototypes P-530 and P-630. Id. The P-530
was the design on which the Air Force awarded the 1972 contract to Northrop. Id.
The agreement was intended to be the foundation for future agreements. 705 F.2d at
1037. By its own terms the Teaming Agreement was to terminate on June 30, 1975,
unless mutually extended. Northrop, 498 F. Supp at 1115.
705 F.2d at 1037.
Id. The Navy designated the new aircraft to be the "F-18." Id.
12 Id. The Government was not a party to this agreement. Id. at 1037 n.3.
I, Id. The key provisions of the Basic Agreement are the Definitions Clause which
defines the F- 18 as a "carrier-based derivative of [the] YF- 17 aircraft... ;" the Objec-
tive Clause in which:
[the parties expressed their commitment to] work together (without in
any manner intending to create a joint venture or otherwise incur or
imply joint or several liability) for the purpose of obtaining and perform-
ing contracts for the development and production of derivatives of [the]
YF- 17 aircraft that are responsive to the requirements of the U.S. Navy
and foreign customers;
and the Contract Responsibilities Clause which provides:
[McDonnell] will be prime contractor in connection with contracts with
the U.S. Navy for the development of the F-18 and for the production of
those F-18 aircraft purchased by the U.S. Navy for its own use.
Futhermore, in the event a foreign customer desires to procure from
[McDonnell] . . .F-18 aircraf of basically the same configuratzon. . . [Mc-
Donnell/ will be prime contractor. /Northrop/ may elect to be prime contractor on
any or all contracts for the development and production of aircraft derived from the
YF- /7 other than those referred to in paragraph. . above.
Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added). The court also examined the Data Exchange Clause
and the Division of Effort Clause. Id. at 1038. The Data Exchange Clause mutually
obligated both parties to exchange available information on the F-18 and YF-17 tech-
nology. Id The exchanged technology could only be used by the receiving party in
furtherance of the contracts referred to in the Contract Responsibilities Clause, and the
Division of Effort Clause provided that absent a contrary Navy directive, all F-18 pro-
duction was to be performed according to the distribution of labor specified by the
parties in the agreement. Id.
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Agreement failed to clearly define the limitations imposed on
McDonnell with respect to the development of F- 18 carrier-
suitable derivatives. 4 Thereafter, the Government awarded
McDonnell the prime contract on the production of the F-
18,"5 and McDonnell awarded Northrop the principal sub-
contract on the project. 16
In late 1975 and early 1976, Iran commenced negotiations
with Northrop to become the first customer of a YF- 17 deriv-
ative land-based fighter.'7 The Navy was concerned that the
sales of Northrop's F-18L to Iran would dilute and under-
mine its F-18A program.' In response, the Navy persuaded
McDonnell and Northrop to enter into a new agreement on
August 26, 1976.'9
Northrop initiated suit against McDonnell on October 29,
1979, °2 alleging that McDonnell waged a deliberate cam-
paign to monopolize the market for YF-17 derivative aircraft
by crippling Northrop as a viable competitor.2' Particularly,
14 Id. at 1038.
15 Id.
1 Id. Northrop was required to provide "personnel, materials, services, facilities,
logistics support, data and management required to design and develop, fabricate,
qualify, test, document and deliver the . . . F-18 major assemblies/equipment in ac-
cordance with MACAIR Statement of Work (SOW) No. WS-F-18-27." Northrop, 498
F. Supp. at 1115.
,1 Id. The Northrop land-based derivative was designated the F-18L, and McDon-
nell's Navy design was known as the F-18A. Id.
Id. at 1115-16.
, 705 F.2d at 1038. This new agreement essentially reaffirmed the Basic Agree-
ment. Id. McDonnell's rights under the contract were expressly unchanged. Id. at
1038 n.5. The fighter that Northrop could develop was more specifically defined under
the new agreement. Id. at 1038. Northrop was exclusively to design, develop and pro-
duce for sale land-based designed fighters derived from the YF- 17 to the United States
and to foreign governments. Id. This assured the Navy that Northrop's agreements
concerning the F-18L would not interfere with development of the F-18A. Id. The
parties satisfied the Navy's demand that they agree on a Foreign Military Sales Master
Plan pursuant to the Military Assistance and Sales Manual, Defense Department Di-
rective 5105.38M. Id.
20 Id. The initiation of suit was in response to McDonnell's aggressive marketing of
the completed design of the production-ready F- 18. Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1116. At
that time, McDonnell was in active negotiations with Canada, Israel, Spain and Aus-
trailia. Id.
2, 705 F.2d at 1038. Generally, Northrop's claims were based on the theories that
McDonnell delayed production of all F-18 derivatives, including Northrop's F-18L, in
order to promote sales of its own land-based F-15 in the interim, that McDonnell at-
tempted to restrict Northrop's F-18L to a specialized class of limited-use fighters
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Northrop alleged that McDonnell breached the Contract Re-
sponsibilities Clause22 of the Basic Agreement by representing
to foreign customers23 that McDonnell could serve as prime
contractor on any version of the F- 18, including a land-based
version.24
McDonnell counterclaimed, moving to dismiss the com-
plaint of Northrop on the grounds that Northrop's claim con-
tained nonjusticiable political and foreign policy questions
and did not state grounds for relief under section 225 of the
known as "day fighters" so that McDonnell's F-15 and F-18A fighters would be more
attractive to customers desiring multi-mission aircraft, and that McDonnell breached
its obligations under the Basic Agreement to exchange F-18 technology and to subcon-
tract the specified share of work to Northrop on F-18A aircraft sold in foreign coun-
tries. Id. at 1039.
Specifically, the relief sought by Northrop can be summarized as follows:
1. Injunctive relief to prevent McDonnell from misappropriating
Northrop's property by breaching the Agreements.
2. Injunctive relief to prevent McDonnell from misappropriating
Northrop's property by exceeding the "license" of technology granted
under the Agreements.
3. A declaration of the parties' rights under the Agreements.
4. Damages for fraud by McDonnell in the inducement to enter the
Agreements.
5. An accounting for profits earned by McDonnell as a result of its
breaches of the Agreements.
6. Injunctive relief and damages for McDonnell's alleged attempt to
monopolize the domestic and foreign markets for F-18s in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
7. Injunctive relief and damages for McDonnell's act of unfair
competition.
8. Recovery in quantum meruit for contributions to the joint business
relationship for which Northrop has not been compensated.
Id at 1039 n.6.
22 See supra note 13 for relevant text of Contract Responsibilities Clause.
2.1 Many of the acts involved negotiations with Israel. Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1116.
2, 705 F.2d at 1039.
25 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads in full:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by impris-
onment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
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Sherman Act.26 McDonnell also asked for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the relief requested by Northrop27
would constitute an illegal restraint of trade in violation of
sections 128 and 229 of the Sherman Act.30
The district court dismissed Northrop's complaint in its en-
tirety and additionally granted McDonnell summary judg-
ment as to five 31 of the eight counts.3 2  The district court
found the case nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine based upon the separation of powers doctrine and
the delegation of the care of the military to the executive
branch?3 The court also found that the facts clearly brought
the case within the per se rule34 and not the "rule of reason"
Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1116. McDonnell also moved on two other grounds-
that there was a failure to join a necessary and indispensible party, the United States,
as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. 498 F.Supp. at 1116. The district court found that the United
States was an indispensible party and granted dismissal on the basis that the Govern-
ment would be prejudiced and inadequately represented. Id. at 1117-19. The district
court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Northrop's remedy
was not wholly against the United States. Id. But only in an action against the Gov-
ernment could its agency relationship be determined. Id. Consequently, the court
lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 1119-20.
27 See supra note 21, counts one, two, three, six and seven.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 states in full:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in the restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court.
Id
29 See supra note 25 for text of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
:m Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1116. McDonnell also alleged that Northrop could not
establish injury in fact in its allegations. Id. See supra note 21, counts four, five, six,
seven and eight.
.1 Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1124. See supra note 21, counts one, two, three, six, and
seven.
:12 705 F.2d at 1036.
A' Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1120.
See infta notes 46-51 and 59-69 and accompanying text for discussion oftheperse
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analysis35 for restraints of trade. 6 The district court also dis-
missed the counterclaim of McDonnell.37 The district court
found that McDonnell's counterclaim was a mirror image of
Northrop's complaint and should be denied on the same
grounds.3
Both parties appealed and cross-appealed 9.3  Held, reversed
and remandedfor further proceedings: The actions of two contrac-
tors under a military arms contract and teaming agreement
are not per se violations of the antitrust laws but are to be
governed by the "rule of reason" analysis despite the exist-
ence of heavy governmental regulation in the industry. North-
rop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Restraint of Trade Test
To curb the unchecked restraints of trade created by trusts
and monopolies and the imposition of those restraints by
them on the free enterprise system, Congress passed the Sher-
man Antitrust Act ("Act") in 1890.40 Sections 14 and 242 of
the Act were written in broad sweeping language leaving to
the courts the job of defining the boundaries.43 The purpose
of the Act was to "prevent undue restraints of interstate com-
merce, to maintain [interstate commerce's] appropriate free-
dom in the public interest, to afford protection from the
subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor.""'
.f See infa notes 52-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the "rule of reason"
analysis.
:% Northrup, 498 F. Supp. at 1122.
.7 705 F.2d at 1036. In the alternative the district court granted Northrop summary
judgment on McDonnell's counterclaim. Id.
:w Id.
3q Id. at 1030.
- Note, The Facial Unreasonableness Theoy.: Filling the Void Between Per Se and Rule of
Reason, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 729, 729 (1981). See generally , I E. KINTNER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 4 (1980).
-1 See supra note 28 for text of section I of the Sherman Act.
42 See supra note 25 for text of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
43 Note, supra note 40, at 729-3 1.
44 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (holding that
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By making the language broad, Congress insured that the
purpose of the Act would be met and a standard of reasona-
bleness would be achieved.45
In first construing the Act, the Supreme Court made the
sweeping determination that the Act embraced every re-
straint of trade without exception.46 This determination was
too broad, and the Court was forced to retreat and concede
that not all restraints of trade were in violation of the Act.47
The Sixth Circuit quickly recognized that there were differ-
ent types of restraints of trade and made the distinction be-
tween "naked" restraints48 and ancillary49 restraints.50 Naked
restraints were condemned by common law, but ancillary re-
straints were exempted.5" Thirteen years after the initial rec-
there was insufficient evidence to prove a violation of the Sherman Act where 137
bituminous coal producers formed an exclusive selling agency to market their coal).
- Id. at 359-60. The Supreme Court equated the generality and adaptability of the
Act with that found in constitutional provisions. Id. For an example of generality and
adaptability in constitutional provisions, see the cases judicially developing the due
process clause, U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lochnej v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) (an
organization of eighteen railroad companies, which had agreed to adhere to certain
rates, rules and regulations for the carriage of freight, held unreasonable restraint
under the Sherman Act).
47 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (a restrictive
agreement collateral to a sales contract held unlawful ancillary restraint).
In Naked restraints are contracts which have no other purpose or consideration on
either side other than the mutual restraint of the parties. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to
Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements. Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and
Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV. 879, 882 (1980).
49 Ancillary restraints are "those merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate
fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits
by the other party." Louis, supra note 48, at 882 (quoting United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (an agree-
ment between six companies to refrain from competing against each other in the iron
pipe market in order to raise the price of iron pipe held unreasonable), afd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
.' Id. at 282. The traditional approach of determining whether an ancillary re-
straint is illegal places the burden of justification on the user of the restraints once its
existence and objectionable nature are established. Thus, the restraint must be essen-
tial-not merely helpful or useful-to the implementation of the underlying transac-
tion. Moreover, it cannot be more restrictive than necessary to meet the parties' needs.
Louis, supra note 48, at 883.
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ognition of restraints of trade, the Supreme Court in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States5 2 announced the rule of reason test.
which established those restraints which were in violation of
the Act.53 The rule departed from theper se unreasonableness
test of all naked restraints found in United States v. Trans-Mis-
souri Freight Association . Effectively this new test recognized
that some transactions were inherently restrictive or required
explicit restraints to make them either efficient or feasible.55
Therefore, only those restraints that unduly inhibited inter-
state commerce were prohibited by the Act. 56 Unreasonable-
ness was to be based either on the nature or character of the
contracts, or on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the
inference or presumption that the contracts were intended to
restrain trade.5 ' The nature of the inquiry, however, was
confined to the consideration of the impact on competitive
conditions.58
But the near per se analysis of Trans-Missouri reemerged in
subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court.59 In United
States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. ,60 the Supreme Court ruled that
horizontal price-fixing61 was per se unreasonable.6 2 The ma-
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Forty competing corporations had entered the Standard Oil
Trust Agreement. Id. at 33-35. The corporations exchanged stock for trust certificates.
Id at 36-37. By 1890, the trust controlled most of the oil refining industry. Id at 33,
40.
.3 Id. The test from Standard Oil virtually absorbed the ancillary restraint exception
of Addston Steel. Louis, supra note 48, at 882. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58
for the rule of reason test.
- 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Louis, supra note 48, at 882 n.23. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
Louis, supra note 48, at 882.
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
17 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)
(an association's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding held to be a violation
of the Sherman Act); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
SNational Soc)' oftofessional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55.
- United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). This was the first case
to explicitly propose theperse rule. The rule, however, was not definitely established as
viable until United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding
that the efforts of oil companies to stabilize market prices through purchasing gas on
the market at high prices was per se illegal).
o Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
6' Horizontal price-fixing refers to an agreement to fix prices between or among
independent entities which compete on the same levels of product or service distribu-
tion. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 40, § 10.3, at 74.
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jor oil companies had attempted to stabilize the midwest gas-
oline markets by purchasing distress gasoline 63 at higher
prevailing market prices.64 In disapproving of this practice,
the Court stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combina-
tion formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.
While the per se rule in Socony- Vacuum was relatively ex-
plicit, the Court further defined the rule in Northem Pacfic
Railway Co. v. United S/ates.66 The Court specifically rejected
the rule of reason analysis because the railroad had "suffi-
cient economic power with respect to the tying product [the
use of the railroad] to appreciably restrain free competition in
the market for the tied product. ' 67 Therefore, in clarifying
theper se rule, the Court stated that "there are certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."'68 The purpose in
advocating theper se rule was to make specific types of unrea-
sonable restraints more certain and predictable, and also to
avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and pro-
longed economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
12 310 U.S. at 223.
61 Distress gasoline is a term for large quantities of gasoline sold by small refiners at
low prices on the spot market because of lack of storage capacity. The result would
depress the price of gasoline as a whole on the market. Note, supra note 40, at 740.
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 179-80.
65 Id. at 223.
- 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
61 Id. at 6-8. A tying arrangement is formed where the seller conditions the sale of
one product (the tying product) upon the purchase of another (the tied product), or
where the buyer agrees to refrain from buying the tied product from any other sup-
plier. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 40, § 10.52, at 223. Here the tying arrangement was
more akin to the former method. The railroad conditioned the sale of land upon the
purchaser's agreement to use only the railroad when shipping goods. 356 U.S. at 3.
356 U.S. at 5.
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undertaken."69
After Northern Pacific, the Court continued the process of
defining theper se rule and expanded its boundaries by creat-
ing the "aggregation of trade restraints doctrine."7 ° In Tfnken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,71 Timken, a manufacturer,
licensed a British company to use its patents and trademarks
in the production of tapered roller bearings.72  The license
agreement divided up the world markets and fixed prices.
7 3
The Court rejected the ancillary restraint doctrine developed
in United States v. Addston Pipe & Steel Co .7 and held that re-
straint of trade was the primary purpose of the arrange-
ment.75 In holding the restraints per se unreasonable, the
Court stated its prior decisions plainly established that the
agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints
such as those existing in Timken were illegal under the Act.76
The Court based its decision on the connected price-fixing
which had been held per se unreasonable in Socony- Vacuum .
By ruling on the price-fixing issue, the Court avoided decid-
ing the horizontal market division issue. 78 The aggregation of
trade restraints doctrine was further reinforced in United States
v. Sealy, Inc. 7' and Citizens Publishhing Co. v. United States.8° The
Court, however, had never explained what it meant by the
1;9 Id.
71 Louis, supra note 48, at 884-89.
, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
' Id. at 595.
,3 Id. at 595-96.
74 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
7r, 341 U.S. at 597-98.
'. Id. at 598. The Court in dicta stated that it could not find authority to justify the
restraints on the basis that the licensing agreement was labeled a joint venture or
otherwise. Id. All agreements could be thus labeled, and hence be beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. Id.
" Id. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
" Louis, supra note 48, at 887. It is noteworthy that the Court, in United States v.
Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.9 (1972), stated in dicta that the territorial restraints
in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) would have been unlawful per se.
79 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (expressly relying upon Timken and holding that the restraints
were horizontal and connected with price-fixing, making them per se unlawful).
- 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (joint venture between two newspapers heldperse unreasona-
ble because it combined advertising and circulation departments and agreed to price-
fixing and profit-sharing arrangements).
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doctrine. 1
The Court finally confronted the issue of horizontal market
division in United States v. Topco Associates .82 Topco was a co-
operative serving as a joint purchasing association for approx-
imately twenty-five medium to small regional supermarket
chains. 3 Topco would order a thousand different items from
independent packers and manufacturers, place its label on
the foodstuffs, and ship them to the member markets. 4 In
return, Topco granted each member an exclusive retail terri-
tory where no other member or prospective member could
operate a store carrying Topco products.85 The Supreme
Court held these territorial restraints to be naked and hori-
zontal, and therefore per se unlawful.8 6 At least one commen-
tator, however, has said that the restraints at issue were
actually ancillary in nature and not naked, thus casting
doubt on the ancillary restraint doctrine which employed the
rule of reason analysis.8
Even as the per se rule reached its pinnacle in Topco, the
Court had begun to reevaluate the absoluteness of the per se
rule and the need for a return to the rule of reason analysis. 8
As a result of its decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwznn &
Co. ,89 the Court was forced to explicitly reevaluate the per se
rule.' In Schwinn, the manufacturer held control and author-
8, Louis, supra note 48, at 887.
,2 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
"0- Id. at 598.
,1 Id. at 598-99.
R.1 Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 608.
"' Louis, supra note 48, at 890, 892. But see National Soc) of Professional Eng'rs, 435
U.S. 679, 689, 696 n.22 (1922) (referring favorably to the common-law uses of the
doctrine).
-9 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The Court re-
jected the per se illegality of nonprice vertical restrictions until an adverse economic
and business impact of the practice could be demonstrated, but it did not adopt the
"rule of reason" test. Id. at 263. The Court simply did not adopt any standard at all.
Stewart & Roberts, Viability of the Antitnst Per Se Illegality Rule. Schwinn Down, How
Many to Go?, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 727, 730-31 (1980). But see United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (the Court unexpectedly found a nonprice-fixing
vertical arrangement as per se illegal).
" 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
' Stewart & Roberts, supra note 88, at 729.
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ity over its product even after it was sold.9 The Court held
that this practice was aper se violation of the antitrust laws.92
The main problem was the Court's reliance upon the per se
analysis when the government did not even pursue that par-
ticular analysis.93
The Supreme Court made its first clear attempt to limit
the application of theper se rule in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.94 The Court recognized that this area of law
was in need of clarification, 95 and focused its decision on
Schwot'nn.96 In a painstakingly detailed decision, Schwinn was
overruled, and the rule of reason analysis was held to apply to
nonprice-fixing vertical restraints.9 7 In overruling Schwinn,
the Court created uncertainty as to the viability of Topco
which had held a questionably naked territorial restraint as
per se unreasonable. 9' After Sylvania, the courts, undaunted
by the legal commentators, continued to apply theper se rule
of Topco to horizontal market allocations.99
The Supreme Court finally reevaluated its approach to the
per se rule in the horizontal market setting in its recent deci-
sion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System
(BMI) .0 The case involved a challenge to the blanket li-
9, 388 U.S. at 379.
92 Id.
Stewart & Roberts, supra note 88, at 730.
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The manufacturer had a distribution system whereby it sold
its product to uncontrolled and company controlled middlemen, who in turn sold the
products to independent retailers. Id at 38. After a decline in market share, the manu-
facturer attempted to limit its authorized retailers to sell only its products at their
approved and franchised locations. Id The manufacturer also reserved the right to
limit the number of franchises in an area. Id See also Note, supra note 40, at 747.
9, 433 U.S. at 47.
Id. at 42-59.
9, Id. at 47-59. It should be noted that the Court based much of its analysis on
Northern Paific Railway, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), a case which it had ignored in Schwinn.
- Louis, supra note 48, at 894. Topco was distinguished on the grounds that it in-
volved horizontal restraints. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
- Stewart & Roberts, supra note 88, at 741-42. See, e.g. ,In re Nissan Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); United States v.
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978).
One author contended that the Sylvania rationale demanded the overruling of Topco.
Weisburg, Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania. Implication for Horizontal, as Well as Vertical,
Restraints on Distributors, 33 Bus. LAw. 1757, 1760-69 (1978).
- 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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censing of musical compositions. °1 The blanket license pro-
cedures effectively bar price competition among copyright
owners because once a license was issued the licensee had un-
limited rights to the music libraries for a fixed fee. 10 2 CBS
alleged that the practice amounted toper se unlawful price-
fixing. 10 3 In reversing the Second Circuit's condemnation of
the licensing agreement, the Court held that the practice of
blanket licensing did not constitute aper se unreasonable re-
straint of trade. 10
4
At the outset of its opinion, the Court held that price fixing
arrangements were per se unreasonable; 0 5 not all arrange-
ments that appeared to be price-fixing, however, fell into this
category. 10 6 The Court stated:
As generally used in the antitrust field, "price fixing" is a
shorthand way of describing certain categories of business be-
havior to which theper se rule has been held applicable ....
[However,] [1]iteralness is overly simplistic and often over-
broad. When two partners set the price of their goods and
services they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per se
in violation of the Sherman Act. Thus, it is necessary to char-
acterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without
that category of behavior to which we apply the label "per se
price fixing." That will often, but not always, be a simple
matter. 107
The Court pointed out that considerable judicial experi-
,o, Under a blanket licensing system, certain organizations operate as clearing
houses for the licensing of copyrighted musical compositions. Id. at 5. Copyright own-
ers grant to these clearinghouses, on a nonexclusive basis, the right to license their
compositions for public performance. Id. In return, the organizations perform various
functions for the composers, including the collection and distribution of royalties. Id.
Authorizations from clearinghouses such as Broadcast Music, Inc. almost always take
the form of blanket licenses. Id. These arrangements permit licensees to use any and
all compositions in the library of the organization for a fixed term. Id. Almost all
television and radio broadcasters hold blanket licenses from clearinghouse organiza-
tions which charge them a fixed rate or percentage of total dollar revenues. Id.
,02 Note, CBS v. ASCAP Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J.
783, 793-94 (1978).
BMI, 441 U.S. at 6.
,o Id. at 7.
lo, Id. at 8.
- Id. at 8-10.
107 Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
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ence with the business relationship involved was required
before a restraint could be found per se unreasonable. 10 8  In
BMI, the necessary business experience was absent.'0 9 Fur-
ther, the Court held that the practice was not a naked re-
straint of trade with no other purpose than to stifle
competition, but instead the practice accompanied the inte-
gration of sales, marketing, and enforcement against unau-
thorized copyright use."0 Therefore, the blanket licensing
was not "price-fixing" within the meaning of theper se rule. "'
One point is clear from BMI and Sylvania: the per se rule
analysis is appropriate under the right conditions but should
not be applied blindly without the proper analysis. 1 2 BMI
effectively placed "a small, relatively undefined area beyond
the reach of the per se rule and, with Sylvania, suggests that
further limitations on the per se rule with respect to practices
having some redeeming social virtue may be in order."' 1 3
BMI, while not specifically identifying the area, did not ex-
pressly overrule or distinguish Topco and "did not hold that
ancillary restraints should be generally analyzed under the
rule of reason."' 14
- Id. (quoting United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).
- Id. at 10. The Court stated, " '[W]e confront conditions both in the copyright
law and in antitrust law which are suigenerzs.' " Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130, 132 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
BMI, 441 U.S. at 20.
Id. at 23. The Court's holding that blanket licensing was notper se "price-fixing"
could be interpreted to undermine theper s rule. Louis, supra note 48, at 898 n.127.
But see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (reaffirming
the validity of the per se rule in naked price-fixing arrangements).
2 Note, supra note 40, at 749. The test for the application of the per se rule is
whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output. BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20. This is
tempered, however, by the unclear result in BA. Note, Pce Firing and the Per Se Rule.-
A Redefmition-Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 5 DEL. J. CORP.
LAW. 73, 92 (1980). The unclear result is possibly an indication of the Court's in-
creased hesistency to employ theper se rule without going through an economic analy-
sis to aid in the resolution of the issue. Id.
' Louis, supra note 48, at 898-99.
, Id. One author states that the present status of both tests is as follows:
[Tihe per se rule can be applied only after scrutiny of the competitive
effects of a particular restraint in a given industry. This limited scrutiny
can be distinguished from the rule of reason analysis in several major
respects. The rule of reason approach entails examination of the precise
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B. Imphed Immunity Doctrine
By passing the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) "5 in 1887,
Congress began what would later prove to be an era of regu-
lation in various industries and markets. 16 When Congress
passed the Sherman Act in 1890,' however, a direct conflict
arose between the purpose of the antitrust laws, which was to
encourage competition, and the purpose of regulation, which
was to suppress competition." 8  This conflict resulted in
facts in the case involved. Indeed, while the competitive consequences of
a restraint are scrutinized under both inquiries, it is the rule of reason
which looks, inter ah'a, to the relevant product and geographic markets as
they existed before and after the challenged practice evolved. Con-
versely, the per se inquiry seeks only to make broad generalizations, and
therefore, does not concern itself with particularities. Moreover, under
the per se inquiry, the purposes of a restraint generally are not scruti-
nized, except when they tend to show competitive effects. A court en-
gaged in the rule of reason analysis, however, will focus upon the
particular defendant's purposes for developing a commercial practice
and will examine the justifications for and scope of that restraint in de-
tail. Finally, the market power of an antitrust defendant may be consid-
ered irrelevant under the per se approach, depending upon the type of
restraint involved. Under the rule of reason analysis, this factor is highly
significant.
Note, supra note 40, at 751-52.
-, An Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
,, See Comment, Antitrust and Regulated Industries.- A Critique and Proposal for Reform of
the ImpliedImmunity Doctrine, 57 TEX. L. REV. 751, 752 n.1 (1979). The rationale be-
hind the institution of regulation in an industry was to control and possibly eliminate
competition as a means towards the greater good or public interest. Ashley, Vanishing
Immunity." The Antitrust Assault on Regulated Industries, 27 Loy. L. REV. 187, 187-88
(1981). According to Ashley, the preference for regulation in an industry has been
based on several theories: (1) a natural monopoly existed in the industry, in particular
the public utilities where the demand for a given service simply cannot support more
than one company, see, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369
(1973); (2) businesses like common carriers which involve public convenience or non-
discriminatory provisions of services should be judged by standards other than compet-
itive ones, see, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 453, 456-67
(1945); (3) the industry has been important to the foreign commerce of the United
States, see, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1952); and
(4) there has been special concern for the regulated industry because of historical
events, as for example, in the securities market where regulation was prompted by the
Great Depression and the belief that that economic calamity was the result of unre-
strained competition in the securities field, see, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
,,1 Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). See supra notes 25, 28 for the text of sections 1 and 2.
- See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S.
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claims of so-called implied immunity by the regulated indus-
tries.1 19 This implied immunity doctrine did not receive any
substantial judicial development until 1907 in Texas &Pacifc
Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 120
In Abilene Cotton, the oil company alleged that the railroad
had overcharged for the transportation of cotton in violation
of the ICA. 121 The Court held that the ICA granted author-
ity to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to ensure
uniform, nondiscriminatory rates in shipping. 122  Therefore,
Abilene's claim that it had the common law right of damages
against the railroad because the railroad had unreasonably
and unjustly set its rates was barred by Congress' exercise of
power to regulate commerce.12 3 Abilene Cotton was an implied
repeal of a common law right; it did not, however, specifically
address the conflict between federal regulations and antitrust
laws. 124
378, 387-90 (1981). Regulation was designed to protect infant industries from, the ef-
fects of unrestrained competition, according to Congress' judgment. Comment, supra
note 116, at 753. It should be further noted that in some respects the two Acts do
coincide-they both were enacted to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources
possible. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 959
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
I National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center V. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378,
387-90 (1981). The basic argument set forth by these industries relying upon implied
immunity was that the very nature of regulation, i.e. suppression of competition, was
inherently and fundamentally inconsistent with the application of the antitrust laws;
therefore, the antitrust laws were impliedly repealed. Baiter & Day, Implied Antitrust
Repeals.: Pnncipalsfor Analysis, 86 DICK. L. REv. 447, 448 (1982).
-o 204 U.S. 426 (1907). Prior to Texas &Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., the imp-
lied immunity issue had been partially addressed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). In Trans-Missouri, the
defendants argued that the ICA authorized the rate setting controls at issue. 166 U.S.
at 314. The Court held that the ICA did not expressly authorize any agreements in-
consistent with the antitrust laws; therefore, no conflict existed, and the agreements
were subject to the antitrust laws. Id. at 335. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
324 U.S. at 456, the Court reaffirmed its statement in Trans-Missouri stating that "regu-
lated industries are notperse exempt from the Sherman Act." A similar argument was
rejected in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898). Trans-Mis-
souri is best noted for its development of the test for restraints of trade. See supra notes
46, 54 and accompanying text.
,2, Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 430.
122 Id. at 441-42.
,2 Id. The appropriate means of redress was through the ICC. Id. at 448.
,2. Id. at 446.
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In Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway ,125 the Supreme
Court addressed the conflict between regulations and the
Sherman Act. 126 In Keogh, the shipper, Keogh, alleged that
the carrier, the railroad, had illegally overcharged the shipper
in violation of the ICA. 27 Keogh also alleged that the rail-
road was restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act.12 8
Having avoided the issue in Trans-Missouri, 29 the Court
was faced with deciding between two conflicting federal stat-
utes. 130 Relying upon its decision in Abilene Cotton, the Court
held that if Keogh was allowed to recover under the Sherman
Act, the damages would be tantamount to a rebate giving
Keogh an unfair advantage over its competitors.' 3' This was
not consistent with the congressional intent behind the
ICA. 132
The most important feature of Keogh was the leap the
Court made from the implied repeal of common law rights
doctrine of Abilene Cotton to the imphed repeal of antitrust laws
doctrine. These two cases provided the basis for the devel-
opment of the implied immunity doctrine. 34 By formulating
this doctrine, the Court created certain exceptions to the anti-
trust laws "on the theory that the public interest would be
better served by allowing specific industries to engage in an-
ticompetitive practices in order to assure growth and in-
creased services."'' 35
Although the implied immunity doctrine was conceived al-
most concurrently with the antitrust laws, it has not been
,2- 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
126 Comment, supra note 116, at 758.
127 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 159-60.
128 Id.
29 See supra note 120.
- Comment, supra note 116, at 758.
.3, Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163.
132 Id.
13. Comment, supra note 116, at 759. Recently, the Supreme Court pointed out that
it was a misconception that Keogh stood for the implied repeal of antitrust laws. Mc-
Lain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980). Keogh was solely a
judicial interpretation of the private injury requirement. Baiter & Day, supra note 119,
at 455.
134 Ashley, supra note 116, at 201.
,3. Ashley, supra note 116, at 201.
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molded into a simple uncomplicated rule; rather, it has
evolved into a mere shell of incoherence and ambiguity.1 36
This has been a direct result of the doctrine's application to a
specific industry which has its own individual characteris-
tics. 37 There are, however, certain factors that have been
consistently examined by the courts to determine whether im-
munity exists. 13
8
The first of these factors is whether there was congressional
intent, express or implied, to permit the regulatory scheme to
prevail over the antitrust laws. t39 The second factor looked at
by the courts has been whether the regulatory agency has
sanctioned the particular conduct. 40 Courts have also looked
1U Ashley, supra note 116, at 202; Comment, supra note 116, at 760. But see Baiter
& Day, supra note 119, at 447-50.
,17 Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 1982).
138 Ashley, supra note 116, at 200-07; Comment, supra note 116, at 766-82.
,34 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1973). Certain
regulatory schemes or statutes have expressly provided for immunity with respect to
certain activities. See, e.g., The Shipping Act, § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) (agreements
approved by the Federal Maritime Commission are immune from the antitrust laws).
More often, however, the statute in question either required compliance, see, e.g., The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2-135 (1976), or was silent or ambiguous on
the matter, see, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963)
(Pan Am's activities did not fall within the express immunitites under the Federal Avi-
ation Act; however, the Supreme Court implied immunity). Where the statute has
been silent or ambiguous, the arguments have been that subjecting an industry to per-
vasive regulation was a manifestation of Congress' intent to lift the ban of the Sherman
Act from activities under a regulatory agency's direction. See, e.g., United States v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 730-33 (1975). The theory most com-
monly advanced for pervasive regulation is that by enacting a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme Congress has indicated that competition alone does not sufficiently serve
the public interest to permit the competitive standards of the antitrust laws to control
the regulated industry. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93, 98
(1953).
110 Ashley, supra note 116, at 204. An express statutory approval of the conduct has
been persuasive to the courts. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
422 U.S. 694, 728 (1975) (holding that section 22(f) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(o) (1976) authorized certain vertical restraints). But the
Supreme Court has rarely found express statutory authorization for immunity. See,
e.g., MationalAss'n ofSec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 713-20, (involving the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1976)); Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at
315 (involving the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1976)). If the industry
has been constantly under agency supervision, then the industry has lost its freedom to
act alone, and immunity may be granted. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973) (holding that the Civil Aeronautics Board's inquiry
involved nearly all actions taken by Hughes Tool and since it had approved those
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to whether the antitrust litigation interferes with the regula-
tory scheme and the goals of that scheme. 14' Finally, the
courts have focused some attention on whether the particular
agency has the authority to enforce the antitrust laws, and
whether the agency has the ability to grant relief to the in-
jured party. 42
These factors, however, are tempered by the courts' disfa-
vor of a finding of implied immunity. 143  Therefore, the
courts have not found immunity where it has not been shown
that a clear repugnancy or total incompatability existed be-
tween the regulation and the antitrust laws. 144 Futhermore,
actions immunity was granted under the Federal Aviation Act and Pan Am. World
Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1973)).
,-, See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 685-86 (1975); Sil-
ver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963). If the antitrust litiga-
tion does interfere with the regulatory scheme, immunity has been found. Gordon, 422
U.S. at 685-86; Silver, 373 U.S. at 360-61. In this regard, the courts have focused on
whether the questioned activity serves the goals of the regulatory scheme. In Hughes
Tool, the Supreme Court referred to "mainstream" responsibilities of the agency. 409
U.S. at 382. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Hughes Tool referred to the "core" of
statutory responsibility. Id. at 412. The nature of the relief sought has also played an
important role in this stage of the analysis. Ashley,supra note 116, at 205. One author
summarized the role the type of action plays by stating that "a successful suit for dam-
ages based on past and completed antitrust activity would not constrain the agency's
ability to select regulatory options after judgment. A suit for injunctive relief from
certain practices, however, might directly conflict with the agency's pursuit of funda-
mental regulatory goals." Comment, supra note 116, at 772.
142 See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 385-90 (discuss-
ing the CAB's control over the actions and situations involved). The Supreme Court
has held that where the agency does not have the ability to enforce the antitrust laws,
immunity must be refused. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358
(1963). One author argues that where the statute grants authority, see, e.g. , The Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976), it does not extend any further than what is expressly
delineated. Comment, supra note 116, at 777-78. But see, Pan Am., 371 U.S. 296 (1973)
(holding that the CAB has authority over all antitrust actions involving the airline
industry). The ability to grant relief, however, has not been considered as important as
the other factors. Comment,supra note 116, at 781. Consequently, the Supreme Court
has manipulated the factor in various cases. See, e.g., Silver, 373 U.S. at 357 (refusal to
find immunity because the SEC did not have the authority to remedy abusive enforce-
ment of the rules); Pan Am., 371 U.S. at 312 (authority was conferred upon the CAB
where one of the participants was arguably outside of the CAB's jurisdiction). One
author has pointed out that without analyzing this factor the result may be that the
injured party has been left without a remedy because the agency's power to grant relief
may be discretionary. Comment, supra note 116, at 781.
,-' United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975). But
see Phonetele, Inc., v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1982).
"I United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975).
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when this has been shown, the immunity is only granted to the
minimum extent necessary to make the regulator scheme work.
Also, each of these factors has not been conclusive in any
particular judicial opinion; thus the result has not been the
development of a "simplistic and mechanically universal doc-
trine of implied antitrust immunity."1 46 Along with the in-
consistency in decisions, '47 the recent trends away from the
doctrine and regulation have caused additional confusion.' 48
The Ninth Circuit summarized the prevailing judicial atti-
tude by warning that the use of abstact characterizations was
an unreliable method of analysis that was more harmful than
helpful. 149
II. NORTHROP CORPORATION V MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
CORPORA TION
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of dis-
missal and summary judgment in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. 150 by first determining that there was subject
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975). Extensive Congres-
sional regulation does not reflect an intent to repeal the antitrust laws by implication
with respect to every action taken by the industry. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334,
346 (1959). If Congress intended to repeal, then that intent must be absolutely clear
before it will control. Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682. The intent is clear when it is expressly
mandated or where the regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require
the type of conduct under challenge. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 730-34;
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 689-90.
145 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
146 Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 1982).
141 See supra note 142 for an example of the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's
opinions.
" The courts have begun to limit the application of the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 1982). Congress,
also, has responded by limiting regulation and promoting competition. See, e.g., Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
,49 Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 1982).
- 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983). The five issues were:
(1) whether the suit against the Government pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1976) (dis-
closure of propriety data) was the exclusive remedy; (2) whether the Government was a
necessary and indispensible party; (3) whether the claims presented non-justiciable
political or foreign policy questions; (4) whether certain agreements between the par-
ties wereper se illegal restraints of trade; and (5) whether the Government so pervaded
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matter jurisdiction,15" ' that the Government did not have to
be joined as a necessary party,'52 and that the issues were jus-
ticiable. 53 The court was then able to focus its attention on
the critical antitrust issues. 154
The court had to first determine the appropriate test for
the antitrust claim.'55 Northrop challenged the district
court's determination that the Contract Responsibility
the relevant market that no trade or commerce existed for Sherman Act purposes. 705
F.2d at 1035-36.
1' 705 F.2d at 1039-42. In an extensive analysis, the court concluded that the dis-
trict court had erred in determining that 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1976) mandated suit
against the Government as exclusive remedy. 705 F.2d at 1039-46. The emphasis of
the court's analysis was on § 2356 which waives sovereign immunity for claims within
its scope and establishes that the exclusive remedy is against the Government. 705
F.2d at 1040; 22 U.S.C. § 2356(a)(2). The court's decision turned on the lack of expres-
sion by the statute itself and by the legislative history that the disclosure by govern-
ment contractors was to be encompassed by § 2356. 705 F.2d at 1041-42.
12 705 F.2d at 1042-46. Under the confines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19,
the Government was not a necessary and indispensible party because it was not a party
to the agreements; it had never asserted a formal interest in the action; it had a non-
party interest, but there was a lack of judicial precedent requiring the joinder as a
necessary party; and its rights to the data were not prejudiced. 705 F.2d at 1043-44.
,ro 705 F.2d at 1046-49. The court did not find, as required by Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962), that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy de-
termination reserved for non-judicial discretion; the impossibility of deciding without
expressing lack of respect for the coordinate branches of government; unusual need for
adherence to a political decision already made; and the potentiality for embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments. Id. at 1046-47. Therefore,
based on these considerations, the court held that the issues were not political ques-
tions, but legal questions which the courts were well equipped to resolve. Id.
As for the Act of State doctrine, the court held that it did not shield the issues from
judicial inquiry. 705 F.2d at 1047-49. Relying upon Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976), the court held that the purely commercial activity
involved between Northrop and McDonnell did not require judicial forebearance
under the Act of State doctrine. 705 F.2d at 1048 n.25. Furthermore, since Northrop
could establish its losses by proof of increased costs without reference to lost sales, the
court held that the doctrine did not shield all violators of private agreements involving
some foreign governmental act. 705 F.2d at 1048 (relying upon Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 599 F.2d 449 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980)).
,54 705 F.2d at 1049.
,,,, Id. at 1049-50. Before the court focused on the antitrust test issue, it pointed out
that summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is generally disfa-
vored in antitrust cases when motive and intent are at issue; however, the court did
note that summary judgment did have certain applications in the antitrust area. Id. at
1050.
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Clause'56 was a per se unreasonable market allocation under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 157 The court concluded that
the application of theperse rule to the horizontal market allo-
cation was inappropriate.'
The court noted that in prior decisions it had held horizon-
tal market divisions asperse unreasonable.' 59 Since BMI, 160
however, there have been exceptions where the rule of reason
analysis was held applicable to horizontal market alloca-
tions."' In order for the rule of reason analysis to apply, cer-
tain characteristics have to surface-judicial inexperience in
the area of teaming agreements, non-harmful effect on com-
petition, and the reasonableness of the limitation clause
through its essentiality to the agreements.
62
With regard to judicial inexperience, the Supreme Court's
"established position [is] that a new per se rule is not justified
until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-reason experi-
ence with the particular type of restraint challenged."' 63 In
remonstrating McDonnell for its narrow interpretation of
BMI, the court reaffirmed the condemnation of literalness as
expressed in BMI. 164 The key factor here was that neither the
district court nor McDonnell could point to a case where sim-
ilar facts had met judicial scrutiny.' 65 In light of this, the
court held that imposing the per se rule here would be
premature. 16
' "i See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
'5 705 F.2d at 1050. See supra note 28 for text of section 1.
'" 705 F.2d at 1050.
' 'q Id. See A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach., 653 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981);
Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936
(1979).
, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 100-114.
705 F.2d at 1050-51. See also Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813,
821-24 (9th Cir.) (as amended) (horizontal market allocations in a lease provision were
not per se unreasonable), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982).
162 705 F.2d at 1050-54.
..... Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 n. 19 (1982). It
is interesting to note that in Maricopa County, the Supreme Court held that even in light
of its inexperience in the health-care antitrust field, the per se rule applied to the hori-
zontal price-fixing agreement. Id. at 2476-80.
,- 705 F.2d at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
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The effect on competition factor was the "most troubling
and conceptually elusive of the three factors." '167 The critical
inquiry in determining whether the per se rule should be ap-
plied without judicial experience is whether the "practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease oUtpUt. ' ' 168 In support of this
broad statement from BMI, the court, citing Sylvania, 169
stated, "[T]hat departure from the rule-of-reason standard
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than...
upon formalistic line drawing." 170  With these concepts in
mind, the court turned to the contracts and analyzed them
for effect. 1 7  The conclusive factor was that the contracts did
not preclude competition amongst the parties, but actually
fostered competition by allowing both parties to compete in a
market from which they would have otherwise been fore-
closed. 72 To label theseperse would revert to the formalistic
line drawing eschewed by Sylvania.
The court then stated that where the effect on competition
is equivocal, a court is obliged to turn to an examination of
the purpose of the restraint.' 74 The teaming agreement was
at the Government's behest and had specific statutory ap-
proval. 175 The restraints were therefore not the type of "na-
ked restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling
competition."' 176 The court then went one step further and
held that "affiliated businesses cannot be held to conspire
with each other where they function as essentially a single-
economic unit," thus raising the spectre of the ancillary re-
straint doctrine. 177
,67 [d.
- Id. (emphasis added).
6 433 U.S. 36 (1977), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 94-99.
170 705 F.2d at 1052 (emphasis added) (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59).
17, 705 F.2d at 1052.
,72 Id. at 1052-53.
" Id. at 1053.
171 Id. See also BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
,7r, 705 F.2d at 1053. See supra note 5.
"7 705 F.2d at 1053 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
." Id. at 1053-54. While the court did not specifically use the phrase "ancillary
restraint," it was essentially reaffirming the Supreme Court's decision in United States
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The third factor-the reasonable use limitation-was the
final basis for justification of the rule of reason. 178 The court
stated that the limitation upon license technology was not a
per se violation if the technology was otherwise unavailable
creating a reciprocal license agreement. 179 Therefore, the
contracts between the parties were reciprocal license agree-
ments and as a result fell within the rule of reason.1 80
After establishing the rule of reason analysis as the appro-
priate test, the court confronted Northrop's attempt to mo-
nopolize claims.' 8 1  McDonnell here alleged implied
immunity while it had not specifically done so at the district
court level. 18 2 Because of the lack of decisions regarding the
immunity question in the military aircraft industry, the court
looked to other regulated industries and those cases involving
the implied immunity doctrine for aid.8 3 Applying the stan-
dards set out by the Supreme Court,'8 4 the court held the
application of blanket immunity was inappropriate.'85 In
particular the court quoted from an earlier decision:
Antitrust immunity is not conferred by the bare fact that de-
fendants' activities might be controlled by an agency having
broad powers over their conduct. There is no general pre-
sumption that Congress intends the antitrust laws to be dis-
placed whenever it gives an agency regulatory authority over
an industry. . .. [T]he area of immunity from antitrust laws
is not coterminous with areas of agency jurisdiction or agency
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of ancillary restraints.
,7a 705 F.2d at 1054.
179 Id. (relying upon A&E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th
Cir. 1968)).
- 705 F.2d at 1054.
lei Id.
182 Id. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that the district court did not directly
deal with the issue, but rather the lower court reasoned that because of the pervasive
governmental control, there was no trade or commerce as defined by the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1054-55. See Northrop, 498 F. Supp. at 1123. The Ninth Circuit held that this
was erroneous, and significant government control did not equal no trade or com-
merce. 705 F.2d at 1055.
, 705 F.2d at 1056.
184 Sea supra note 115-149 and accompanying text.
8r, 705 F.2d at 1056.
498 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
expertise. 186
Thus under the holding of that case and Armed Services
Procurement Regulation section 4-117(b) 187 the court held
that there was a sufficient basis to subject the actions of the
parties to antitrust scrutiny, and hence immunity was
improper. '8
III. CONCLUSION
In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,189 the Ninth
Circuit continued the current trend towards confronting anti-
trust issues. By holding that the teaming agreements between
Northrop and McDonnell did not come within political ques-
tion or act of state doctrines, the court was able to fully ana-
lyze the antitrust issue. The court, however, did not add to
the political question analysis or the act of state doctrine. It
merely used the established tests and determined that the
agreements between Northrop and McDonnell werejusticiable. '90
Futhermore, the court dismissed McDonnell's contention
that the agreements and its actions were protected by the im-
plied immunity doctrine. The court did so even though it
appeared that McDonnell was correct. The Government
does regulate the military aircraft industry so extensively that
the contractors must have the executive branch's approval
before acting. This is similar to the circumstances that lead
196 Id. (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d at 729 (9th Cir.
1982)).
1A7 Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 4-117(b) states that team-
ing agreements cannot violate the antitrust statutes. See supra note 5 for the full text of
section 4-117.
- 705 F.2d at 1057.
mg 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983).
- The use of the political question doctrine has faded in the recent years. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that the tapes of conversations on
matters related to Watergate were not protected by the political question doctrine even
though the evidence clearly met the Baker v. Carr test). At the same time the Act of
State doctrine has been limited by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (holding that the doctrine does not apply to
commercial obligations).
CASENOTES AND STA TUTE NOTES
the Supreme Court to grant the airline industry immunity. 9'
The Ninth Circuit refused to recognize this, probably because
of its express disdainment of the implied immunity doc-
trine.' 92 It is noteworthy that the agreements themselves
were not in violation of the antitrust laws, but rather the al-
leged actions of McDonnell were violative of the antitrust
laws. This coupled with the fact that the implied immunity
defense was raised only on appeal gave the court an opportu-
nity to deny immunity and turn to the restraint of trade
analysis.
On the surface, the decision appears to merely apply the
analysis delineated in BMI. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals
that the decision clears some of the confusion left by the
Supreme Court after BMI and Topco. 9 As pointed out, the
decision in BMI did not state whether the rule of reason
should generally apply to ancillary restraints. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has given new life to the proposition that the rule of rea-
son should apply to ancillary restraints. The agreements here
involved entirely ancillary restraints, and by holding that the
rule of reason should apply, the court has provided a founda-
tion for other courts to stand upon. On the other hand, the
court's emphasis on judicial experience in the particular in-
dustry may cause other courts to cast a wary eye on the deci-
sion before relying upon it. Even so, the Ninth Circuit has
taken the first step towards a return to the ancillary restraint
doctrine of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co 194 It is now
up to the other courts to recognize the importance of the case
and continue the process begun by the Ninth Circuit.
Bryan D. McCrogy
,9, See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan Am.
World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
,92 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
,9 See supra text accompanying note 114.
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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